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ABSTRACT  
 
Based on the Open Door Policy, the United States has pursued an informal empire 
based on spreading its economic influence by ensuring open access to vital goods and 
raw materials, and establishing military presence in areas of interest, as America’s 
corporate and strategic interests worked together in harmony. This approach has been 
especially evident in energy-producing regions, where the US seeks to establish 
economic and military dominance to support its global economic power.  
 
George W. Bush, like all his predecessors, pursued the Open Door Empire, especially 
with respect to access to foreign energy resources, which took on an even higher 
priority because of his ties to the oil industry and the belief that the US was suffering 
from an energy crisis and relative economic decline. Energy procurement was linked 
to his other foreign policy priority as he took office; military advancement.  
 
After the September 11 attacks, two other foreign policy priorities were established: 
the War on Terror, and global power projection. Bush used the War on Terror to 
implement the Open Door Policy and meld the four priorities. He used the military to 
solve America’s economic and energy problems by invading Afghanistan and Iraq to 
control vital energy routes and resources, both as an end in itself (due to the economic 
and corporate benefits to the US) and a means to other, greater ends (as control over 
global energy supplies strengthened America’s imperial status). The Bush Doctrine 
stipulated that in the War on Terror, the US should take the war to the enemy and 
spread democracy as a tool to combat terrorism. Invading Iraq was meant to 
 
 
demonstrate US military power, fight terrorism (based on the false claims of Saddam 
Hussein’s ties to al Qaeda), secure Iraq’s oil resources and rebuild the country, using 
Iraq’s oil revenues. Thus Iraq would become a democratic model for the Middle East 
and a substitute for Saudi Arabia as America’s main strategic ally and source of oil.  
 
Compared to the George H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations, the George W. 
Bush Administration is unique in two ways. First, it put energy resources at the fore 
of its foreign policy goals during his first days in office. Second, unlike previous US 
administrations that preserved undemocratic regimes in the Middle East to stabilize 
the region’s oil resources, the Bush Administration tried to democratise the region, 
using Iraq’s oil to rebuild the country into a democratic model.  
 
In pursuing these aims, the Bush Administration can be blamed for negligence, as it 
ignored warnings of post-war violence while planning for the Iraq war. The Bush 
Doctrine was too dependent on success in Iraq and on rebuilding the Iraqi oil sector. 
The post-war instability led to the failure of the Bush Doctrine’s plans for the region, 
meaning that the Bush Administration had to return to supporting undemocratic 
regimes in the Middle East. Despite endeavours to spread its global military power, 
promote global economic influence and diversify energy resources away from the 
Middle East, the US  will continue to suffer from relative decline and will be less 
energy secure than ever.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“I think that in the modern world, if you don’t understand the relationship between 
economics and politics, you cannot be a great statesman. You cannot do it with 
foreign policy and security knowledge alone.” 
    Henry Kissinger, April 1986.1 
  
“The national policy of the United States should aim at securing for American 
nationals access to the world’s oil resources.” 
Petroleum Industry War Council, December 1943.2  
 
“Security and economic considerations are inevitably linked and energy cannot be 
separated from either.”  
Richard Nixon, 1974.3  
 
“America imports 50% of its oil, more than 10 million barrels per day. And the figure 
is rising. This is dependence on foreign oil. And this dependence is a challenge to our 
economic security, because dependence can lead to price shocks and fuel shortages. 
And this dependence on foreign oil is a matter of national security. To put it bluntly, 
                                                 
1 Antonia Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: Invading the world, one economy at a time (London: Duckworth, 
2006): 162, from Leslie Gelb, “Kissinger means business”, New York Times, April 20, 1986.   
2 Ian Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: America’s Relentless Drive for Energy Security, (London: I. B. Tauris, 
2005): 30.  The Petroleum Industry War Council was an advisory group that served as a link between 
the US Government and the oil industry (ibid). 
3 Simon Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991): 
vii. 
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sometimes we rely upon energy sources from countries that don’t particularly like 
us.” 
George W. Bush, February 25, 20024 
  
With its control of the world’s most advanced military forces, nuclear arsenal, and 
with the US dollar as the global reserve currency, the United States emerged as the 
world’s strongest superpower after World War II. This position was reinforced with 
the fall of the Soviet Union in December 19915 making America, according to 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, “the first, only, and last truly global superpower,”6 as “never 
before in history has a single power been so paramount.” 7  
 
This prompted authors to refer to the United States as an “informal empire.” Susan 
Strange, for instance, argued that the reach of the United States’ economic clout and 
global business corporations turned it into a “non-territorial empire”: 
It is that non-territorial empire that is really the 
flourishing economic base of US power… The United 
States is still the largest and richest (and mostly open) 
market for goods and services under one political 
authority…The world-wide reach of US controlled 
enterprises means that the capacity of the United States to 
exercise extraterritorial influence and authority is greater 
than that of any other government.8  
 
 
                                                 
4 George W. Bush. “President promotes energy efficiency through technology”, White House, February 
25, 2002 [accessed March 2, 2008] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020225-
5.html. 
5 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower, 
(New York: Basic Books, 2008): 20-21.  
6 Zbigniew Brzezinksi, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, 
(New York: Basic Books, 1997): 215. Brzezkinski also said that America is “the world’s first truly 
global power” (Brzezinski, Second Chance: 20-21). 
7 Brzezinksi, Second Chance: 3.  
8 Susan Strange, “The future of the American empire”, in Richard Little and Michael 
Smith (eds.) Perspectives on World Politics (London: Routledge, 2006): 353. 
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In the words of Bill Emmott, the United States is “the mightiest colossus, in both 
absolute and relative terms, the world has ever seen,” adding that it is indeed an 
empire, although in the informal sense, i.e.: without having to occupy other countries 
like nineteenth-century Britain.9 Vassillis Fouskas and Bülent Gökay defined this 
American “neo-imperialism” in terms of global military bases and economic 
domination without the actual need to invade countries as much as in traditional 
colonialism.10 
 
This thesis is not proposing a new definition or interpretation of hegemony, 
imperialism or power. Instead, after an initial consideration of the role of economic 
factors in US global power, this thesis focuses on the role of energy resources, in 
particular the role of oil resources and the procurement of foreign oil, within the 
context of the relation between economic, geopolitical, and strategic factors in US 
foreign policy. A special focus is given to the George W. Bush Administration 
(January 2001 - January 2009). With a president and vice president (George W. Bush 
and Dick Cheney) coming from the energy industry, and with an American military 
invasion in two energy-rich regions (Central Asia and the Middle East) as a reaction 
to the September 11 attacks, there has been lots of talk about the imperial designs of 
the Bush foreign policy and the significance of energy resources within this imperial 
design.  
 
This thesis starts by arguing that in order to fully understand the role of foreign 
energy supplies in US foreign policy, a discussion of “American empire” is 
                                                 
9 Bill Emmott, 20:21 Vision: The Lessons of the 20th Century for the 21st (London: Penguin, 2003): 28-
29. 
10 Vassilis Fouskas and Bülent Gökay, The New American Imperialism: Bush’s War on Terror and 
Blood for Oil. (Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2005): 13, 74, 231-232. 
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incomplete if it does not engage with the role of economic factors in US power. Many 
analysts have written about the role of economic interests as a determinant of US 
foreign policy and a necessity for US imperialism. This thesis sets its historical 
analysis within the tradition of William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko and 
others on the informal Open Door empire and the role of business corporations in US 
foreign policy and energy security. Based on this tradition, this thesis argues that 
American politicians, intellectuals and businessmen always sought the continued 
overseas expansion of the American marketplace as a solution to America’s domestic 
economic problems, believing that the system of entrepreneurial capitalism could 
function successfully only if the marketplace constantly expanded, thus creating 
America’s global (economic) empire without traditional colonialism.11  
 
This global economic expansion was based on a marketplace conception, and on “the 
struggle for economic empire,” where the main strategy of American foreign policy 
became the Open Door Policy, which was introduced with the advent of the Open 
Door Notes of 1899 and 1900, written by US Secretary of State John Hay. His Open 
Door Notes were influenced by politicians and corporation directors who advocated 
an American empire based on the “corporation political economy,” or “the political 
economy of the large corporation,” and were based on the economic definition of the 
world (which assumed that overseas economic expansion was the solution for 
America’s social, political and economic problems). Thus, Hay wrote the Open Door 
                                                 
11 William Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study in the Growth and 
Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace society (New York: Vintage Books, 1970): xiv, 
Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 
1945-1954 (New York: Harper and Row Publishers 1972): 2, 8, 709, Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of 
War: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of 1943-1945 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969): 
294. 
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Notes to define America’s competition for empire,12 turning it into America’s version 
of the liberal policy of “informal empire” or “free trade imperialism,” where the US 
relied upon its economic power to control weaker or less developed nations, without 
the burdens and responsibilities of a formal annexation.13 However, despite not being 
a formal empire, the Open Door Policy had repercussions on US military policy 
abroad, as the Open Door Notes resulted in Washington sending troops to troubled 
areas around the globe, such as Morocco, Congo, Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, Venezuela, 
Brazil, Cuba and China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to ensure the 
security of America’s trade routes and economic interests14 and maintain America’s 
policy of “sustained expansion.”15 Thus, Williams argued that this “marketplace 
image or conception of the world… provided the dynamic causal force for a steady 
movement… towards an imperial foreign policy,” resulting in “the formulation of a 
grand strategy for such imperial expansion of the free American marketplace,”16 
becoming “the central feature of American foreign policy in the twentieth century.”17 
Williams added that “the large corporations (and their leaders) dominated American 
                                                 
12 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Norton: 1984): 45-
46, 229, William Appleman Williams, The Contours of American History (Chicago: Quarrangle Books: 
1966): 349, 368, 369, 370, 372 and passim and William Appleman Williams, “The Large Corporation 
and American Foreign Policy”, in David Horowitz (ed) Corporations and the Cold War (London: 
Monthly Review Press, 1969): 71-104. Among the advisers who influenced John Hay was Brooks 
Adams, who openly avowed his support of American imperialism by arguing that “great civilizations 
were created by conquering,” that “the centre of empire had reached the United States” in the 1890s, 
and therefore the United States had to accept the corporation political economy and tighten up its 
control of the Western Hemisphere and economic dominance in Asia (Williams, The Contours of 
American History: 364, 368.)  
13 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: 47, 96, 97 and Williams, The Contours of American 
History: 369. More specifically, John Hay’s Open Door Notes were “designed to secure equal 
opportunities for American economic power in such areas as China, and to prevent other advanced 
nations from carving up such regions into new colonies and spheres of influence” (Williams, “The 
Large Corporation and American Foreign Policy”: 80-81). It was later extended to other parts of the 
world (ibid: 87). 
14 Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: 246-247 and Williams, The Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy: passim. 
15 Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: xii. 
16 Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: 450. 
17 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: 59 and Williams, “The Large Corporation and 
American Foreign Policy”: 81.  
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history,” leading to America’s “overseas economic empire,”18 since the interests of 
businesses and US foreign policy overlapped.  
 
Gabriel Kolko, a student of Williams’,19 extended this analysis, citing that politicians 
and entrepreneurs support a “Hullian” view of the world, named after Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull (whose view of the world was based on Hay’s Open Door Policy), 
as Hull saw that free trade was the solution to American and global problems, 
believing that wars and economic crisis (like the Great Depression and World War II) 
have arisen from the lack of free trade and access to markets.20  
 
“In this fashion,” wrote Williams,  
[E]conomic expansion became both a means and an 
end for American policy-makers. Defined as a goal 
because of its vital importance to the continued success 
of the domestic economic system, it was also considered 
a means to build the empire of peace and prosperity 
which would secure the world for continued expansion 
in the years to come.21 
 
Kolko paid special attention to America’s increasing dependence on imports of raw 
materials to support its economy. America’s ability to procure such raw materials as it 
needed, and at prices it could afford, was “one of the keystones of its economic 
power” and maintaining these materials was “vital to the future of its mastery of the 
international economy.”22 
                                                 
18 Williams, The Contours of American History: 346, 347. 
19 Bradford Perkins, “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: Twenty Five Years After” in Williams, 
The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: 324. 
20 Kolko, The Politics of War: 244-248, 254, 265, 280 and Gabriel Kolko, Main Currents of Modern 
American History (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1976): 223, 350. Williams agreed that Hull 
was “a vigorous advocate of expanded exports and raw material imports” (Williams, The Contours of 
American History: 455). 
21 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: 129. 
22 Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971): 52, 55  
 and Kolko, Main Currents in Modern American History: 205. 
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 Paul Kennedy, too, cited William’s thoughts on the Open Door in his book The Rise 
and Fall of the Great Powers, where he said that the Open Door Policy was used to 
gain access to global markets as US producers feared that the domestic market might 
not be able to absorb the “hyperproductivity of American factories and farms.”23 So 
did Andrew Bacevich, saying that the “grand strategy” of the Open Door empire 
continued during the Cold War, and even after the Cold War as US presidents 
continued to push for global “openness” to spread America’s economic reach.24  
 
Naomi Klein and Stephen Kinzer agreed on Williams and Kolko’s general arguments, 
but they focued on violent change as a tool for promoting US economic/business 
interests. Klein argued that US foreign policy aimed to promote a policy of maximum 
privatisation through “shock treatment” and “disaster capitalism”: using violent 
regime change and other similar “disasters” to force change on target regions to 
impose US business interests, citing Chile in 1973 and Iraq in 2003 as examples.25 
Similarly, Stephen Kinzer, following Williams’ argument that the US needs economic 
expansion to foreign markets to survive,26 argued that “most [US-backed] regime 
change operations fit within the larger category of resource wars.”27  
 
                                                 
23 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict 
From 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana Press, 1989): 315-316, 318. 
24 Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy. 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002): 2, 3, 4 and Andrew J. Bacevich, “Tragedy renewed: 
William Appleman Williams”, World Affairs, Winter 2009 [accessed April 22, 2009] 
http://www.worldaffairs.org/2009%20-%20Winter/full-Bacevich.html.  
25 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (London: Penguin, 2008): 3-21. 
This policy was promoted by the late famous economist Milton Friedman (ibid). 
26 Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change From Hawaii to Iraq. (New 
York: Times Books, 2006): 34. 
27 Kinzer, Overthrow: 321. 
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Therefore, US foreign policy was based on expanding America’s free trade empire, 
where the interests of politicians went hand in hand with business interests, in what 
Williams calls the “political economy of the large corporation,”28 or what Kolko and 
David Painter called “corporatism”; a “public-private partnership” where people from 
large US corporations would temporarily leave their posts to work at the US 
Government, where they would continue to promote policies that would serve their 
previous industries (where there is usually no conflict of interest between government 
goals and business interests), then they would return to the US business sector once 
they leave government office.29 This was “a reflection as well as the cause” of US 
foreign policy, which expressed the common ideologies and interests of “the ruling 
class of American capitalism” which served as the “fount” of US foreign policy.30  
 
This thesis extends all of the above analysis on US empire, the Open Door policy, 
public-private partnership and “disaster capitalism” to US foreign policy on energy 
resources, specifically during the George W. Bush Administration, under which  oil 
considerations reached a level never seen before. To protect the interests of US 
business, the US Government intervened in foreign regions where there was no real or 
immediate threat to US national security, except that US business interests were 
threatened. I also argue that when the US Government intervened in such regions, it 
would use (over-exaggerated) threats (whether terrorism, weapons of mass destruction 
or any other threat), in order to rally the public opinion behind the intervention. Kolko 
                                                 
28 William Appleman Williams, “The Large Corporation and American Foreign Policy”: 71-104, and 
Williams, The Contours of American History: 368, 369, 370, 372 and passim.  
29 Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American Hisotry, 1900-1916 
(London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963): 3, Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: 5, 16, 
17, 18, 24-25, David Painter, Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of US Foreign Oil 
Policy, 1941-1954 (London: The John Hopkins Press Ltd, 1986) 1, 2 and Joseph R. Stromberg, “The 
Political Economy of Liberal Corporatism,” Center for Libertarian Studies, The Memory Hole, 1977 
[accessed February 15, 2009] http://tmh.floonet.net/articles/strombrg.html 
30 Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: 26. 
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argued that, in order to protect access to raw materials,31 the United States 
“intervened continuously in numerous, diverse ways in regions where [intern
political developments were] irrelevant to American security, save as they threaten
United States economic interests.”
al 
 
ked its 
                                                
32 Klein and Kinzer agreed that the US cloa
interventions abroad in the rhetoric of fighting a threat to US national security, even 
though the real aim was to promote US business interests abroad by overthrowing 
uncooperative foreign leaders.33 I also argue that Iraq was a case study for this 
phenomenon due to its oil resources.  
 
Oil lies at an intersection of politics and economics, due to the strategic importance of 
oil in the military and economic organization of society, the place of oil as the largest 
single component of world trade, the role of state-owned companies in the market, 
and the industry’s periodic instability.34 Oil historian Daniel Yergin argued that oil, as 
a commodity, is “intimately intertwined with national strategies and global politics 
and power,”35 and “has provided the point at which foreign policy, international 
economic considerations, national security and corporate interests would all 
converge.”36 Therefore, an attempt to argue for the relation between oil resources and 
US hegemony, argued Simon Bromley, “requires a high degree of cross-fertilization 
among the social sciences” of US foreign policy, security studies, and energy 
studies.37 As Susan Strange said, the political economy of the world energy system 
“seems to be a classic case of the no man’s land lying between the social sciences, an 
 
31 Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: 53, 55, 79, 85. 
32 Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: xvi. 
33 Kinzer, Overthrow, 3-4 and Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 309-310.  
34 Bromley, American  Hegemony and World Oil: 53, from Ernest J. Wilson III, “World Politics and 
international energy markets”, International Organization, 41, 1987: 125-149.  
35 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. (New York: Free Press, 1992): 
13. 
36 Yergin, The Prize: 410.  
37 Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil: 9. 
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area unexplored and unoccupied by any of the major theoretical disciplines.”38 There 
is a body of literature on the global energy system, but economic and international 
relations theories are ill-adapted to this field.39 Economists who attempt to apply 
economic theory to the energy market are challenged by the fact that energy markets 
are highly susceptible to strong forces that are essentially political in nature,40 while 
theorists in political science and international relations are unaccustomed to take 
account of the powerful market forces associated with the global oil market, and 
political theorists who work on security matters still tend to think of strategy as 
something related mainly to military security and defence policy, and not to energy 
policy.41  
 
Nevertheless, the limitations facing the studying of energy resources as a theoretical 
gap in social science is not the main argument of this thesis, which is more concerned 
with the historical question of how the procurement of foreign oil supplies was 
addressed in US foreign policy, especially under George W. Bush, with special focus 
on the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the negative impact of the Bush policy 
on the future of the American empire and its energy security.    
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ENERGY RESOURCES FOR US EMPIRE:  
 
Throughout the Cold War, and even after the Cold War was over, the significance of 
energy control influenced US policy initiatives. The prominent role of energy 
                                                 
38 Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil: 46, from Susan Strange, States and Markets, 
(London: Pinter, 1988): 191, and Susan Strange, States and Markets (second edition), (London: Pinter, 
1997): 195. 
39 Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil: 46.  
40 Strange, States and Markets (second edition): 194. 
41 Strange, States and Markets (second edition): 195. 
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resources in the American economic position has affected America’s geopolitical 
priorities, as many of the world’s largest reserves of oil are located in areas that are 
unstable or rife with internal divisions and destabilizing factors. Three major wars in 
recent US history, the Gulf War (1991), the war in Afghanistan (2001), and the 
invasion of Iraq (2003) were in oil producing regions and/or areas vital for energy 
distribution and transport routes. 
 
Some historians incorporated energy procurement in their narratives. William 
Appleman Williams included Middle East oil in his interpretation of American 
empire, with “the Open-Door expansion in the Middle East.” “Oil was the major 
objective of American policy” in the Middle East, reflecting “a successful example of 
corporate capitalism in action,” wrote Williams.42 Kolko, too, argued that oil, in 
particular, reflected America’s economic aims in relation to the Hullian theory of US 
economic objectives and the Open Door Policy.43  
 
This thesis argues that America’s (economic/informal) empire is based on controlling 
the global oil order. Bromley argued that, after World War II, the United States 
formed an “informal empire of American hegemony,” based on controlling the 
international oil order which was at the centre of American hegemony, displacing 
Great Britain as the dominant power over the Middle East and its oil reserves, with 
the help of the US major oil corporations who “played a central role in this 
                                                 
42 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: 160. Williams adds that “American leaders did not 
overlook the long-range importance of a new and as yet unrecognised [Middle Eastern] market of 
prodigious size” (Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: 159). 
43 Kolko, The Politics of War: 624. 
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strategy.”44 Similarly, Svante Karlsson’s Oil and the World Order: American Foreign 
Oil Policy, agreed that “the American-controlled world economic order was to a large 
extent built on the control of oil,” as United States control over the international oil 
market was:  
 
intimately interconnected with the control of the world 
economic order, which was established after the 
Second World War. Oil is and has been the most 
important single commodity in the present world order. 
It became the very vehicle on which the unprecedented 
economic expansion of the postwar world has been 
riding. Thus, the control of the international oil market 
was one of the most important keys to the control of the 
world order.45 
 
 
In addition to its importance for US power, energy is not just a goal in US foreign 
policy, it is also “a powerful tool of US foreign policy.”46 For instance, the United 
States used energy “as a weapon, by sanctions that deny US investors and markets to 
countries that threaten America.”47 Oil sanctions were used against the oil sectors of 
the “rogue states” like Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Libya and others. Also, the US interest in 
controlling oil is not limited to America’s own consumption, but also to denying it to 
others48 in order to use its control over energy resources to control the economic 
destinies of others. For instance, Noam Chomsky argued that the US has to control 
vital energy regions around the world, not necessarily for US consumption, but to 
                                                 
44 Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil: 48, 53, 106, 123, 245. Bromley adds that that “control 
of oil may be viewed as the centre of gravity of US economic hegemony.” (Simon Bromley, American 
Power and the Prospects for International Order (Cambridge: Polity, 2008): 105). 
45 Svante Karlsson, Oil and the World Order: American Foreign Oil Policy, (Warwickshire: Berg 
Publishers Limited, 1986): 279. 
46 Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, “Introduction”, in Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn (eds) 
Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy, (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre 
Press, 2005): 11. 
47 Bill Richardson, “Foreword”, in Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn (eds) Energy and Security: 
Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy, (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2005): xvii. 
48 Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 24. 
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control the supplies of other great powers in Europe and Asia.49 Similarly, Ian 
Rutledge argued that the US did not always aim to “steal the oil”, but to “control” it 
without having to own it.50 I therefore argue that control over oil resources in US 
foreign policy is both an end and a means for other ends. An end because it is 
necessary for US economic performance and US business profit. A means to other 
ends, because control over energy resources paves the way to US imperial influence, 
whether by controlling the supplies to other great powers, or (as in the case of Iraq) 
using oil revenues to rebuild Iraq into a pro-American model country in the Middle 
East to reshape the region, as we will see. 
 
LINK BETWEEN OIL INDUSTRY AND US GOVERNMENT: 
 
This thesis argues that the link between the US Government and the oil business is 
necessary to maintain control over the global oil system, maintain US empire, secure 
America’s oil interests and promote foreign policy decisions which advance the 
interests of the oil industry. Energy considerations and the need to control the global 
oil system affected the foreign oil policy of the United States during World War II 
and the Cold War, as the US Government and the US oil industry cooperated in what 
Painter called a “public-private partnership”, or a “symbiosis between public and 
private interests that safeguarded and advanced the private interests of the oil 
companies while furthering US efforts to control world oil reserves, combat economic 
                                                 
49 Noam Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions: Conversations with Noam Chomsky on the Post-9/11 World 
(London: Penguin Books, 2006): 6, 112, Noam Chomsky, Interventions (London: Penguin Books, 
2007): 46, 47, 77, 85, 112, 135, 202, 208, and Noam Chomsky and Gilbert Achcar, Perilous Power: 
The Middle East and US Foreign Policy (London: Penguin Books, 2008): 55-57.   
50 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: xi. He also adds the intersection of the Bush Adminsitration and the oil 
business interests (Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: xii, xiii). Rutledge argues that the US oil companies 
would not seek to own oil reserves in Iraq, but just to manage them through Production Sharing 
Agreements. US attempts to diversify outside the Middle East would not work, as other regions outside 
the Middle East, like the Caspian region and Latin America, do not have sufficient oil to satisfy the US 
economy. (Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 104-119). 
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nationalism, and contain the Soviet Union,” in accordance with US ideological 
aims.51 Based on his argument that the “ruling class of American capitalism” is the 
“fount” of US foreign policy,52 Kolko argued that since World War II, the US State 
Department  
 
 public interest 
which had been the functional basis of American 
foreign economic policy for decades.53 
the 
 
 where the interests of the US 
overnment and the US oil companies intersected.55  
                                                
completely identified the national interest with that of 
American oil firms operating abroad, not merely 
because numerous former oil industry executives 
occupied key posts in the department, but primarily due 
to traditional synthesis of private and
 
Attempting to extend its influence over Middle East oil, the United States invoked 
Open Door policy to abrogate agreements with Britain to limit US oil companies’
access to Middle East oil in the 1930s and 1940s, allowing the US companies to 
extend to oilfields traditionally managed by Britain.54 Also, both Painter and Kolko 
cited the Marshall Plan of 1947 as an evident example
g
 
51 Painter, Oil and the American Century: 1.  
52 Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: 26. 
53 Kolko, The Politics of War: 302. 
54 Kolko, The Politics of War: 294-313, Kolko, Main Currents in Modern American History: 202-203 
and Kolko and Kolko, The Limits of Power: 70-72, Painter, Oil and the American Century: 59, 199, 
202. 
55 Kolko and Kolko, The Limits of Power: 444, 447, Painter, Oil and the American Century: 155-156, 
and Karlsson, Oil and the World Order: 91. Without the Marshall Plan, “the American oil business in 
Europe would… have been shot to pieces” said Walter Levy, head of the Marshall Plan’s oil division, 
as the Marshall Plan purchased Middle East oil from American firms at the price of $2.65 a barrel, 
while Middle East oil cost only fifty cents per barrel (ibid). Levy used to work for Socony-Vacuum 
(the company later known as Mobil), but he resigned in July 1948 (Kolko and Kolko, The Limits of 
Power: 447). Oil was the largest single item on the dollar budget of most of the Marshall Plan 
countries, Due to the dominant position of the United States in petroleum equipment, technology, and 
shipping, and due to the dominant position of the US oil companies and the US dollar, Europe needed 
dollars to pay for its energy needs with imported oil. Thus, oil became one of the key commodities in 
the European Recovery Program (ERP). More than 10 percent of the total aid extended under the ERP 
was spent on oil, more than any other single commodity. This aid not only helped provide Europe with 
the energy it needed for recovery; it also served to maintain markets for US oil companies at a time 
when potential customers would otherwise have been unable to obtain the necessary dollars. This aid 
was especially important to the US oil companies operating in the Middle East, since most of their 
potential markets were in Western Europe.” (Painter, Oil and the American Century: 155-156). 
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 Anthony Sampson’s classic book on US oil corporations, The Seven Sisters,56 
extended this argument to the 1970s, arguing that besides invoking the Open Door 
policy to protect US oil business on several occasions during the first half of the 20th 
Century,57 the US Government provided diplomatic protection to the US oil busines
after World War II,
s 
 
 
idered 
ces 
 
58 where the US State Department would delegate diplomacy in 
the oil-producing countries, as far as possible, to the American oil corporations (due 
to the contradiction between Washington’s support for Israel and the need to woo the 
oil-producing Arabs.)59 However, the oil companies started to get weaker in 1970 due 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict (and the power of the Israeli lobby in Washington), and the
rising power of the oil-producing states.60 After the 1973 oil boycott, it became clear
that oil was too important to be left to the companies61 as the Western governments 
tried to come up with serious oil policies following the oil crisis.62 The US cons
invading Saudi Arabia’s oilfields in 1975, but rejected the idea due to the risks 
entailed.63 Energy conservation and regional diversification of foreign oil resour
would not decrease dependence on Middle East oil as desired. The best option, 
according to John Morrissey, was emphasizing military protection of Persian Gulf oil,
                                                 
56 This is the book which most other books on oil use as refernce to the historical relation between the 
ons. It is thus an authority on this subject. 
rs: The Great Oil Companies and The World They Shaped (Kent: 
84, 105, 108, 117, 118. 
f Aramco and the Saudi Kings (New York: 
the World 
US Government and US oil corporati
57 Anthony Sampson, The Seven Siste
Hodder and Soughton Limited: 1980): 82, 
58 Sampson, The Seven Sisters: 107. 
59 Sampson, The Seven Sisters: 115. 
60 Sampson, The Seven Sisters: 243, 259.  
61 Sampson, The Seven Sisters: 287. 
62 Sampson, The Seven Sisters: 324. 
63 Anthony Brown, Oil, God and Gold: The Story o
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999): 299-300, William Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: Oil, Iraq, and the 
Future of the Dollar (Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers, 2005): 43, Karlsson, Oil and 
Order: 250, and Sampson, The Seven Sisters: 314. 
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as seen in the Carter Doctrine of 1980, and its applications in the 1991 Gulf War and 
e 2003 invasion of Iraq. 64 th
 
 
OIL AFTER THE COLD WAR: 
 
With the end of the Cold War, competition over raw materials, especially oil a
energy resources, rose to a new level as ideological conflicts ceased. Yergin 
that “in the Cold War years, the battle for control of oil between international 
companies and developing countries was a major part of the great drama of 
decolonisation and emergent nationalism… With the end of the Cold War, a new 
world order [was] taking shape [where] economic competition, regional struggles and 
ethnic rivalries may replace ideology as the focus of international – and national – 
conflict.”  Along the same lines, Michael Klare’s Resource Wars argued that c
over resources would be a conspicuous feature of international security in the post-
Cold War world.  Among the US objectives after the Cold War, “none has so 
profoundly influenced American military policy as the determination to ensure US 
access to overseas supplies of vital resources,”  and none of these natural resourc
                                                
nd 
argued 
onflict 
es 
65
66
67
 
64 John Morrissey,  “The Geoeconomic Pivot of the Global War on Terror: US Central Command and 
the War in Iraq”, in David Ryan and Patrick Kiely (eds), America and Iraq: Policy-Making, 
at 
an Orientalism: The United States and the Middle 
 I.B. Tauris, 2005): 152). 
lare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Owl Books, 
Intervention and Regional Politics (Oxon: Routledge, 2009): 103-122. Also see Michael T. Klare, 
“Energy Security” in Paul D. Williams (ed), Security Studies: An Introduction. (Oxon: Routledge, 
2008): 487.  It could be argued that the Carter Doctrine was modelled on the Truman Doctrine of 1947 
and the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, as Brzezinksi told Carter that he “had the opportunity to do wh
President Truman did on Greece and Turkey”, and come up with a “Carter Doctrine” (Karlsson, Oil 
and the World Order: 262 and Douglas Little, Americ
East since 1945  (London:
65 Yergin, The Prize: 14.  
66 Michael K
2002): xiii.  
67 Klare, Resource Wars: 3. 
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was more likely to provoke conflict in the 21st Century than oil.   George H. W. B
used the 1991 Gulf War to protect the Gulf’s oil and assert the US position in the 
post-Cold War world. William J. Clinton’s policy on foreign energy was not very 
different from his predecessor’s, and he also used his wars in the Balkans to secure 
the region’s energy routes and to secure the Alba
68 ush 
nian-Macedonian-Bulgarian Oil 
MBO) pipeline, an investment by BP and Halliburton. 69 According to Bacevich, 
oth presidents were applying the Open Door Policy. However, George W. Bush took 
ice, and he had 
ry in oil-rich regions.   
(A
b
this to a new level as he prioritised energy during his first days in off
greater use for the milita
 
 
OIL, EMPIRE, THE INDUSTRY AND THE GEORGE W. BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION:  
 
Most importantly, the importance of oil in maintaining the US empire, and the 
importance of the public-private partnership in the oil industry, rose to a n
during the George W. Bush Administration. Bush has brought oil to the fore in US 
foreign policy making, raising the place of energy procurement in US foreign policy 
to a level never seen before. Bush introduced oil as a part of a strategic approach, for 
example,
ew height 
 through the National Energy Policy of May 2001 (on which his 
dministration started working only a few days after he took office), and through the 
                                                
a
 
68 Klare, Resource Wars: 27.  
69 Foiuskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 152-153, 174, Dan Briody, The Halliburton 
Agenda: The politics of oil and money (New Jersey: Wiley, 2004): 199, Chalmers Johnson, The 
Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic (London: Verso, 2006 edition): 
145-146, 155, Michel Collon, Media Lies and the Conquest of Kosovo: NATO’s Prototype for the Next 
Wars of Globalization (New York: Unwritten History: 2007): 6, 8, 29, 34, 35, 91, 93, 97, 99, 104, 105, 
107, 108, 112-114, 118, 121, 123, 124, 127-130, 134-136, 145, 154, 156, 172, 210 and Peter Dale 
Scott, “The Background of 9/11: Drugs, Oil and US Covert Operations”, in David Ray Griffin and 
Peter Dale Scott (eds) 9/11 and American Empire: Intellectuals Speak Out (Glouchestershire: Arris 
Books, 2007): 76. 
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invasion of Iraq, controlling its oil supplies and the role that Iraq’s oil revenues wer
meant to play in rebuilding Iraq and thus the whole Middle East into a pro-American
region.  
 
Furthermore, energy’s central role in the Bush Administration was linked to other 
foreign policy goals, such as promoting US hegemony and preponderance of power
(which was stated as a goal in the Quadrennial Defence Review of 2001), and military 
advancement, which was also a major goal of the Bush Administration as seen in 
promoting the National Miss
e 
 
 
ile Defence (NMD) system, with the War on Terror used 
s a justification to advance US energy interests. Because of the place of energy in 
 
in 
S 
administration in the history of the United States. This had put “oil capitalism” at the 
very heart of US power and high on the agenda of the Bush Administration, especially 
a
that pursuit for power, certain cases became central to the Bush approach (most 
notably Iraq), acting as what I call “points of intersection” where all of these goals 
were meant to be achieved.  
 
Bush had more ties to the energy industry than any other American administration in 
history, as he used to be an oil executive himself (albeit not a very successful one),
having established Arbusto, merged it with Spectrum 7, and worked at Harken 
Energy. Furthermore, the Bush family had strong ties to the oil industry. His vice 
president, Dick Cheney, used to be the CEO of Halliburton, and he had a great role 
devising the foreign and energy policies of the Bush Administration as he headed 
several important committees which devised these policies. Also, Bush’s government-
oil industry ties were affecting his foreign policy decisions. Many authors, including 
Ian Rutledge, argued that the Bush Administration was the most oil-dominated U
18 
 
that Bush was elected at a time when the interests of the US oil companies an
consumers were rapidly moving closer together, leading to a
d the oil 
 relentless drive for 
American Imperium” and “Energy Security” in the Middle East, due to the 
s 
 
 
. Juhasz’s main failure, however, was that 
e did not mention the invasion of Afghanistan or the US plans for Central Asian oil 
“
increasing dependence on imports from the Persian Gulf.70  
 
Antonia Juhasz, too, focused on the Bush-energy industry relations,71 where she 
linked the Bush Administration to US empire and oil, as she extended the 
combination of imperialism, corporatism and oil interests in what she called a “Bush 
Agenda,” or “corporate globalisation,” which she defined as global economic policie
designed to support key US multinational corporations by using military force, aiming 
for an American empire driven forward by US multinationals and military power,72 
whose main pillars are war, oil, imperialism and corporate globalisation.73 This policy
was not new, since it has been a part of US policy for decades. But Bush was unique 
in his use of military power to advance economic interests, taking it to a new, radical
level,74 as he thought that he could build a new American empire by invading Iraq 
and having US bases in the oil-rich region
sh
as a part of Bush’s global economic agenda.   
 
This thesis argues that Bush was aware that, as the United States was in a phase of 
relative economic decline, and due to the fact that in 1998 the US imported more than 
                                                 
70 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 7. For information on increasing US dependence on Middle East oil, see 
94, 131, 197. Rutledge mentioned the drive for the “American 
, Addicted to Oil: xiii and 11.  
z, The Bush Agenda: 7, 102, 310. 
Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 9, 93, 
Imperium” in the Middle East in Rutledge
71 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 6. 
72 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 4. 
73 Juhas
74 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 5-6. 
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50% of its oil75 (and it is forecasted that the US will import 100% of its oil by 
2050),76 it became more necessary to expand American economic reach and prom
the Open Door policy for American business through military expansion.
ote 
 Paul 
 
 country’s power to defend them all simultaneously.79 
e also defined “imperial overstretch” in the context of “relative” economic change, 
 
e 
lish 
he 
                                                
77
Kennedy famously argued that US power is declining, as its relative economic 
strength is declining,78 and that the US is now suffering from what he calls “imperial 
overstretch,” where the sum total of the United States’ global interests and obligations
is nowadays far larger than the
H
compared to other nations.80  
 
The perception of the inevitable relative economic decline of the United States made 
it even more necessary to transform the rest of the world in America’s image.81 This 
was why, after Iraq, Bush wanted to extend his agenda to the Middle East region, in
order to expand the American empire,82 as seen in his plans to democratise the whol
region, and establish a Middle East Free Trade Agreement (MEFTA). Fouskas and 
Gökay argued that the relative decline in US economic power led to promoting the 
role of the US military to reshape the world (as seen in Central Asia and the Middle 
East after the September 11 attacks to control vital oil routes in Eurasia).83 Chomsky 
and Chalmers Johnson argued that the invasion of Afghanistan was meant to estab
US bases close to Central Asia’s oil-rich region and help secure the region to build t
 
, 2004): 13, 56 and Rutledge, Addicted to 
1. 
he Great Powers: 316.  
e Great Powers: 665-666. 
ut: Praeger Security International, 2005): 71, 72, 136, 231. 
75 Michael Klare, Blood and Oil, (London: Hamish Hamilton
Oil: 9. 
76 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 130.  
77 Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 7
78 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of t
79 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of th
80 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: xv. 
81 Bromley, American Power: 2.  
82 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 8, 9. 
83 Vassilis Fouskas and Bülent Gökay, The New American Imperialism: Bush’s War on Terror and 
Blood for Oil. (Connectic
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Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) pipeline and other important pipeline 
projects.84 Similarly, Michael Klare,85 Fouskas and Gökay,86 and Lutz Kleveman87 
argued that the invasion of Afghanistan, and the establishment of US bases in the 
region for the first time, were beneficial for America’s energy interests in the Caspian 
region. Ahmed Rashid88 and Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquié argue that 
e Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations initially negotiated with the Taliban 
on 
ter 
uadrennial Defence Review (QDR) of September 2001.91  
here were “points of intersection” where the four strands met, such as the invasion 
th
over Osama bin Laden and over the TAP pipeline.89  
 
Beyond the invasion of Afghanistan, the September 11 attacks had their influence 
Bush’s foreign policy agenda. When Bush first came to office, argued Klare, his 
foreign policy agenda sought two foreign policy goals, or strands; military power 
preponderance, (as seen in the NMD system), and foreign energy procurement. Af
September 11, argued Klare, a third strand was added, which is the war on terror.90 
Based on Klare’s analysis, however, I add a fourth strand, which is global power 
projection as seen in the Q
T
of Afghanistan and Iraq.  
                                                 
84 Noam Chomsky, The Essential Chomsky (London: The Bodley Head, 2008.): 345 and Chalmers 
Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic, (London: Verso, 
2006 edition): 151-185. 
85 Klare, Blood and Oil: 152-179.  
86 Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 150-160. 
87 Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (London: Atlantic Books, 
2004): passim. 
88 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords (London: Pan MacMillan, 2001): 128-
217. 
89 Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquié, Forbidden Truth: US-Taliban Diplomacy and the 
Failed Hunt for Bin Laden (New York: Nation Books, 2002): passim. 
90 Michael Klare, Blood and Oil, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2004): 72-73 and Michael Klare 
“Resources” in John Feffer (ed) Power Trip: US Unilateralism and Global Strategy After September 11 
(New York: Severn Stories Press, 2003): 50-51. 
91 “Quadrennial Defence Review Report”, September 30, 2001, US Department of Defence, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ 
qdr2001.pdf#search='quadrennial%20defence%20review%202001'. 
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 Furthermore, After the September 11 attacks and the invasion of Afghanistan, Bush 
introduced the Bush Doctrine, which was America’s first attempt at a grand strategy 
nce the end of the Cold War. The four strands of the Bush Administration’s foreign 
nited 
e 
al 
 
 
er 
 
uild 
                                                
si
policy (energy procurement, military advancement, anti-terrorism and global power 
projection)92 were reflected in the Bush Doctrine.  
 
The Bush Doctrine was divided into several main elements or ideas. First, America 
was at war with global terrorism. Second, offence is the best defence, thus the U
States should take the war to the enemy using pre-emptive strikes. Third, the doctrin
gave the United States the freedom to act alone, so as not to be tied with multilater
commitments. Fourth, the US was committed to maintaining its position as the 
world’s sole superpower. Finally, the Doctrine stated that the United States should
spread democracy in the Middle East as a means to fight terrorism.93 The foreign
policy goals (or strands) of anti-terrorism, military preponderance and global pow
projection were clear in this definition of the Bush Doctrine. In an unprecedented 
manner, this thesis argues that the oil strand is also present in the Bush Doctrine 
(despite denials by the Bush Administration) because, first, US global influence 
depends on control of global oil resources, and, second, the neo-conservative plans for
democracy in the Middle East were unattainable without Iraq’s oil revenues to reb
Iraq into a model democratic country for the Arabs to follow (as the Iraqi economy 
 
92 Michael T Klare, “Resources”, in John Feffer (ed.) Power Trip: US Unilateralism and Global 
Strategy After September 11 (New York, Seven Stories Press, 2003): 50-51 and Klare, Blood and Oil: 
72-73.  
93Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol, The War Over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s 
Mission (California: Encounter Books: 2003): 73-74, 112, John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial 
Ambition: The Lures of Preemption”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2002, Vol. 81 Issue 5  and 
Adrian Wooldridge, “Can the Bush doctrine last?” from “After Bush: A special report on America and 
the world”, The Economist, March 29, 2008.  
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was too dependent on oil revenues, and a strong democracy could not be built in Iraq
without the oil revenues). Furthermore, this thesis aims to provide an alternative 
framework for thinking about US foreign policy and neo-imperialism in relation to
global oil r
 
 
esources, and to analyse the link between energy resources and other US 
oreign policy strands of military preponderance, global power projection and anti-
rrorism in the foreign policy approach of the Bush Administration and the Bush 
f
te
Doctrine. 
 
 
THE INVASION OF IRAQ:  
 
This thesis argues that the invasion of Iraq was not for anti-terrorist goals or alleged 
weapons of mass destruction (as the Bush administration claimed), as Iraq did not 
actually pose any immediate or real threat to US security. Rather, the Bush 
Administration used these claims to cover up for its real aims; controlling Iraq’s oil 
resources (although not necessary for US consumption, but to control oil supplies to 
other great powers), and build military bases in the region to protect oil interests. Th
invasion also aimed to rebuild Iraq, using its oil resources and revenues, to tur
a strong and stable pro-American country to act as a model for the rest of the regio
thus decrease US dependence on Saudi Arabia for oil and strategic assistance, and 
also secure Israel. Bromley argued that the war aimed to stabilize the “arc of 
instability” (the region which runs from the Middle East through Central Asia to 
e 
n it into 
n, 
Northeast Asia),94 and use military power to provide for open, liberal international 
                                                 
94 Bromley, American Power: 132, 134, 135-138. 
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economic order and open oil industry.  Ian Rutledge argued, within the context of the 
reasons mentioned above,  that oil was the “most important factor” for the invasion 
of Iraq, although not to “steal the oil”, but to “control” it without having to own it,  
in addition to the neo-conservative desire remake the Middle East and establish a 
“new American Imperium in the Middle East: one in which American-selected local 
rulers would invite American oil companies to make super-profits for American
investors under the protective shield of the American military, while at the same time 
satisfying the voracious demands of the motorized American oil consumer.”  
Rutledge’s weakness was that he did not analyse Bush’s National Energy Policy 
(NEP), the plan devised by oil industry executives and Bush Administration officials 
in May 2001 to advise Bush on domestic and foreign energy policy, as much as 
Michael Klare did.  Also, Rutledge did not link the different strands of Bush’s 
foreign policy as deeply as Klare did. However, Ru
95
96
97
 
tledge’s analysis of Washington’s 
lans for Iraq’s oil focused on “Production Sharing Agreement” contracts,100 which 
ar aimed 
98
99
p
Klare missed out, (the significance of which will be discussed in detail).  
 
Noam Chomsky, Chalmers Johnson and Stephen Pelletière argued that the w
to strengthen the system of US control over the region’s oil resources, and to 
strengthen what Johnson calls an “empire of bases” near vital oil routes and 
                                                 
95 Bromley, American Power: 142.  
96 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: xii, 11, 155-157, 198.  
o added the intersection of the Bush Adminsitration and the oil 
icted to Oil: xii, xiii). Rutledge argued that the US oil companies 
q, but just to manage them through Production Sharing 
e 
 US 
97 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: xi. He als
business interests (Rutledge, Add
would not seek to own oil reserves in Ira
Agreements. US attempts to diversify outside the Middle East would not work, as other regions outsid
the Middle East, like the Caspian region and Latin America, do not have sufficient oil to satisfy the
economy. (Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 104-119). 
98 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: xiii, 11. 
99 Klare, Blood and Oil: 59-73. 
100 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 184-185. 
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resources.101 Similarly, Roger Burbach and Jim Tarbell argued that Bush’s wars 
aimed to advance the interests of a “petro-military complex” and to advance the Op
Door policy in the 21st Century.
en 
 
d 
er 
 
ril 
,” 
ld be “only marginal.”106 However, both Klein and Kinzer 
102 Klein argued that Iraq fitted the “shock doctrine”
formula, as Washington was concerned over Saddam’s oil contracts with Russian, 
French and Chinese oil companies.103 Linking “disaster capitalism” and the war on 
Iraq to American neo-imperialism, she claimed that the Washington “hawks” and neo-
conservatives, in addition to a “disaster capitalism complex,” (all of whom were allie
on a US imperial/military/neo-conservative project), were “committed to an imperial 
role for the United States in the world and for Israel in the Middle East.” She added 
that “nowhere has the merger of these political and profit-making goals been clear
than [in] Iraq.”104 She cited an interview that right-wing economist Milton Friedman,
the father of the “shock doctrine,”105  had with German magazine Focus in Ap
2003, where he said that the war would “undoubtedly stimulate the [US] economy
that “US President Bush only wanted war because anything else would have 
threatened the freedom and prosperity of the US,” that Bush “didn’t even have to 
consult the UN at all” regarding the war because “the end justifies the means,” and 
that the cost of the war wou
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The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic, (London: Verso, 2006 
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(London: Zed Books, 2004): 51, 128-
103 Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 313.  
104 Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 322.  
105 Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 11, 56-57, 253. 
106 Christian Euler, “Resurrect Erhard”, The Shock Doctrine, April 7, 2003 [accessed January 5, 2010]
http://www.naomiklein.org/shock-doctrine/resources/milton-friedman-war-iraq. For the German 
original, please see Von Christian Euler, “Lasst Erhard auferstehen”, Focus, April 7, 2003 [accessed 
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Interestingly, in July 2006, Milton Friedman had an interview with the Wall Street Journal, where
said that he “was opposed to going into war from the beginning” because it was an “aggre
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briefly discussed the role of oil in invading Iraq, but they do not tackle it in the deta
which this thesis intends.  
 
107
108
il 
Ron Suskind’s account of Paul O’Neill’s time in the Bush Administration was an 
important insider’s account of Bush’s first days in office and his initial focus on Iraq, 
as “Iraq might be the key to reshaping the entire [Middle East].”  Maps of Iraq’s 
oilfields which, according to O’Neill, were used by Secretary of Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld  were the same maps used by Vice President Dick Cheney as he laid out 
the National Energy Policy (NEP) of May 2001 (as revealed by court order, as shall 
be discussed), showing that energy procurement had a military dimension. O’Neill’s 
accounts were supported by Greg Palast’s BBC Newsnight interviews with oil 
executives.   
 
Apart from invading Afghanistan and Iraq to establish military presence in oil-rich 
regions, this thesis argues that the invasion of Iraq also meant to protect the 
petrodollar system form the euro threat. US influence over the global oil order is 
supported by two factors on which the US position in the world economy depended. 
The first factor is the interdependence between the oil industry and US hegemony in 
ensuring US energy security, US global power based on control of oil resources, and 
the interests of the corporations,  (reflecting Williams and Kolko’s business-
government relations). Second, the dominant role of the US dollar in international 
financial and monetary relations is linked to the fact that, since the end of World War 
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II, the US dollar became the primary currency used in the international oil trade. (T
was further facilitated by the agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia in 1974-
1975, which stipulated that OPEC would price oil exclusively in US dollars; the so-
called “petrodollar agreement”).
his 
 dollar; the United States), thus preserving the 
ollar’s high liquidity value and America’s strong economy,113 and allowing the US 
y 
illiam 
 
as the sole superpower rests upon two pillars; first, its overwhelming military 
                                                
111 This helped create a global demand for the US 
dollar,112 as every nation sought to maximize its dollar holdings (by buying dollar-
based assets from the “issuer” of the
d
to create credit114 to finance its huge deficit while other countries accept the dollar as 
the global medium of exchange.115 Thus, the US dollar as a dominant global currenc
gets its power from the oil system.  
 
Vassilis Fouskas and Bülent Gökay linked US neo-imperialism to control over global 
oil resources, the role of the US dollar and petrodollar, military preponderance and 
the threat from the euro as an alternative currency in the international oil trade (the 
so-called “petroeuro”) to the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency.116 W
Clark wrote along the same lines.117 They argued that America’s dominant position
 
as necessary as there were fears that OPEC was discussing the pricing of oil in a 
 
2-33. Petrodollar recycling works because every nation around the 
dings to import oil (Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: 32). As nations 
r-assets from “the issuer”: the United States, who “controls the dollar and prints it at fiat” 
ror and 
t: Praeger Security International, 2005).  
 
Publishers, 2005). 
111 Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: 20, 21, 30 and Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 
17-18. The 1974-75 w
basket of currencies, as the dollar was falling in value due to the financial strains of the Vitenam War 
(Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: 20, 30). 
112 Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 18. Also see Bromley, American Hegemony
and World Oil: 241. 
113 Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: 22, 3
world needs to maximize its dollar hol
seek to maximize their dollar holdings, “they do not just stack all these dollars in their vaults”, they 
purchase dolla
(Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: 32).   
114 Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: 22. 
115 Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: 28. 70% of global trade is conducted in dollars (Clark, Petrodollar 
Warfare: 32). 
116 Vassilis Fouskas and Bülent Gökay, The New American Imperialism: Bush’s War on Ter
Blood for Oil. (Connecticu
117 William Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: Oil, Iraq, and the Future of the Dollar (Gabriola Island: New
Society 
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superiority and, second, its influence over the global economic system through the
unique role of the dollar as the world’s reserve c
 
urrency,118 where America’s entire 
onetary supremacy depends on dollar “recycling”;119 the operation by which oil 
t 
e 
skas and Gökay briefly mentioned the 
eo-conservative dream to use Iraq as a model for the rest of the region to weaken 
 
11 
and 
                                                
m
exporting countries receive payments for petroleum exports in US dollars, then inves
these petrodollars in US and European banks.120  
 
This thesis argues that Saddam’s decision in November 2000 to switch the payment 
for Iraqi oil exports from US dollars to euros was one of the reasons for the US 
invasion of Iraq, which aimed, among other things, to return Iraq’s oil exports to th
dollar system.121 However, while Clark and Fou
n
OPEC, secure Israel, fight terrorism and impose a pro-US agenda, they gave only 
little attention to these neo-conservative goals.  
 
Finally, I believe that the Open Door Policy and the thoughts of William Appleman 
Williams were still relevant under the George W. Bush Administration. This was seen
in the increased American military involvement in the world after the September 
attacks to make up for economic decline, especially with the wars in Afghanistan 
Iraq, and as Washington (especially under the Bush Administration) replaced access 
 
rs, 
est these dollars back in the US, 
h 
one account; the Federal Reserve in New York” One commentator says that as long as oil is traded 
118 Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: 17, 27-28, 34, and Fouskas and Gökay, The New American 
Imperialism: 11-37. 
119 Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: 28 and 33, and Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 
11-37.  
120 Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: 21-31 and Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 19, 30-
31. According to Clark, Japan, for instance, would export goods to the US, receive payment in dolla
then use these dollars to buy oil from the Gulf States who would inv
and this is why it is called “petrodollar recycling”. He added that “70% of Saudi Arabia’s entire wealt
is in 
in dollars, and the US can print them on fiat, then the US has its own “money tree” (Simon Reeve, 
“Conspiracy Theories: Iraq”, Sky1, January 10, 2007, 22:00 GMT) 
121 Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: passim and Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 25-
27. 
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to Asian (and Chinese) markets with access to Persian Gulf oil through building 
military bases in and around Afghanistan and Iraq. 122  Some authors did link the 
Open Door to Bush’s oil policies. For instance, former CIA analyst Stephen Pelletièr
argued that Bush’s War on Terror was a “variant” of the Open Door Policy to expand 
the US empire,
e 
t briefly. Similarly, Burbach and Tarbell argued that Bush’s 
ars aimed to advance the interests of a “petro-military complex” and to advance the 
Open Door policy in the 21st Century,124 eir analysis did not focus on energy 
e after the end of the Cold War, but that, in 
oth policies, oil did not rise to the level it did with the George W. Bush agenda. This 
 
123 but he did not go into the details of the origins of the Open Door, 
and he only mentioned i
w
 but th
and oil resources like I do.  
 
* * * 
Chapter One focuses on the role of oil and energy resources in the New World Order 
of George H. W. Bush, and in the Engagement and Enlargement policy of William J. 
Clinton, where I argue that both administrations proceeded with the Open Door 
policy, that oil did increase in significanc
b
was also the period where the US paid more attention to Caspian oil as an alternative
to diversify away from Middle East oil.  
 
Chapter Two focuses on the George W. Bush Administration before September 11, 
where I argue that oil and Iraq were among Bush’s highest priorities since his first 
days in office. This was due to more ties to the oil industry than any other US 
                                                 
122 Andrew J. Bacevich, “Tragedy renewed: William Appleman Williams”, World Affairs, Winter 2009 
ccessed April 22, 2009] http://www.worldaffairs.org/2009%20-%20Winter/full-Bacevich.html, and 
homas McCormick “What would William Appleman Williams say now?” History News Network, 
September 24, 2007 [accessed April 22, 2009] http://hnn.us/articles/42971.html. 
[a
T
123 Pelletière, America’s Oil Wars: 137. 
124 Roger Burbach and Jim Tarbell, Imperial Overstretch: George W. Bush and the Hubris of Empire 
(London: Zed Books, 2004): 51, 128-129, 199, 202.   
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administration, America’s increased dependence on oil imports and pressure from the 
military hawks and neo-conservatives for more focus on Iraq. I also argue that the
foreign policy aims of energy procurement and military advancement were “melded” 
under Bush, as seen in official documents. 
 
Chapter Three focuses on the effect of 9/11 and the addition of the war on terror as a
primary goal of the Bush Administration, in addition to global power projection 
which was mentioned in the QDR of September 30, 2001. I argue that the invasion o
Afghanistan was a point of intersection of all foreign policy strands of oil 
procurement, military advancement, anti-terrorism and global power projection, 
although the Bush Adminis
 two 
 
f 
tration did not have plans to remake Central Asia, like it 
id with the Middle East. I also argue that the Bush Administration used 9/11 as an 
point of 
 
ceptional 
d
“opportunity” to promote an invasion of Iraq, which would also serve as a 
intersection of all strands, in addition to the neo-conservative goal of reshaping the 
Middle East into a pro-American mould to secure Israel, fight terrorism and open
markets for US business.  
 
Chapter Four focuses on the invasion of Iraq, where I argue that the Bush 
Administration secured its grip on the Iraqi economy (and its oil) to open ex
opportunities for US business. However, the plan for Iraq failed due to the Bush 
Administration’s failure to plan properly for post-invasion Iraq.  
 
Finally, I argue that, due to failure in Iraq, and due to the financial strain of the war, 
the US got weaker in terms of global clout and in terms of energy security. 
Furthermore, the diversification of US energy supplies away from the Middle East 
30 
 
will fail, as all other regions have less resources than the Middle East, and are not 
necessarily very stable or friendly towards the US. I also argue that the US is facing 
strong competition over energy resources from rising powers like China and Russia 
(in fact, China was the first country to sign an energy deal with Iraq after the 
invasion), and that the Bush Administration still followed an ad-hoc, case-by-case 
approach in foreign policy towards the Middle East and other oil producing regions, 
as Iraq failed to provide the US with the strategic and energy security that it aimed for 
(with a coda on the Obama Administration, to further explain the consequences and 
legacy of Bush’s policies).
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 CHAPTER ONE 
 
FOREIGN ENERGY RESOURCES IN THE POST-COLD 
WAR DECADE:  
THE DEMOCRACY CONUNDRUM, REGIONAL 
DIVERSIFICATION, AND AN AD HOC POLICY ON 
ENERGY RESOURCES 
 
 
 
“I put it this way. They got a president of the United States that came out of the oil 
and gas industry, that knows it and knows it well.” 
George H. W. Bush, on the eve of his 
inauguration as President.1  
 
 
“Prosperity at home depends on stability in key regions with which we trade or from 
which we import critical commodities, such as oil and natural gas.” 
William J. Clinton, December 1999.2  
 
 
During his State of the Union speech in February 1989, President George H. W. Bush 
expressed optimism that “we meet at a time of extraordinary hope... And it's a time of 
great change in the world.”3 Despite this optimism, however, there were authors who 
thought that the new world was rife with instability. Charles Krauthammer challenged 
                                                 
1 Yergin, The Prize: 753. 
2 Klare, Resource Wars: 8-9. 
3 George H. W. Bush, “Address on administration goals before a joint session of Congress”, The 
American Presidency Project, February 9, 1989 [accessed October 19, 2006] 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16660 
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the conventional wisdom which said that the threat of war would decrease after the 
fall of the Soviet Union,4 arguing that Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and 
plans to develop weapons of mass destruction using his oil wealth were proof that the 
threat of war did not decrease, and that weapons of mass destruction were 
increasingly a global threat. Moreover, said Krauthammer, Iraq was not the only state 
seeking weapons of mass destruction; so were Syria, North Korea, Libya and Iran, 
arguing that the post-Cold war era could be called the era of weapons of mass 
destruction.5  Michael Cox agreed that the end of the Cold War made the world more 
complicated, due to the great shifts in the balance of global power, politically as well 
as economically, which made it more difficult for policymakers to come up with 
solutions to global problems.6 Bush himself would say during his State of the Union 
speech in January 1992: “As we seek to build a new world order in the aftermath of 
the Cold War… the enemy we face is… instability itself.”7 Moreover, William J. 
Clinton added during his presidential campaign that the factors which could make the 
new era a time of peace were the same factors which could make it a time of 
uncertainty and increased danger.8 
 
On the other hand, the end of the Cold War, despite ushering in a more complex 
world, has also ushered in the Age of Globalisation, where doors were open for the 
free movement of US capital, trade, principles and culture. The two American 
administrations which presided during the post-Cold War decade (the George H. W. 
                                                 
4 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment”, Foreign Affairs, Volume 70 Number 1, 1991: 23, 
24.  
5 Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment”: 28-31.  
6 Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Superpower Without A Mission? (London: 
Pinter, 1995): 4.  
7 George H. W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union”, The 
American Presidency Project, January 28, 1992 [accessed October 19, 2006] 
http://www.presidency.uscb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=20544 
8 James Boys, An Evaluation of Engagement and Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine (1993-1997), 
PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, July 2006: 1. 
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Bush and William J. Clinton Administrations) were similar in that they both pursued a 
policy of global economic openness. Thus, an American policy of global economic 
openness replaced the policy of Containment, (although, as seen in the writings of 
William Appleman Williams, Bush and Clinton did not invent openness; they just 
revived a strategy that predated the Cold War by several decades.)9  
 
Even though George H. W. Bush failed to come up with a foreign policy “vision” and 
failed to uphold the New World Order, he did adhere to the patterns identified by 
William Appleman Williams. Similarly, Clinton’s doctrine of Engagement and 
Enlargement followed Bush’s footsteps on emphasizing global openness and free 
trade and investment as prerequisites for prosperity at home, as Bush pushed for 
NAFTA and APEC, and Clinton continued on this path, again building on Williams’ 
views. Openness was also a matter of national security, as Larry Summers, Clinton’s 
Treasury Secretary, argued that trade promoted peace among nations, and that the 
American market was saturated and the American economy could not grow without 
the international market.10  
 
This shows that both Bush and Clinton followed on with a global Open Door 
imperialism, based on corporatism, or the political economy of the large corporation, 
or a corporate globalisation policy. In both administrations, the US military had a 
great role in supporting the American policy of openness in regions critical to the 
strategy of openness, like the Persian Gulf and Asia-Pacific, as Secretary of Defence 
                                                 
9 Bacevich, American Empire: 36, 38-39, 88, 90 and passim.  
10 Baecvich, American Empire: 71, 73, 85, 86.  
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William Cohen said that “economists and soldiers share the same interest in 
stability.”11  
 
While Bush and Clinton tried to come up with global doctrines - Bush’s New World 
Order and Clinton’s Engagement and Enlargement - which promoted American global 
leadership, a policy of democratisation and promotion of market openness, both 
doctrines failed to promote democracy in the Middle East, due to the Democracy 
Conundrum, which is the fear that attempts on democratisation or political reform 
would threaten the stability of the pro-American, oil-producing Gulf regimes.12 
Another name for this phenomenon is the “Arab despotic exception”, where America 
opposes democracy in the Middle East due to fears over oil supplies, and the fear that 
anti-American parties might win elections.13 Thus, Bush and Clinton’s strategy of 
openness did not apply to the Middle East, where Washington’s aim was to maintain 
the status quo, fearing that attempts to change the region would threaten the flow of 
oil.14 Also, both had a policy of regional diversification of energy resources away 
from the Middle East. For example, NAFTA, which gave much attention to North 
American energy cooperation,15 started in the Bush era, and US energy companies 
were in the Caspian region since 1991,16 and Clinton followed through with this 
diversification policy.     
 
                                                 
11 Bacevich, American Empire: 126, 127, 128. 
12 Maria Do Ceau Pinto, Political Islam and the United States: A Study of U.S. Policy Towards Islamist 
Movements in the Middle East, (Ithaca Press, 1999): x.   
13 Noam Chomsky and Gilbert Achcar, Perilous Power: The Middle East and US Foreign Policy 
(London: Penguin Books, 2008): 42.  
14 Bacevich, American Empire: 106.  
15 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 80-101. 
16 Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquié, Forbidden Truth: US-Taliban Diplomacy and the 
Failed Hunt for Bin Laden. (New York: Nation Books, 2002): 15.  
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Also, both initially supported an anti-democratic regime which was vital for 
America’s oil supplies, which later turned out to be anti-American, as Bush initially 
supported Saddam Hussein in order to promote the interests of American oil 
corporations, before the invasion of Kuwait, and urged Iran to stop its anti-American 
and anti-Iraq behaviour in the region. Similarly, Clinton supported the Taliban, in 
order to promote the TAP gas pipeline which American corporations were building in 
the region,17 before the 1998 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. They both maintained 
oil sanctions on other rogue states. Thus, both administrations had an ad hoc policy on 
foreign energy resources. They also both followed what David Painter called the 
“public-private partnership” in the field of energy, where the US Government 
promotes and protects the aims of the oil industry, in order to secure America’s 
national and energy security.  
 
With the end of the Cold War, and as George H. W. Bush succeeded Ronald Reagan 
as President of the United States, Yergin argued that “the confrontations of the future 
would surely become global competitions for money and markets”18:  
 
The competition among nations in the years ahead, 
some predicted, would no longer be ideological but 
instead primarily economic… If that would be the case, 
oil as a fuel would certainly remain a vital commodity 
in the economies of both the industrialized and the 
developing nations of the world. As a bargaining chip 
among the producers and consumers of oil, it would 
also remain of paramount importance in the politics of 
world power.19 
 
                                                 
17 Rashid, Taliban: 154, 163 and 176. 
18 Yergin, The Prize: 769. 
19 Yergin, The Prize: 768. 
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Similarly, Michael Mandelbaum wrote that “as security issues lose some of their 
previous significance, economic questions will assume a new international 
importance… Promoting capitalism, then, is a plausible goal for American foreign 
policy in the post-Cold War world.”20 
 
A leading author who agreed that conflicts after the Cold War were mainly over 
resources, especially oil, was Michael Klare. He wrote in Resource Wars (2002) that 
resources were always critical to US foreign policy, but during the Cold War, their 
emphasis in US foreign policy diminished as attention to Europe and Asia increased. 
After the end of the Cold War, the issue of resources reassumed their central role in 
US military planning.21 Among the US objectives after the Cold War, “none has so 
profoundly influenced American military policy as the determination to ensure US 
access to overseas supplies of vital resources,” especially Persian Gulf oil, on which 
US dependence is growing, where US presence in the region is dictated by its need to 
control its oil supplies.22  
 
Due to the importance of energy, a major concern for the George H. W. Bush 
Administration when it took office in 1989 was Persian Gulf security through 
cooperation with Iraq. Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration 
remained committed to a policy of engagement with Iraq, as it thought that continued 
engagement would lead to the moderation of Iraqi behaviour.23 As the Iraqis emerged 
                                                 
20 Michael Mandelbaum, “The Bush Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 70:1 (1991): 14 - 16. 
21 Klare, Resource Wars: 6-7. Klare added that resources will not be the “One Big Thing” that lies at 
the heart of international relations, but it will help explain. Resource conflict will not be the only source 
of conflict in the 21st Century, but it will increasingly rise as a factor. (Klare, Resource Wars: 14 and 
25).  
22 Klare, Resource Wars: xi, 3 and 27.  
23 Robert S. Litwak, “Iraq and Iran: From Dual to Differentiated Containment”, in Robert J. Lieber 
(ed.) Eagle Rules? Foreign policy and American primacy in the twenty-first century (New Jersey, 
Prentice Hall, 2002): 176.  
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with the upper hand from the Iraq-Iran war, US policymakers saw Baghdad as a 
potential ally against Iran. Furthermore, in a show of corporatism, a secret policy 
review towards Iraq was performed shortly after Bush took office, promoting US 
business interests, saying that Iraq’s “vast oil reserves [promised] a lucrative market 
for US goods,” adding that US oil imports from Iraq skyrocketed after Iraq began 
offering American oil companies “large incentives.”24 This led to National Security 
Directive 26; “US Policy Toward the Persian Gulf”, dated October 2, 1989. The first 
paragraph of the directive emphasized the importance of Persian Gulf oil:  
 
Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key 
friendly states in the area are vital to US national 
security. The United States remains committed to 
defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and 
appropriate through the use of US military force, 
against the Soviet Union or any other regional power 
with interests inimical to our own.25  
 
 
The directive also encouraged normal relations with Saddam Hussein and Iraq, 
linking Baghdad to the wider issues of the Middle East, such as Arab-Israeli peace, 
Lebanon, Iran, WMDs and human rights:  
Normal relations between the United States and Iraq 
would serve our longer-term interests and promote 
stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The 
United States Government should propose economic 
and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its 
behaviour and to increase our influence with Iraq. At 
the same time, the Iraqi leadership must understand 
that any illegal use of chemical and/or biological 
weapons will lead to economic and political 
sanctions… Human rights considerations should 
continue to be an important element in our policy 
                                                 
24 Alan Friedman, Spider’s Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq, 
(New York: Bantam Books: 1993): 133, 134.  
25 George H. W. Bush, “National Security Directive 26, US Policy Toward the Persian Gulf”, 
Foundation of American Scientists, October 2, 1989, [accessed October 13, 2006] 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf   
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toward Iraq. In addition, Iraq should be urged to cease 
its meddling in external affairs, such as in Lebanon, 
and be encouraged to play a constructive role in 
negotiating a settlement with Iran and cooperate in the 
Middle East peace process.26  
 
On Iran, NSD 26 recognized the opportunities presented by the death of Khomeini in 
June 1989, and held the possibility of normalized relations with Iran if the latter 
stopped its anti-American behaviour and signed a peace treaty with Iraq:  
 
The United States should continue to be prepared for a 
normal relationship with Iran on the basis of strict 
reciprocity. A process of normalization must begin with 
Iranian action to cease its support for international 
terrorism and help obtain the release of all American 
hostages, which will not be a matter for bargaining or 
blackmail. Other criteria Iran must meet before full 
normalization of US-Iranian relations include halting 
its subversive activities and improving relations with its 
neighbours, making a good faith effort toward a peace 
treaty with Iraq, and improving its human rights 
practices.27  
 
However, the document was vague on what US policy would be if Tehran did not 
change its behaviour. Also, Washington failed to obtain Baghdad’s cooperation on 
the Arab-Israeli peace process, as Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz refused James 
Baker’s offer of an aid package of $1.2 billion in return for Iraq’s assistance in Arab-
Israeli negotiations.28  
 
Nevertheless, despite the lack of progress on these issues, American business interests 
in Iraq, especially in the field of energy and reconstruction, were encouraged:  
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Peter Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Washington, 
DC: Potomac Books, 2005): 106.  
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We should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities 
for US firms to participate in the reconstruction of the 
Iraqi economy, particularly in the energy area, where 
they do not conflict with our non-proliferation and 
other significant objectives.29  
 
Oil was a significant factor in the Bush Administration’s relationship with Baghdad. 
From only 80,000 barrels a day in 1987, US imports of Iraqi oil jumped to 675,000 
barrels in 1990, and the figures kept rising rapidly from month to month. By July 
1990, the figure had leapt to 1.1 million barrels a day – more than a quarter of Iraq’s 
total oil exports.30 Bush, an old oilman himself, (having founded Zapata Offshore 
Drilling in the 1950s, with James Baker as his lawyer,)31 understood the needs and 
importance of oil considerations, and Baker admitted in his memoirs, The Politics of 
Diplomacy, that policy toward Iraq was “not immune from domestic economic 
considerations.”32 (“When you look at NSD 26, you find out that it was the 
Administration’s sole desire and policy to aid and abet Saddam Hussein,” said 
Congressman Sam Gejdenson, a Connecticut Democrat and one of Bush’s harshest 
critics.)33  
 
Naturally, American businessmen supported doing business with Iraq. The US-Iraq 
Business Forum, an American trade association which represented sixty US 
                                                 
29 Bush, “National Security Directive 26.” 
30 Friedman, Spider’s Web: 163.  
31 Bryce, Cronies: 204, Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud. (London: Gibson Square, 2007): 
39, 43 and Yergin, The Prize: 753.  
32 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet. (London: Penguin Books, 
2004): 183. Another example of Bush’s support for Iraq was that he voided a prohibition that Congress 
has imposed on any new financing for Iraq by the Export-Import Bank, due to Saddam’s human rights 
violations. On January 17, 1990, Bush signed a waiver which determined that the prohibition was “not 
in the national interest of the United States,” making Saddam once again eligible for US taxpayer-
backed loan guarantees worth about $200 million (Friedman, Spider’s Web: 157). The State 
Department said that lifting the ban was necessary to achieve the “goal of increasing US exports and 
put us in a better position to deal with Iraq regarding its human rights record” (Noam Chomsky, 
Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance (London: Penguin Books, 2004): 114) 
33 Friedman, Spider’s Web: 134.  
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companies (including Bechtel, Lockheed, Texaco, Exxon and Mobil) was established 
by Marshall Wiley, a lifelong US foreign service officer. Arguing that the United 
States should not prosecute Saddam Hussein for his human rights violations, since 
Iraq was important as a trading partner and as a guardian of US business interests and 
energy resources in the Gulf region, Wiley said in 1989 that:  
Iraq plays an important role now in bringing about 
stability in the Gulf region as an offset to Iran. This 
balance of power is important to us because of our 
interest further down the Gulf in the countries that are 
friendly to us and where we have substantial energy 
reserves that must be protected. So Iraq plays an 
important political and geopolitical role in addition to 
being an important trading partner for us, and we can’t 
push all these considerations to the side and shut our 
eyes to them because of some perceived human rights 
violations.34 
 
 
Moreover, military cooperation with Iraq was encouraged in NSD 26, which said that 
“as a means of developing access to and influence with the Iraqi defence 
establishment, the United States should consider sales of non-lethal forms of military 
assistance, e.g., training courses and medical exchanges.”35  
 
As late as April 1990, four months before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, John Kelly, explained 
that the US policy on Iraq was based on an attempt to gradually develop a mutually 
                                                 
34 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda, 160, 161 and Joe Conason, “The Iraq Lobby: Kissinger, the Business 
Forum & Co.” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Serf (eds) The Gulf War Reader (New York: Random 
House, 1991): 79-84.   
35 According to Christopher Simpson, author of National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations, this military cooperation was expanded to the extent that the CIA provided “unusually 
detailed military intelligence to Iraq that Iraqi security agencies put to use in a genocide campaign 
against Iraq’s Kurdish minority group”. (Interestingly, Simpson also said that US financial relations 
with Iraq and CIA operations in the country also became entangled in the complex Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI) scandal (Simpson, National Security Directives of the Reagan and 
Bush Administrations: 897)). 
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beneficial relationship that would strengthen the positive trends in Iraq’s foreign and 
domestic policies. He also said that the principal American interest in the region was 
energy, and that the importance of Iraq and the Persian Gulf to the United States was 
likely to increase in the coming decade, due to the increased dependence of the United 
States on oil from the region.36 However, Saddam invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 
1990, caused the first post-Cold War crisis and exposed the weakness of depending on 
Iraq for securing the Persian Gulf and its energy supplies.  
 
The crisis was partly explained in economic terms. If successful in holding on to 
Kuwait, Saddam would directly control Iraq and Kuwait’s oil resources, which 
together add up to 20% of OPEC production and 20% of world oil reserves. He would 
also be in a position to threaten his oil-producing neighbours, because if he captured 
Saudi Arabia as well, the sum of world oil under his control would rise to about 45%, 
and he would wield unprecedented influence over the world oil market and have the 
economic freedom to take even larger steps, raising the price of oil to unprecedented 
levels. Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence 
Eagleburger and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft argued to Bush that 
                                                 
36 Reuven Hollo, Oil and American Foreign policy in the Persian Gulf 1947-1991, PhD, University of 
Texas, May 1995: 331. Even during his days as Vice-President (under Ronald Reagan), Bush “made it 
clear he wanted to help Iraq,” said a former White House official. A gleaming example is the oil 
pipeline which Bechtel and Brown & Root planned to build from the Iraqi oilfields at Kirkuk to the 
Jordanian port of Aqaba, as Vice President Bush has lobbied the Export-Import Bank so hard to extend 
financing to Iraq for this project. Also, Brown & Root have been working for the Baath Party since the 
1973 to build and develop the Mina al-Bakr and Khor al-Amaya oil terminals in Iraq (Bryce, Cronies: 
124, 127-128, 129, 130, Friedman, Spider’s Web: 117, 156-157 and Unger, House of Bush, House of 
Saud: 70). Reagan’s Secretary of State George Shultz, who had business ties with Bechtel, lobbied hard 
for the Aqaba pipeline. After he left government, he went back to work for Bechtel (Juhasz, The Bush 
Agenda: 165). Also, Reagan has sent his special envoy, Donald Rumsfeld, to meet Saddam in 
November 1983 to discuss the Aqaba pipeline (Bryce, Cronies: 127-128, Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 
103, 165-167, Dilip Hiro. Secrets and Lies: The True Story of the Iraq War. (London: Politico’s, 2005): 
372). At first, Saddam was not interested in the Aqaba pipeline, fearing that Israel would attack it, but 
he later approved it when he saw that the US Government and US companies were serious about it 
(Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 166). However, in November 1985, Saddam rejected the Aqaba pipeline 
deal, again citing concerns over the pipeline’s security as it passed through Israel (Juhasz, The Bush 
Agenda: 167).   
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Saddam’s invasion was a far more important issue than Kuwait, as it was about oil. 
Even if Saddam was not to invade Saudi Arabia, there was still a risk of oil being 
denied to the US and its allies.37  
 
In response to the invasion, Bush released National Security Directive 45, titled “US 
Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait”, on August 20, 1990. The first 
paragraph of NSD 45 was very similar to that of NSD 26 of October 1989 as it 
emphasized the importance of securing Persian Gulf oil:  
U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf are vital to the 
national security. These interests include access to oil 
and the security and stability of key friendly states in 
the region.  The United States will defend its vital 
interests in the area, through the use of U.S. military 
force if necessary and appropriate, against any power 
with interests inimical to our own.38    
 
NSD 45 then listed the “four principles” that would “guide US policy during this 
crisis”; the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government to replace the puppet 
                                                 
37 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the 
New World Order (London: Faber and Faber: 1994): 76, Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 51, Pinto, Political 
Islam and the United States: 58, 117, Yergin, The Prize: 773, Maria Do Ceau Pinto, “Persian Gulf 
Instability: A Threat to Western Interests.” From L. C. Montanheiro, R. H. Haigh and D. S. Morris (ed) 
Essays on International Co-operation and Defence,. (Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam University Press, 
1998): 125. Colin Powell, then Joint Chief of Staff and a former National Security Advisor, doubted 
that the United States would go to war over Kuwait, but thought that the United States would go to war 
over Saudi Arabia (Norman H. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (London: Bantam Books, 1992): 
344 and 366).   
38 George H. W. Bush, “National Security Directive 45: US Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of 
Kuwait”, Foundation of American Scientists, August 20, 1990, [accessed October 13, 2006] 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd_45.htm  
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regime installed by Iraq; a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian 
Gulf; and the protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.39 
 
NSD 45 also allocated a whole paragraph to the procedures that the United States 
would take to protect its energy supplies, calling on oil-producing countries to raise 
oil production:  
The United States now imports nearly half the oil it consumes 
and, as a result of the current crisis, could face a major 
threat to its economy.  Much of the world is even more 
dependent on imported oil and more vulnerable to Iraqi 
threats.  To minimize any impact that oil flow reductions 
from Iraq and Kuwait will have on the world's economies, it 
will be our policy to ask oil-producing nations to do what 
they can to increase production to offset these losses.40  
 
Thus, Saudi Arabia raised its production of oil in order to offset the rise in prices that 
resulted from the crisis. Due to the sanctions on Iraq, which pulled Iraqi oil out of the 
global market (thus decreasing the global supply of oil), plus Saddam’s threats to 
destroy the Saudi oil supply system, oil prices jumped to $40/barrel, approximately 
double what they were before the invasion.41 This sharp rise in oil prices led to an 
increase in prices at the pump and for home heating.42 However, the Saudis quickly 
raised production to push the prices back down to around $20 / barrel.43  
                                                 
39 Bush, “National Security Directive 45”. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Yergin, The Prize: 774, and Faisal Islam, “War: Who is it good for?”, Guardian, August 11, 2002, 
[accessed August 23, 2002] http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/story/0,2763,772666,00.html and Patrick 
E. Tyler and Richard W. Stevenson, “Profound effect on US economy seen in a war on Iraq,” Truthout, 
July 30, 2002, [accessed August 5, 2002] http://truthout.com/docs_02/07.31C.war.econo.htm.  
42 “Iraq overshadows world’s biggest oil summit”, CNN, September 6, 2002, [accessed September 6, 
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43 F. Gregory Gause, “Saudi Arabia over a barrel,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2000: 87. Saudi Arabia 
raised its production to make up for three quarters of the lost supply. (Venezuela and the United Arab 
Emirates also increased their production of oil.) This Saudi action was not just a bow to US desires, but 
in the interest of the Saudis, since Saudi interest is that oil prices are not too high or too low, since very 
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 Bush continued to emphasize the importance of the oil factor in this crisis, as he said 
on August 8, 1990 that “our nation now imports nearly half the oil it consumers and 
could face a major threat to its economic independence… The sovereign 
independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the United States.”44 He also said 
in a speech on August 15, 1990, to gather US public support for the upcoming Gulf 
War that “our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly 
countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world’s greatest oil 
reserves fell in the hands of Saddam Hussein.”45 Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney 
highlighted the threat of oil on his first major statement on the crisis, on September 
11, 1990, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, saying that once Saddam 
acquired Kuwait and deployed and army as large the one he possesses, he would be 
“in a position to be able to dictate the future of worldwide energy policy, and that 
[would give] him a stranglehold on our economy.”46 
 
On the other hand, some analysts believed that oil was not the number one reason for 
American involvement in the 1991 Gulf War, although they did not deny oil’s 
importance. Apart from oil, the United States had to use the military option against 
Saddam in order to maintain and expand American influence on the global arena. 
Bush himself acknowledged that preserving the global system of US influence was a 
main factor in the war, as he said in the January 1991 State of the Union address: 
“What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea: a new world order, 
                                                                                                                                            
low prices would decrease the oil exporter’s revenues, and very high prices would lead to a decrease in 
demand for oil and the shift to other sources of energy and energy conservation measures (Yergin, The 
Prize: 774 and Gause, “Saudi Arabia over a barrel”: 87). 
44  Klare, Resource Wars: 34 and Klare, Blood and Oil: 5 and 50.  
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where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal 
aspirations of mankind -- peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law.”47  
 
According to Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, oil was not the main reason for the 
war, as US global leadership was more important:  
 
Seizure of one Gulf state by another à la Saddam is, of 
course, unacceptable, but that has less to do with 
energy security than with preventing a grab for power 
by hostile states in a strategic region. “Oil” may have 
been part of the early rationale for US intervention 
after Iraq invaded Kuwait… but the real stakes were 
larger: US leadership and global order.48  
 
Moreover, Fuller and Lesser emphasized that preventing the rise of a regional 
hegemonic power and preserving US hegemony in the Gulf were more vital factors: 
 
Some US strategists suggest that America has a 
broader interest in preventing the rise of any regional 
hegemonic power anywhere, especially one capable of 
threatening global stability through the use of force. 
Implicit in this formulation is retention of the US role 
as the primary security arbiter in the Gulf and 
maintenance of the US presence there as a symbol of a 
global American security commitment. In some respects 
it would be more accurate to describe this objective as 
preserving US hegemony in the Gulf.49   
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Thomas McCormick considered both the oil factor and the global US leadership 
factor, as he acknowledged that “short-term concern over the American and global 
economies” has prompted the United States to intervene to liberate Kuwait, since 
“Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait’s oil production, and its threat to Saudi Arabia’s, left 
[Iraq] in a position to profoundly alter the structure of world oil prices.” Iraq was in a 
position to raise oil prices, causing a new oil shock that would deepen the US and 
global recession.50 (He also mentioned Bush’s political need to wage a quick and 
victorious war in order to improve his re-election chances in 1992 and overcome the 
so-called “wimp” factor.)51 Having said that, McCormick acknowledged that longer-
term goals regarding the preservation of US hegemony were more important,52 as US 
hegemony was required to protect “global capitalism”:  
  
While… short-term political and economic factors were 
undoubtedly important in promoting American military 
action, they pale in significance alongside the [Bush] 
administration’s long-term desire to perpetuate the 
credibility of American hegemony and to continue with 
its ongoing hegemonic project. Notwithstanding the end 
of the Cold War, the American government believed 
that the structural imperatives of global capitalism 
required a hegemonic centre to make and enforce the 
international rules of liberal capitalism.53   
 
Similarly, Zbigniew Brzezinski thought that Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait was a 
challenge to America’s global power, which was “more important” than just oil, 
saying that  
                                                 
50 Thomas J. McCormick, America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and 
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Saddam’s action was not only a challenge to the 
traditional US position in the Persian Gulf (especially 
to America’s oil interests in Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates) but – perhaps even more 
important – to America’s new dominance in the world 
and Bush’s new global status. Whatever the legitimacy 
of Iraq’s historic claims to Kuwait, the invasion was an 
act of defiance.54  
 
Thus, according to William Hyland, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was also an 
important opportunity for the United States, as “the United States was essentially free 
to intervene abroad without fear of confrontation with Moscow. This was a new and 
important dimension in foreign policy.”55  Therefore, the economic and energy 
considerations were indeed an important factor in deciding to wage war on Iraq. 
However, the more important factor was emphasizing a post-Cold War global system 
based on US leadership and interests.  
 
On January 15, 1991, National Security Directive 54, titled “Responding to Iraqi 
Aggression in the Gulf” was adopted to implement the US policy on the crisis within 
the context of the New World Order and coalition building. NSD 54 set itself out as 
an extension of NSD 26 and NSD 45, again stressing the importance of Persian Gulf 
oil:   
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Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key 
friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national 
security. Consistent with NSD 26 of October 2, 1989, 
and NSD 45 of August 20, 1990, and as a matter of 
long-standing policy, the United States remains 
committed to defending its vital interests in the region, 
if necessary through the use of military force, against 
any power with interests inimical to our own.56 
 
In order to protect the US interest, Bush authorized US military action: “I hereby 
authorize military actions designed to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.”57 
The directive also said that the United States would change the Iraqi regime if it was 
to use weapons of mass destruction or destroy Kuwait’s oilfields:   
Should Iraq resort to using chemical, biological, or 
nuclear weapons, be found supporting terrorist acts 
against U.S. or coalition partners anywhere in the 
world, or destroy Kuwait's oil fields, it shall become an 
explicit objective of the United States to replace the 
current leadership of Iraq.58  
 
Saddam did burn 700 of Kuwait’s oilfields, causing $20 billion in damage.59 
However, the US military did not follow through with the regime change threat in 
NSD 54, refraining from entering Baghdad after the liberation of Kuwait.60 In his 
memoirs, General Norman H. Schwarzkopf, Centcom Commander-in-Chief during 
Operation Desert Storm, explained the reasons for not entering Baghdad. UN 
resolutions, he said, only called for liberating Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion and this 
gave the United States the authority to “take whatever actions were necessary to 
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accomplish that mission, including attacks into Iraq”. The Americans, therefore, had 
no authority to invade Iraq for the purpose of capturing the entire country or its 
capital, and breaching UN resolutions would have caused the collapse of the coalition 
that the US has built on the basis on UN legitimacy, and this would have cost the 
United States a lot in terms of increased financial burden and loss of American troops. 
Citing the defeat in Vietnam as an example, he said that lack of international 
legitimacy would have caused a defeat to the US military if they would have invaded 
Iraq.61  
 
Furthermore, Bush and Scowcroft admitted in their joint book A World Transformed 
that they preferred to leave Saddam in power, as removing him would have led to the 
division of Iraq, or, as they called it, to a “Lebanonization of Iraq,” thus destabilizing 
the region. Colin Powell made a similar assessment in My American Journey: “It 
would not contribute to the stability we want in the Middle East to have Iraq 
fragmented into separate Sunni, Shia and Kurd political entities.” Powell added that 
“our practical intention was to leave Baghdad enough power to survive as a threat to 
an Iran that remained bitterly hostile to the United States.” What the Bush team 
wanted was Iraqi and Persian Gulf stability, even it had been enforced by keeping 
Saddam in power, thus Washington allowed Saddam to crush the Shiite and Kurdish 
uprisings following the war.62 Also, the Bush Administration wanted to work on the 
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Arab-Israeli peace process, and feared that a US military invasion of Iraq would not 
help Arab-Israeli peace.63  
 
 
US POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER THE WAR:  
 
“I cannot believe the lift that this crisis and our response to it have given our country. 
This is the way the world’s only remaining superpower is supposed to behave.”  
 
Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a personal 
 conversation with Norman Schwarzkopf in February 1991.64 
 
The Gulf War showed the mutual need for cooperation between the Arab oil exporters 
and the Western importers, as the importers needed oil, and the exporters needed 
                                                                                                                                            
effect on the Arab Gulf states, all of whom were pro-US allies. It would also destabilize the region, 
raising the price of oil or cutting the supplies from the region. Moreover, the Gulf’s Arab Shiites might 
form alliances with Iran (Noam Chomsky, Middle East Illusions (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 
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military protection.65 The war also provided Washington with enhanced influence in 
the Middle East. It enabled the United States to deploy its forces in the Gulf Arab 
states and to strengthen its ties and/or sign bilateral defence agreements with the 
region’s major powers: Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. 
Following the end of the 1991 Gulf War, 25,000 US troops remained in the region, 
5,000 of whom were deployed in Saudi Arabia.66   
 
Furthermore, Bush used the liberation of Kuwait to promote the idea of a New World 
Order, where he said that “What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big 
idea: a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause 
to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind -- peace and security, freedom, and 
the rule of law.”67 Shortly after the war, Bush said before the US Congress on March 
6th, 1991: 
 
We can see a new world coming into view, a world in 
which there is the very real prospect of a new world 
order … a world where the United Nations – freed from 
Cold War stalemate – is poised to fulfil the historic 
vision of its founders; a world in which freedom and 
respect for human rights find a home among all 
nations.68 
 
However, he stressed that the United States should be the nation to dictate the form of 
the New World Order, saying in his 1991 State of the Union speech that “American 
leadership is indispensable” and that “we must step forward and accept our 
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responsibility to lead the world” because “we’re the only nation on earth that could 
assemble the forces of peace [and] freedom.”69 
 
In tandem with this vision, his March 6, 1991 speech outlined the challenges that 
faced the Persian Gulf following the war. First, he cited the need to create shared 
security arrangements in the region, where the US would maintain strong military 
presence in the region. Second, he wanted to prevent a nuclear arms race from 
developing in the region, meaning that the Iraqi nuclear arsenal had to be 
dismantled.70 Third, Bush said that the Gulf War presented new opportunities for a 
comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement. Finally, the United States would foster 
economic development in the Middle East using the region’s oil resources.71  
 
These concerns were also outlined in the National Security Strategy of August 1991, 
in the context of the Gulf War and the promise of the New World Order, including oil 
supplies, Arab-Israeli peace, fighting terrorism and weapons of mass destruction:  
Promoting stability and the security of our friends, 
maintaining a free flow of oil, curbing the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, 
discouraging destabilizing conventional arms sales, 
countering terrorism and encouraging a peace process 
that brings about reconciliation between Israel and the 
Arab states as well as between Palestinians and Israel 
in a manner consonant with our enduring commitment 
to Israel's security.72  
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In the State of the Union speech of January 1992, Bush recognized that the United 
States should not withdraw from international issues just because the Soviet Union 
has disintegrated, as the Soviet threat was replaced by the threat of “instability itself”:  
As the war in the Gulf made clear, the easing of the 
Soviet threat does not mean an end to all hazards. As 
we seek to build a new world order in the aftermath of 
the Cold War, we will likely discover that the enemy we 
face is less an expansionist communism than it is 
instability itself. And, in the face of multiple and varied 
threats to stability, we will increasingly find our 
military strength a source of reassurance and a 
foundation for security, regionally and globally.73  
 
New World Order rhetoric and promises were included, in the form of a promise for 
“a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and 
democratic institutions flourish”, since “our interests are best served in a world in 
which democracy and its ideals are widespread and secure.”74  
 
The Gulf War had also shown the Bush Administration the importance of Arab-Israeli 
peace, since Saddam has used the Palestinian cause as a tool to rally supporters 
around him and this enabled him to win the Palestinians to his side against the United 
States. This showed that the Arab-Israeli conflict was linked to any cause of 
instability in the region, which could be hazardous to the American interests in the 
region, especially access to oil. Thus, Washington saw that fixing the Arab-Israeli 
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problem would help secure vital US interests, easing the challenges to Israel’s 
survival and to vital energy supplies.75  
 
The NSS 1991 also renewed the US pledge to protect energy resources using military 
means and ties to the oil industry:  
Security of oil supplies is enhanced by a supportive 
foreign policy and appropriate military capabilities. We 
will work to improve understanding among key 
participants in the oil industry of the basic 
fundamentals of the oil market. We will also maintain 
our capability to respond to requests to protect vital oil 
facilities, on land or at sea, while working to resolve 
the underlying political, social and economic tensions 
that could threaten the free flow of oil 76 
 
Special attention was paid to the protection of the energy resources in the Persian 
Gulf region, since it “contains two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves”, and thus 
the region “is of fundamental concern to us”. It was also recognized that events in the 
region would affect US interests, as “political and military turbulence in the region 
has a direct impact on our economy, largely through higher oil prices and potential 
supply disruptions.”77  
The 1991 Gulf War did not fundamentally change the US policy on the Middle East, 
(as it was actually an application of the Carter Doctrine). The US policy in the Middle 
East remained committed to Arab-Israeli peace, and the protection of oil resources, 
both of which became easier to advance after the end of the Cold War, the collapse of 
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the Soviet Union and the defeat of Saddam Hussein.78 However, there was no real 
follow up on the Arab-Israeli front after the Madrid Conference which Bush 
organized in October 1991, as the conference did not result in an agreement between 
the Arabs and the Israelis on steps towards a peace deal.  
 
In his frequent references to a New World Order, Bush seemed to be on the verge of 
setting a new doctrine for US policy. However, Bush did not establish a new doctrine, 
and a rare moment of opportunity had passed.79 Bush’s ambition of realizing a New 
World Order failed to get off the ground, due to the lack of a clear enemy in the wake 
of the Cold War,80 and the inward-looking American public opinion which was 
increasingly unwilling to interfere in other peoples’ affairs.81 Furthermore, Bush’s 
vision for global coalition building based on a New World Order was mainly focused 
on the events of the Persian Gulf rather than on the international system as a whole. 
The New World Order reflected the conduct of American foreign policy in the Gulf 
but did not necessarily reflect the general changes in international politics,82 and 
Bush’s skilful coalition building was not achievable under different conditions in the 
future where the world’s energy resources were not at an immediate or direct risk.83 
 
Furthermore, Bush showed little interest in promoting the moral values enshrined in 
the New World Order such as spreading human rights, democracy, free market 
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economies and other similar values. This was especially true in the Middle East, as 
Washington feared of producing potentially unfriendly regimes (the symptom known 
as the Democracy Conundrum; the contradiction between American democracy and 
American support of non-democratic regimes, where the United States cannot avoid 
calling for democratic values abroad and yet it cannot allow its non-democratic allies 
to be undermined.)84 Thus, the New World Order failed to materialize, due to 
concerns about the security and price of Persian Gulf oil supplies.85  So the concern 
for oil stability, and thus the stability of the Gulf’s non-democratic regimes, was a 
reason for the failure of the New World Order to promote human rights and 
democratisation in the Middle East. 
 
Bush generally followed a policy of global economic openness, based on maintaining 
US preponderance in order to protect the Open Door empire. This was evident in his 
initial support of Saddam, especially in the field of energy where the political 
economy of the large corporation was seen in the use of corporate interests to promote 
America’s energy security. The 1991 Gulf War was a war to protect energy supplies, 
and to maintain American preponderance in a system of global openness. Echoing 
William Appleman Williams and Gabriel Kolko, Noam Chomsky said that the Bush 
administration needed the 1991 Gulf War to deal with domestic economic problems in 
the US, by “selling protection” and acting “like mercenary states” in order to protect 
the petrodollar recycling process necessary to “prop up” the American economy 
which was suffering recession,86 and to protect America’s “imperial settlement” based 
                                                 
84 Pinto, Political Islam and the United States: x. 
85 Hunter, “Starting at Zero”: 13-14.  
86 Noam Chomsky, “After the Cold War: US Middle East Policy”, in Phyllis Bennis and Michel 
Moushabeck (eds) Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991): 79 
- 80, 87. The 1991 Gulf War cost $60 billion, wherein the US allies paid $50 billion of this $60 billion 
57 
 
on control of oil resources, especially in the Middle East.87 This was the situation 
which President Bill Clinton inherited, where Clinton followed in the footsteps of 
Open Door imperialism.  
 
Clinton did raise the importance of economic issues in US national security,88 and the 
slogan of his 1992 campaign was “It’s the economy, stupid!” During a speech in 
December 1991 at Georgetown University, Clinton called for the integration of US 
foreign policy and domestic economic concerns, to enable productive US economic 
competition and a stable international system:89   
 
We face two foreign policy challenges today. First, we 
must define a new national security policy that builds 
on freedom’s victory in the Cold War… And second, we 
must forge a new economic policy to serve ordinary 
Americans by launching a new era of global growth. 
We must tear down the wall in our thinking between 
domestic and foreign policy.90 
 
Furthermore, “in a throw back to the Open Door policy, Clinton declared that it was 
time ‘to make trade a priority element of American security.’”91 As he took office in 
January 1993, Clinton saw that with the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States 
was able to expand global democracy while prioritising economic affairs in US 
national security.92 Clinton thus introduced the Engagement and Enlargement policy, 
which called for America to remain “engaged” in world affairs while “enlarging” and 
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spreading market democracy worldwide, leading to the promotion of market 
capitalism and a policy of global economic openness and American trade, thus sustain 
the US economy. The Clinton Administration did set out clear objectives in the 
Engagement and Enlargement policy, linking democratisation to security and 
economic objectives,93 where the US would “support the consolidation of market 
democracy where it is taking new root.” However, he added limitations, saying that “I 
do not mean to announce some crusade to force our way of life and doing things on 
others.”94  National Security Advisor Anthony Lake agreed that it would not be a 
democratic crusade, or a one-size-fits-all policy, saying that “this is not a democratic 
crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to see freedom take hold where that will help 
us most.”95  
 
Therefore, Engagement and Enlargement did not apply to the Middle East. As the 
administration made it clear that the democratisation drive would apply only where it 
would benefit US interests, what took priority in the Middle East was not economic 
and political reform, but the search for an Arab-Israeli settlement96 which would 
stabilize the region and its oil resources. In the words of former Assistant Secretary of 
State for Near Eastern Affairs, Martin Indyk, “the engine for change in the region was 
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not democratisation, but peace.”97 Indyk added that the United States did not want to 
call for democratisation in the Middle East lest it would destabilize the oil producing 
regimes:   
 
The United States could not afford the destabilizing 
impact that pressure for reform would generate in 
deeply traditional and repressed societies. Pushing 
hard for political change might not only disrupt the 
effort to promote peace but could also work against 
vital US interests: stability in the oil-rich Persian Gulf 
and in strategically critical Egypt.98  
 
Thus, instead of democratisation, Arab-Israeli peace was seen as a realistic option that 
would ensure unimpeded access to the oilfields of the Persian Gulf,99 again reflecting 
the Democracy Conundrum. And since the threat to this peace came from Iraq and 
Iran, Clinton tried to link the policy on both countries to a new approach on the 
Persian Gulf. On May 18, 1993, Indyk spoke at the Washington Institute of Near East 
Policy and introduced the policy of Dual Containment on Iraq and Iran, where instead 
of supporting one nation against the other, the Clinton Administration would seek to 
rein in both countries, which were both viewed as “re-arming… fervently anti-
Western… potential threats to Persian Gulf oil supplies.”100 Lake said that the Clinton 
Administration saw that Iraq and Iran could disrupt regional and global stability, thus 
the US needed to contain them,101 and according to Indyk, “our strategy for the whole 
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region was based on pursuing a comprehensive Middle East peace at the same time as 
containing Iraq and Iran.”102 
 
However, the Clinton Administration would not yet support regime change in either 
country,103 since, first, the US was still committed to the territorial integrity of Iraq,104 
and, second, regime change in Iraq or Iran would require an armed conflict that had 
little or no backing from the Congress, the American people or the White House itself. 
Dual Containment would not provide a long-term solution, but it would keep Saddam 
“in his box” for the rest of the decade, even though the policy failed to obtain support 
from America’s allies.105 (Furthermore, Dual Containment also aimed to protect 
Saudi oil from competition from Iranian and Iraqi oil and keep supplies at a level that 
would maintain moderate oil prices.)106  
                                                
 
Beyond Dual Containment, US relations with Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil 
producer, deteriorated under Clinton. The tension started with problems over Saudi 
payments for weapons imported from the US.107 But the main point of dispute was 
that the United States no longer coordinated oil policy with Saudi Arabia partly 
because of the attacks on US bases in November 1995 (the Saudi Arabian National 
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Guard, SANG) and June 1996 (Khobar),108 and partly because of Saddam’s 
propaganda war against the United States which prompted the Saudis to withdraw 
some basing rights and over-flight privileges.109 US-Saudi relations were strained 
further after the transfer of power from the ailing King Fahd to his half-brother, 
Crown Prince Abdullah, who was not as pro-American.110 For example, under King 
Fahd, Saudi Arabia sold oil at a discounted rate to the United States in order to 
maintain a strategic relationship, a concession that was stopped under Abdullah.111 
Furthermore, when George H. W. Bush left the White House in 1993, the bulk of 
American imports of oil were from the Gulf. Under Clinton, however, the United 
States moved to getting the bulk of its oil from Venezuela, Mexico, and Canada. By 
1997 the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, were selling only 19% of their 
production to the Americans.112  
 
The preference of stabilization over democratisation in the Middle East shows that the 
Middle East did not fit into the policies of engagement and democratic enlargement, 
as the United States would only pursue Engagement and Enlargement where possible 
and where desirable. But this Middle East policy started to crack, as it became clear in 
the mid-1990s that Dual Containment was coming under strain because it lacked 
international support, as French, Russian, Chinese and other firms were still dealing 
with the Iraqi regime.113 Thus, by November 1998, the Clinton Administration 
replaced its policy of Dual Containment towards Iraq and Iran with, in the case of 
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Iraq, a policy of “containment combined with regime change” and, in the case of Iran, 
a policy of “containment until the Iranians are ready for engagement.” According to 
Indyk, the reason for this change in policy was that it became more difficult to contain 
Iraq, while, in Iran, the election of the moderate Mohammad Khatami as president 
gave new hope to change in Iranian policy. 114 
 
The defining moment in the Clinton Administration’s policy on regime change in Iraq 
came with the authorization of the Iraqi Liberation Act on October 31, 1998. Clinton 
officially stated:  
Today I am signing into law H.R. 4655, the “Iraq 
Liberation Act of 1998.” This Act makes clear that it is 
the sense of the Congress that the United States should 
support those elements of the Iraqi opposition that 
advocate a very different future for Iraq than the bitter 
reality of internal repression and external aggression 
that the current regime in Baghdad now offers... The 
United States wants Iraq to rejoin the family of nations 
as a freedom-loving and law-abiding member. This is in 
our interest and that of our allies within the region.115  
 
Regarding Iran, “Dual Containment” never meant that the policy was the same for 
Iran and Iraq. Iran posed a different challenge for the Clinton Administration. In 
contrast to domestic pressure to work on regime change in Baghdad, focus on Iran did 
not aim for regime change. Instead, the Dual Containment policy towards Iran 
focused more on economic sanctions,116 especially in the energy field. This was 
evident in US policy on pipelines in the region. In January 1994, Iran, Turkmenistan 
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and Turkey signed an agreement to construct a pipeline between Turkmenistan to 
Turkey passing through Iran, but US opposition delayed the project by blocking its 
finance.117  However, in July 1997, amidst growing scepticism in Washington that 
Pakistan and the Taliban would actually help unite Afghanistan (as the Clinton 
Administration hoped),118 the United States announced that the pipeline would not 
violate the American embargo on Iran, but, in an apparent U-turn, subsequent 
American opposition dashed hopes for early implementation.119  
 
Despite the US sanctions imposed on Iran in 1980, Iran had continued to export oil to 
the United States as much as $1.6 billion worth in 1987, until the “tanker war” in that 
year (an American military operation which involved the re-flagging of Kuwaiti oil 
tankers to protect them from Iranian attacks) ended the import of Iranian oil.120 With 
the measures by the George H. W. Bush Administration to scale back the sanctions on 
Iran, the United States became the largest single buyer of Iranian oil, through the 
overseas subsidiaries of American companies, and became Iran’s third largest trading 
partner.121 In 1995, however, Clinton issued an executive order to ban all trade with 
Iran, including oil deals involving the Iranian energy sector, citing Hezbollah’s 
attacks on Israel and on Israeli and Jewish interests in Argentina.122 Executive Order 
12957 prohibited of “the entry into or performance by a United States person, or the 
approval by a United States person of the entry into or performance by an entity 
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owned or controlled by a United States person” of a contract that would include the 
supervision, management or financing of “the development of petroleum resources 
located in Iran” or “a guarantee of another person's performance under such a 
contract.”123 Among the deals suspended was a billion-dollar agreement between Iran 
and Conoco.124  
 
Clinton’s order was complemented with the presentation of the Iran And Libya 
Sanctions Act Of 1996 (H.R. 3107) was represented to the House of Representatives 
to “punish both states for supporting terrorism and aiming to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction,”125 including sanctions on the Iranian petroleum sector:  
a) Policy With Respect to Iran: The Congress declares 
that it is the policy of the United States to deny Iran the 
ability to support acts of international terrorism and to 
fund the development and acquisition of weapons of 
mass destruction and the means to deliver them by 
limiting the development of Iran's ability to explore for, 
extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum 
resources of Iran.  
(b) Policy With Respect to Libya: The Congress further 
declares that it is the policy of the United States to seek 
full compliance by Libya with its obligations under 
Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 of the Security Council 
of the United Nations, including ending all support for 
acts of international terrorism and efforts to develop or 
acquire weapons of mass destruction.126  
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The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) imposed severe penalties on non-US firms 
that invested more than $40 million in Iran’s oil industry.127 Nevertheless, the Act had 
a loophole, since it did not ban foreign subsidiaries of US corporations of working 
with Iran, as long as the subsidiaries did not employ US citizens and were not a front 
for the parent company. For example, the US Department of Justice, a federal grand 
jury in Texas, and the Securities and Exchange Commission subsequently launched 
formal investigations to determine if Halliburton’s use of subsidiaries in Iran was in 
conflict with the Act. Halliburton responded in early 2005, saying that it would not 
seek new contracts in Iran, but would maintain the “existing contracts and 
commitments which the subsidiaries have previously undertaken” there.128  
The significance of Iran is that it is not just situated on the Persian Gulf; it is also 
situated on the Caspian Sea, which was a major part of Clinton’s policy for regional 
diversification of energy resources away from the Middle East.   
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REGIONAL DIVERSIFICATION OF  
US FOREIGN ENERGY SOURCES 
 
 
“In a world of growing energy demand, our nation cannot afford to rely on any single 
region for our energy supplies.” 
William J. Clinton, August 1997.129 
 
“I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become 
as strategically significant as the Caspian.” 
Richard Cheney, CEO, Halliburton, 1998.130  
 
The long-term stability of the Gulf region is elusive, due to the Iranian threat, terrorist 
attacks on US interests, instability caused by declining living standards, disputes 
within the ruling families of the Gulf States and border disputes among the Gulf 
States.131 Therefore, the United States is trying to diversify its foreign energy sources, 
in order to decrease the risks of supply disruptions. The United States sees the oil-rich 
Caspian region as an alternative to the Gulf.132 In describing the current geopolitics of 
the Caspian and Central Asian region, it has become customary to make some 
reference to the “Great Game” – the nineteenth century struggle between Great 
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Britain and Tsarist Russia for control over Central Asia.133 In Central Asia today, “big 
powers such as Russia, China, the United States, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, 
the Central Asian states themselves and the most powerful players of all, the oil 
companies, compete in… the New Great Game”134 over the energy resources of the 
region. However, the Caspian region suffered from the same problems as the Persian 
Gulf, and US involvement in the Caspian region would increase problems with 
Moscow, as the US and Russia compete over the region’s resources in the “New 
Great Game” which would involve competing pipeline routes and proxies.135 
 
The policy of regional diversification was not clearly defined in a formal policy 
document, but Energy Secretary Bill Richardson spoke in 1998 about “America’s 
energy security which depends on diversifying our sources of oil and gas worldwide,” 
adding that regional diversification was “also about preventing strategic inroads by 
those who don’t share our values.”136 Thus, diversification of energy resources 
became a matter of national security, especially that America’s oil imports increased 
by more than 50% during the Clinton era137 (where the US imported more than 50% 
of its oil in 1998.)138  
 
US policymakers started to pay more attention to the Caspian region due to oil 
contracts between US oil firms and Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in 1993-1994,139 in a 
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show of the public-private partnership between the US Government and the US oil 
corporations: 
It was not until major oil contracts were signed 
between U.S. oil companies and the governments of 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in 1993-1994 that the 
region really began to register on the radar screens of 
the American public. The commercial interests of U.S. 
oil companies in exploiting new energy reserves gave 
U.S. policymakers a specific interest to protect in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. The U.S. has come to see 
Caspian resources as one of the few prospects for 
diversifying world energy supply away from the Middle 
East.140 
 
 
In an April 1997 report to Congress, the Department of State explained the strategic 
importance of the Caspian region, and US policy began to “promote rapid deployment 
of Caspian energy resources” to “reinforce Western energy security.”141 Clinton was a 
vigorous advocate of American companies which sought drilling rights in the Caspian 
basin, and he explicitly designated the area’s energy resources a matter of national 
security. He said to President Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan in the White House in 
August 1997: “In a world of growing energy demand, our nation cannot afford to rely 
on any single region for our energy supplies”. By helping Azerbajian to develop its 
untapped oil reserves, “we not only help Azerbaijan to prosper, we also help diversify 
our energy supplies and strengthen our nation’s security.” Clinton repeated this view 
in conversations with other presidents from the region, including Nursultan 
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Saparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan.142 Citing the 
US-Russian competition over the region’s energy resources and routes, Sheila Heslin 
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of the US National Security Council told a Senate committee on September 17, 1997, 
that the goal of American policy in the Caspian is “in essence to break Russia’s 
monopoly of control over the transportation of oil from the region.”143  
 
Clinton also ordered the establishment of a Caspian task force headed by Deputy 
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and composed of officials from the State, Energy 
and Commerce Departments, the National Security Council, and the CIA. On July 21, 
1997, Talbott announced that the United States wanted economic and political reform 
to fight terrorism and to make the region a valuable trade route and a stable energy 
supplier:144  
If economic and political reform in the countries of the 
Caucasus and Central Asia does not succeed--if 
internal and cross-border conflicts simmer and flare--
the region could become a breeding ground of 
terrorism, a hotbed of religious and political 
extremism, and a battleground for outright war. It 
would matter profoundly to the United States if that 
were to happen in an area that sits on as much as 200 
billion barrels of oil.  That is yet another reason why 
conflict resolution must be job one for U.S. policy in the 
region: It is both the prerequisite for and an 
accompaniment to energy development.145  
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1997, Tree Media Group [accessed May 14, 2005]  
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America’s support to the states of the region would “have four dimensions: the 
promotion of democracy, the creation of free market economies, the sponsorship of 
peace and cooperation within and among the countries of the region, and their 
integration with the larger international community.”146 
 
American interest in the region was seen in visits by First Lady Hillary Clinton to the 
region, and CENTRAZBAT military exercises in September 1997 between the United 
States and the Central Asian region.147 In May 1998, during the “Crossroads of the 
World” conference in Istanbul, Energy Secretary Federico Peña announced the 
Caspian Sea Initiative “that brings together, for the first time, the heads of the US 
Government’s three independent trade and investment agencies – EXIM [Export-
Import Bank], OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] and TDA [Trade and 
Development Agency] - to coordinate the development and support of project 
opportunities in the Caspian.”148 Peña said that the Initiative emphasised the role of 
US private investment in promoting Caspian energy resources and transport routes:  
 
Through these agencies, the United States will dedicate 
and coordinate the diplomatic and financial resources 
needed to promote the rapid and effective development 
of Caspian energy resources and multiple export 
routes. This focus will help to mobilize and leverage 
private sector capital from the United States and other 
counties, as well as government participation from the 
                                                 
146 Talbott , “A Farewell to Flashman.”  
147 Dekmejian, Troubled Waters: 135-136 and Klare, Resource Wars: 1. Talbott also presented the 
actions of the US in promoting political and economic reform in the region, including supporting pro-
democratic NGOs, pledging more than $2.2 billion in overall assistance to the eight states of the 
Caucasus and Central Asian region since 1992, working through international financial institutions to 
promote reform in the region, employing Euro-American cooperation for that purpose, and 
encouraging these states to join the World Trade Organization in the future (Talbott, “A Farewell to 
Flashman”).  
148“Text: Pena announces Caspian Sea Initiative at Conference: Speech at Crossroads of the Worlds 
Conference May 27”, US Embassy in Israel, June 1, 1998 [accessed July 23, 2009] 
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countries in the region… This high-level policy 
attention will help ensure that American commercial 
interests and diplomatic interests work together in the 
Caspian region.149   
 
In March 1999, Ambassador Richard L. Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President 
and Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, testified before the 
Senate Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Exports and Trade 
Promotion and said that, “in general”, the American “Caspian energy policy 
[addressed] four strategic objectives in the Caspian region”: strengthening the 
independence, sovereignty, and prosperity of the new Caspian states and encouraging 
political and economic reform; mitigating regional conflicts by building economic 
linkages between the new states of region; bolstering the energy security of the U.S. 
and our allies and the energy independence of the Caspian region by ensuring the free 
flow of oil and gas to the world market place, and; enhancing commercial 
opportunities for U.S. companies, where the US Government’s role was to facilitate 
discussions between US firms and Central Asian governments. 150 
With this linkage of geo-politics, competition with Moscow, and the need to secure 
Caspian energy supplies and routes, the US government became more involved in the 
deals which the US oil companies signed with the region’s countries, such as the 
“Contract of the Century”; a Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) signed in 
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the President and Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, Before the Senate 
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September 1994 between Azerbaijan and a consortium of eight oil companies, 
including three US oil multinationals: Amoco, Pennzoil and Unocal.151  
Another major project in the region was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to 
carry Caspian oil and gas, passing through the Azeri capital, Baku, then Georgian 
capital Tbilisi, to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, avoiding Russian and Iranian controlled 
territory. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said in 1998 that the BTC pipeline was 
vital for American national security: “This is about America’s energy security, which 
depends on diversifying our sources of oil and gas… It is also about preventing 
strategic inroads by those who don’t share our values.”152 He added in 1999 that “this 
is not just another oil and gas deal… It is a strategic framework that advances 
America’s national security interests.”153 
The BTC pipeline was not the only pipeline planned by US oil corporations and 
supported by the US Government. Argentina’s Bridas and USA’s Unocal planned to 
build two pipelines from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan, to Pakistan (the 
                                                 
151 Dekmejian, Troubled Waters: 29, and Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 107. The agreement was signed 
with Azerbaijan’s state-owned oil company, the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) 
to exploit 4.3 billion barrels of estimated oil reserves in the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli fields, at a cost of 
$13 billion. Presiding over the assembled dignitaries from Azerbaijan and the world of multinational 
oil at the contract-signing ceremony was US Deputy Energy Secretary Bill White and UK Energy 
Minister Tim Eggar. The deal included the three US oil multinationals, Amoco, Pennzoil, Unocal, US 
energy services company McDermott, and the US-Saudi partnership Delta Hess, in addition to Britain’s 
BP, Norway’s Statoil, Russia’s Lukoil and the Turkish State Oil Company (Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 
107-108). The United States intervened decisively to exclude Iran from the Contract of the Century 
(Dekemejian, Troubled Waters: 134). Production Sharing Agreements will be discussed in more details 
in this thesis in the chapter on the American invasion of Iraq.  
152 Klare, Resource Wars: 90 and Klare, Blood and Oil: 155.  
153 Klare, Resource Wars: 102. Zbigniew Brzezinksi, former National Security Advisor to President 
Jimmy Carter, and consultant to US oil company Amoco, was a major supporter of the BTC pipeline, 
and was a key figure who played an influential role in directing the Clinton Administration’s attention 
towards the Caspian and Central Asia, and has made extensive visits to the region in the early 1990s as 
a consultant to Amoco. He was asked by Clinton in October 1995 to deliver a personal letter from 
Clinton to President Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan to engage Aliyev in a dialogue regarding the 
prospects of the BTC pipeline, which, according to Brzezinski, was “an initiative that subsequently has 
become an obstacle to a resurgence of Russian imperialism.” (Brzezinksi, Second Chance: 121 and 
Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 104-105). Israel, too, supported the BTC pipeline which would carry 
Caspian oil to the port of Haifa (Rashid, Taliban: 154). Israel also supported the BTC pipeline since it 
would enhance Turkey’s position in the region, given the alliances between Turkey and Israel.  
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Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Pipeline, or TAP Line). Pakistan’s Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto supported this idea. On October 21, 1995, Turkmen President 
Saparmurad Niyazov signed an agreement with Unocal in New York, where Henry 
Kissinger was present, acting as an adviser to Unocal, and the US government 
supported the deal.154 The pipeline project had an impact on Washington’s policy 
towards the Taliban who were in control of Kabul. 
 
The strategy over pipelines was “the driving force behind Washington’s interest in the 
Taliban.”155 The US policy on the Taliban in Afghanistan went through several 
phases “attempting quick-fix solutions rather than a strategic policy.” Initially, from 
1994 to 1998, the United States supported the Taliban, believing that they had anti-
Iranian and pro-US business inclinations which would help the Unocal pipeline. 
However, the US still “had no strategic plan towards accessing Central Asian energy
and thought that pipelines could be built without resolutions to regional civil wars,”
 
56 
fghanistan.   
                                                
1
especially the civil war in A
 
Furthermore, Zalmay Khalilzad, as a senior strategist at the RAND Corporation, 
expressed his support to the Taliban in the Washington Post in October 1996: “Based 
on recent conversations with Afghans, including various Taliban factions, and 
 
154 Kleveman, The New Great Game: 160 and Rashid, Taliban: 160.  Argentine’s oil company Bridas 
was competing with Unocal over the construction of this pipeline (ibid). Actually, the Taliban and 
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto preferred to deal with Argentine’s Bridas, not USA’s Unocal, 
since Bridas did not need loans from international financial institutions whose first requirement was 
international recognition of the Taliban regime. In March 1996, US ambassador to Paksitan, Tom 
Simmons, had a major row with heated arguments with Bhutto as he lobbied for Unocal. In 1996, the 
Pakistani President sacked Bhutto government on charges of corruption, which many believe was a 
result of US pressure. The new government of Nawaz Sharif turned its back to Bridas and instead 
supported Unocal (Kleveman, The New Great Game: 243 and Rashid, Taliban: 165). 
155 Rashid, Taliban: 163.  
156 Rashid, Taliban: 154, 163 and 176. The Saudis supported the Taliban in order to limit Iranian 
power, spread Wahhabism and help the American agenda in the region. Furthermore, Israel initially 
supported the Taliban, seeing that it was an anti-Iranian force.(Rashid, Taliban: 154). 
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Pakistanis, I am confident that they would welcome American reengagement. The 
Taliban does not practice the anti-US style of fundamentalism practiced by Iran – it is 
closer to the Saudi model.”157 (Khalilizad also worked as an adviser for Unocal.)158 
Similarly, Robin Raphel, assistant Secretary of State for Southeast Asian Affairs, told 
the UN that the Taliban did provide “a measure of peace and security.”159 She was a 
supporter of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline, saying at a press 
conference in Pakistan in April 1996 that “we have an American company which is 
interested in building a pipeline from Turkmenistan through to Pakistan [via 
Afghanistan]… The pipeline project will be very good for Turkmenistan, for Pakistan, 
and for Afghanistan as it will not only offer job opportunities but also energy for 
Afghanistan.”160  
Moreover, John J. Maresca, Vice President of International Relations, Unocal 
Corporation, testified to the Committee on International Relations of the House of 
Representatives in February 1998, that Afghanistan was the most practical and 
economic path for the pipeline between Turkmenistan and Pakistan (the 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline, or TAP pipeline), but since the country 
is not stable, then the United States should work on stabilizing it. His testimony 
focused on three issues: first, the need for multiple pipeline routes for Central Asian 
oil and gas resources; second, the need for US support for international and regional 
efforts to achieve balanced and lasting political settlements to the conflicts in the 
region, including Afghanistan; third, the need for structured assistance to encourage 
                                                 
157 Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquié, Forbidden Truth: US-Taliban Diplomacy and the 
Failed Hunt for Bin Laden. (New York: Nation Books, 2002): 21.  
158 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 61. 
159 Rashid, Taliban: 178. However, Raphel did tell the US Senate in May 1996 that “Afghanistan has 
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160 Rashid, Taliban: 166.  
75 
 
economic reforms and the development of appropriate investment climates in the 
region.161  
 
Thus, said Steve Coll, author of Ghost Wars, “American policy had been captured by 
the language of corporate deal making” as the State Department took up Unocal’s 
agenda as its own, and “American tolerance of the Taliban was… linked to the 
financial goals of an oil corporation.”162  
 
Both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance (the loose group of Afghan warlords who 
were fighting the Taliban) were interested in the TAP pipeline project. The Taliban 
were offered $250 million/year in transit fees, and both were told that the pipeline 
would give them money, jobs and gas, but it would not be feasible as long as the civil 
war went on. Also, as long as the Taliban were not recognized by the West as a 
legitimate government, Unocal was unable to secure loans from international financial 
institutions. But the Northern Alliance was not ready to make peace with the Taliban 
just for the pipeline.163  
 
However, after the attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania, and 
the American bombing of Afghanistan (and Sudan) in August 1998, the US-Taliban 
                                                 
161 John Maresca, “U.S. interests in the Central Asian Republics: Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One 
hundred fifth Congress, Second Session, February 12, 1998, Statement of John J. Maresca, Vice 
President of International Relations, Unocal Corporation”, Hartford Web Publishing, February 12, 
1998 [accessed May 13, 2006] http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/120.html  
162 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet 
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163 Kleveman, The New Great Game: 161, 162. Russia, India and Iran supported the Northern Alliance 
on this position, as all three countries had a reason to prevent the Unocal pipeline from going through 
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negotiations did stop, but for only six months,164 as the United States still needed a 
strong government in Afghanistan (which could only be provided by the Taliban) to 
preserve stability for US energy investment. Thus, even after the August 1998 
bombings, negotiations between the US and the Taliban continued.165 Senior 
American officials were dispatched to meet senior Taliban officials in Islamabad in 
February 1999. But the Americans did pressurize the UN every now and then to 
impose sanctions on the Taliban, to pressurize the Taliban into giving up Osama bin 
Laden.166 In July 1999, Clinton cut off commercial ties with the Taliban and froze all 
of their US assets to press them to hand in Osama bin Laden,167 but secret meetings 
with Taliban officials continued nevertheless.168  
 
To facilitate the passage of oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian region to the West, 
and to secure America’s oil interests in Eurasia, it was essential to ensure US 
influence in the Balkan region. During Operation Allied force, the US-led NATO war 
on Yugoslavia in 1999, critics of NATO alleged that the United States was in fact 
seeking to secure a passage for oil and gas from the Caspian region. In 1997, BP and 
Halliburton proposed the Albanian-Macedonian-Bulgarian Oil (AMBO) pipeline that 
would transport oil from Burgas in Bulgaria, through Skopje in Macedonia to Vlorë, a 
port in Albania on the Adriatic Sea, where supertankers would load the oil from Vlorë 
                                                 
164 Brisard, Forbidden Truth: 27.  
165 Brisard, Forbidden Truth: 9.  
166 Brisard, Forbidden Truth: 29.  
167 Brisard, Forbidden Truth:  6 and 31.  
168 Brisard, Forbidden Truth: 8 and 33. For instance, in January 2000, US Assistant Secretary of State 
Karl Inderfurth met Taliban officials in Pakistan (ibid). After the bombings, the United States urged 
Saudi Arabia to use its influence on the Taliban to help capture bin Laden. Saudi Arabia suspended 
diplomatic relations with the Taliban and ceased all aid to them as a result of the insults to Prince Turki 
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(London: Abacus, 2007): 48-49, Bronson, Thicker Than Oil: 227 and Rashid, Taliban: 138-139 and 
202,). But the Saudis did not withdraw recognition of the Taliban government, despite this incident 
(Rashid, Taliban: 139). 
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and ship it to the West. After the NATO bombing campaign ended, the US built 
Camp Bondsteel in southern Kosovo, the largest American foreign military base 
constructed since Vietnam. Camp Bondsteel was built by Brown & Root, a division of 
Halliburton, and is located close to vital oil pipelines and energy corridors, such as the 
AMBO pipeline.169 In a demonstration of what may be dubbed the “military-
petroleum complex,” Brown & Root performed the initial feasibility study of the 
AMBO pipeline,170 where the link between AMBO and Camp Bondsteel was a part of 
what Chalmers Johnson considered an American empire of military bases, where the 
US is building military bases in the oil-rich region of southern Eurasia, including the 
Middle East and Central Asia, in order to control oil supplies going to other 
countries.171 Thus, Operation Allied Force was necessary to preserve US primacy in 
Europe, and to preserve openness and economic integration.172    
 
Despite all of these efforts, however, the Clinton Administration failed to establish an 
alternative source of energy in the Caspian region. A major reason for this failure was 
the overoptimistic estimations of Caspian energy resources, leading to unrealistic 
expectations that dependence on Middle East oil can decrease significantly. An 
Energy Information Administration report in 1998 described Central Asia as a “new 
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Middle East”173 with overoptimistic estimates forecasting reserves as large as 
Kuwait’s or even the Persian Gulf’s.174  
 
Another reason for the failure to provide an alternative to the Middle East in the 
Caspian was Washington’s lack of coherent strategy towards the region, which led to 
the rise of anti-American Islamic militancy. As Ahmed Rashid noted, Washington 
was never serious about developed a new strategic framework or vision for Central 
Asia after the end of the Cold War. The United States dealt with issues as they came 
up in a haphazard, piecemeal fashion, pursuing constantly changing single-issue 
agendas that were driven more by American politics than the goal of ending the civil 
war in Afghanistan.175 Rashid added that:   
Had the United States been serious about its strategic 
vision for Central Asia, policymakers should not only 
have talked about conflict resolution; they should have 
insisted that it be the number one priority. In 
particular, the United States should have lent political 
                                                 
173 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 104, 118, 119, 197. 
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119. Comparing the figures published by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) on Caspian 
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policy”, Information Clearing House, May 26-27, 2003 [accessed January 25, 2010] 
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Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, “Shocks of a world of cheap oil”, Foreign Affairs, 
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exaggerated (Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 157). 
175 Rashid 2001, Taliban: 176, Rashid, Jihad: 190, Ahmed Rashid, “The Taliban: exporting 
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muscle to the UN attempts to end the civil war in 
Afghanistan, which was posing the key threat to Central 
Asia.176  
 
Fiona Hill added in February 2001 that “United States policy towards the Caucasus 
and Central Asia over the last ten years has been marked by a distinct lack of 
direction. The US stumbled into the region.” Like Rashid, she believed that decisions 
on the region were “ad hoc,” saying that “all of these policy decisions [on pipelines in 
the region] were ad hoc responses to increasing U.S. engagement in Caspian oil 
development. They were not part of a grander strategy for the Caucasus and Central 
Asian states.”177  
 
Like the Middle East, Central Asia would not fit in Clinton’s Engagement and 
Enlargement, where Washington continued to support non-democratic regimes as 
long as they provide a stable supply of oil and gas for Western economies. In this 
sense, there was no difference between US policy in the Middle East, and the 
Caspian.  
 
The Caspian was not the only region which Washington saw as an alternative source 
to the Middle East. There were other regions, including the Western Hemisphere and 
Africa. With the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of 1989 and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994, the United States ensured the integration of 
Canada in a continental energy market.178 Things were not as successful with Mexico, 
however, as the United States failed to pressurize Mexico to open its energy sector for 
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US investment during NAFTA negotiations. The failure with Mexico foretold the 
failure with other potential hemispheric partners such as Venezuela, and by 2001, the 
hemispheric solution was not successful in Mexico or in Hugo Chavez’s 
Venezuela.179  
 
As for Africa, America’s other option for regional diversification, there was no 
unified agreement that would link countries in the same way that NAFTA had tied the 
US to Canada and Venezuela,180 although the US Government did turn its attention to 
the continent and its energy resources.181  
 “We have substantially changed the way the US government is structured to deal 
with Africa” said the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in 1999. “There 
was a time not long ago when Africa was the exclusive domain of one understaffed 
bureau at Foggy Bottom”, but now, he said, “virtually every government agency is 
building the capacity to implement new programs that support our policy of 
comprehensive engagement with Africa… We have important strategic interests in 
Africa… Africa is the source of over 16% of our nation’s imported oil… Within the 
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(Klare, Resource Wars: 46).  
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clothes, making $109.7 million in Somalia, again showing that companies make profit out of US 
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World’s Only Superpower, (London: Zed Books, 2001): 158, Briody, The Halliburton Agenda: 186). 
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next decade, oil imports from Africa are expected to surpass those from the Persian 
Gulf.”182 In April 1999, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson visited Africa, to discuss 
Western energy investments,183 and during Clinton’s second visit to Africa in August 
2000, there was a major focus on energy concerns. In Nigeria, Clinton appealed to the 
Nigerian leaders to increase their production of oil in order to alleviate the worldwide 
shortage of petroleum.184  
 
CONCLUSION: 
THE US OPEN DOOR EMPIRE CONTINUES DEPENDING ON OIL, BUT 
DEMOCRATISATION FAILS AND AN AD HOC POLICY CONTINUES 
 
 
It may not be surprising that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, “the first post-Cold War 
crisis turned out to be a geopolitical oil crisis.”185 The US reaction to the crisis was 
meant to secure access to the region’s oil, and to maintain US prestige in order to 
protect the global system of Open Door imperialism.  
George H. W. Bush and William J. Clinton worked on sustaining America’s Open 
Door empire based on the political economy of the large corporation, and the control 
of energy resources using a public-private partnership between the US Government 
and the US oil corporations, the role of which was vital in maintaining the 
international oil system on which the US empire is based, and in ensuring US energy 
security.   
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 The Middle East and the Caspian region did not fit in the democratising efforts of the 
New World Order, nor in Clinton’s Engagement and Enlargement, as the Democracy 
Conundrum hindered a real effort to reshape the Middle East, for fear of any 
instability which might threaten the pro-US regimes and the Middle East’s energy 
resources. Instead, Bush and Clinton preferred to support undemocratic regimes like 
the Gulf States, the Caspian states and the Taliban, and limiting themselves to a case-
by-case approach to deal with specific issues such as securing energy resources, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, containing Iraq and Iran, and the rise of al Qaeda, failing to 
come up with a comprehensive policy to link securing energy resources to 
democratisation and Arab-Israeli peace.  
 
As the United States attempted to diversify America’s foreign energy resources away 
from the troublesome Middle East, it faced problems in the alternative regions of the 
Caspian, the Western Hemisphere and Africa. However, the US did not have a real 
comprehensive policy on these regions, and would thus fail to make them suitable 
enough as alternatives to the Middle East. Clinton bequeathed these problems to 
George W. Bush, a new president who had foreign energy procurement high on his 
agenda since the early days in office. This would be evident in the formation of the 
Energy Task Force only a few days after he took office, and the subsequent National 
Energy Policy (NEP) of May 2001.
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE UNILATERAL OILMAN 
 
ENERGY PROCUREMENT IN GEORGE W. BUSH’S 
FOREIGN POLICY 
 (JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2001) 
 
 
In his memoirs, Bill Clinton wrote about a visit from President-elect George W. Bush 
in the White House on December 19, 2000. According to Clinton, Bush’s foreign 
policy team “believed that the biggest security issues were the need for national 
missile defence and [action against] Iraq.” In reaction, Clinton wrote:  
I told him [Bush] that based on the last eight years, I 
thought his biggest security problems, in order, would 
be Osama bin Laden; the absence of peace in the 
Middle East; the standoff between nuclear powers India 
and Pakistan and the ties of Pakistanis to the Taliban 
and al Qaeda; North Korea; and then Iraq. I said that 
my biggest disappointment was not getting bin Laden, 
that we still might achieve an agreement in the Middle 
East, and that we had almost reached a deal with North 
Korea to end its missile program, but that he would 
probably have to go there to close the deal.  
 
He listened to what I had to say without much comment, 
then changed the subject to how I did the job.1  
 
Beyond Iraq and the NMD program, it is more accurate to say that the Bush 
Administration had two “strategic priorities”, or two foreign policy strands, upon 
taking office in 2001: the modernization of US military capabilities, and the 
                                                 
1 Bill Clinton, My Life (London: Arrow Books, 2005): 935. Also see Michael Gordon and Bernard 
Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq ( London: Atlantic Books, 
2006): 13-14.  
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procurement of additional oil from foreign sources.2 Anti-terrorism was added as a 
third major strand after the September 11 attacks, and there was also a fourth strand 
after September 11; the global power projection envisaged by the Quadrennial 
Defence Review of September 2001. Bush’s focus on Iraq aimed to serve all foreign 
policy strands simultaneously.   
 
The United States did not have an energy policy since the days of Jimmy Carter, 
during the years of soaring oil prices. There were two main reasons why the Bush 
Administration wanted a return to an energy policy; the increased US dependence on 
foreign oil as US oil imports exceeded the psychological 50% threshold, and the 
increased clout of the US energy industry in the Bush Administration.3 No other 
candidate in federal office received as much money from the oil industry as Bush did 
in 2000,4 (making Bush “the candidate of Big Oil” and “the ultimate insider.”5) 
Bush’s links to the energy lobby were evident early in his administration, as nine days 
before he was inaugurated, energy lobbyists gathered at the American Petroleum 
Institute (API) offices on K Street in Washington.6 Key leaders from the American 
                                                 
2 Michael T Klare, “Resources”, in John Feffer (ed.) Power Trip: US Unilateralism and Global 
Strategy After September 11 (New York, Seven Stories Press, 2003): 50-51 and Klare, Blood and Oil: 
72-73.  
3 Klare, Blood and Oil: 13, 56 and Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 9, 66. It is worth mentioning that 
domestic US oil production peaked in 1970, according to King Hubbert, who introduced Hubbert’s 
Peak theory in 1956, which predicted that US oil production would peak between 1966 and 1972 
(Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: 76).  It is forecasted that the US will import 100% of its oil by 2050 
(Rutledgte, Addicted  to Oil: 130). 
4 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 59 and Barton Gelman, Angler: The shadow presidency of Dick Cheney. 
(London: Penguin Books, 2009): 94. From the energy and natural resources sector as a whole, Bush 
received almost $3 million, of which $1.9 million came from the oil and gas sector, which was 13 times 
as much as the money received from the oil and gas industry by the Gore campaign (Rutledge, 
Addicted to Oil: 59 and Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud: 191).  From 1998 to 2003, Halliburton’s 
contributions to the Republican Party totalled $1,146,248, and $55, 650 went to the Democratic Party 
(Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Blimes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict. 
(London: Allen Lane, 2008): 15). The coal industry contributed $700,000 to the Bush campaign 
(Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud: 218). 
5 Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud: 198. 
6 Bruce P. Montgomery, The Bush-Cheney Administration’s Assault on Open Government. 
(Connecticut: Praeger: 2008): 64 and Howard Fineman and Michael Isikoff. “Big energy at the table”, 
Newsweek, May 14, 2001: 48. 
86 
 
Petroleum Institute were appointed to pivotal position in Bush’s administration. “Not 
since the rise of the railroads more than a century ago has an industry placed so many 
foot soldiers at the top of the new administration” wrote Newsweek.7 Industry leaders, 
who donated $22.5 million to the Republicans in the 2000 election, enjoyed constant 
contact with the Energy Task Force,8 a committee headed by Cheney to come up with 
an energy plan for the Bush Administration. Controversially, no one has enjoyed 
better access than Enron CEO Ken Lay, who was a good friend of Bush.9 Moreover, 
as soon as he was in office as Vice-President, Cheney began a series of meetings with 
the chief executives of major oil companies who supported the Republicans in 2000, 
showing the clout of the US energy corporations in the working of the Energy Task 
Force.10 Furthermore, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham hosted 109 representatives 
of energy firms between January and May 2001, including ChevronTexaco, 
ExxonMobil and Enron, who were lavish contributors to the Bush campaign in 
2000.11 Cheney defended these meetings, saying that “just because somebody makes 
a campaign contribution doesn’t mean that they should be denied the opportunity to
express their view to government officials.”
 
                                                
12 Nevertheless, the influence of business 
interests on the Bush Administration’s energy plans, devised by a task force headed 
by Cheney, would be evident.  
 
These ties to the oil industry date back to the earlier careers of Bush and Cheney 
before they took office. Bush, who aspired to be an oilman like his father, established 
 
7 Montgomery, The Bush-Cheney Administration’s Assault on Open Government: 64 and Fineman, 
“Big Energy at the Table”: 48-49. 
8 Barton Gelman, Angler: The shadow presidency of Dick Cheney. (London: Penguin Books, 2009): 81, 
Fineman, “Big Energy at the Table”: 49-50. 
9 Gelman, Angler: 81, Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 58, 59 and Fineman, “Big Energy at the Table”: 50. 
10 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil:  66.  
11 Klare, Blood and Oil: 58.  
12 Bruce P. Montgomery, The Bush-Cheney Administration’s Assault on Open Government. 
(Connecticut: Praeger: 2008):63. 
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his first energy company, Arbusto (Spanish for “Bush”) in Texas in 1977. However, 
the company was struggling, as it drilled one dry hole after another. In 1984, in need 
of more financing, Bush sold Arbusto to another oil company, Spectrum 7, where he 
was given the job of CEO with a salary of $75,000 and 16.3% of the company’s 
stocks. To many, the Spectrum-Arbusto transaction was seen as a bail-out of the 
younger Bush by his father’s friends. But Spectrum 7, too, was suffering as global oil 
prices were as low as $10 in the mid-1980s, and oil companies were suffering from 
layoffs and losses. In 1986, Harken, an oil and gas company based in Texas and 
partially owned by George Soros and Harvard University, bought Bush’s failing 
company for $2.25 million in stock. Bush got roughly $600,000 out of the deal, a seat 
on the board, and a consultancy paying between $50,000 and $120,000 annually. 
Harken’s motivation to bail Bush out was its eagerness to develop ties with the son of 
the US vice president. But Harken, too, was suffering from dry wells and financial 
problems. However, governments of the Gulf states, eager to foster their ties with the 
son of the US president, started to invest in Harken and grant it drilling rights.13  
 
Similarly, Dick Cheney has a background in the oil sector. As Secretary of Defence in 
1990, he argued to Bush that Saddam’s invasion was a far more important issue than 
Kuwait, as it was about oil.14 On leaving office in 1993, Cheney became a senior 
fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a conservative Washington-based 
think tank.15 In 1994, thanks to the global relations which he developed as Secretary 
                                                 
13 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 54-56, Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud: 70, 115-122 and  Jacob 
Weisberg, The Bush Tragedy: The Unmaking of a President (London: Bloomsbury, 2008): 49, 55. 
14 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the 
New World Order (London: Faber and Faber: 1994): 76, Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 51.   
15 Briody, The Halliburton Agenda: 196-197, Burbach and Tarbell, Imperial Overstretch: 78-84, 91-92, 
207, Harper and Clarke, America Alone: 48 and Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 62. The AEI was known to 
be among the think tanks financed by the American corporate right to promote free enterprise, free 
market principles, limited government intervention and a strong US military to protect America’s 
business interests around the world (Burbach and Tarbell, Imperial Overstretch: 78-84, 91-92, 207). 
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of Defence, he was appointed by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev to the 
twelve-member Kazakhstan Oil Advisory Board, where Cheney helped broker the 
deal which set up the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), a 1,580-km pipeline to 
transport oil from Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oilfield (operated by Chevron) to the Russian 
Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.16 Cheney also became one of the seven-member 
Honorary Council of Advisors for the Azerbaijan-US Chamber of Commerce, which 
focused on promoting the interests of US oil corporations in Azerbaijan.17 He then 
took the job of CEO at Halliburton from October 1995 to August 2000.18 Halliburton 
appointed him CEO because, during his days as Secretary of Defence, he developed 
good relations with the Saudis and considerable leverage in Washington which 
Halliburton could use.19 According to the Washington Post: “soon he was on first 
name basis with oil ministers all over the world, building on the ties he had developed 
in the Middle East during the Pentagon days.” Between 1994 and 2001, Halliburton’s 
revenues increased by 127%.20  
 
As he took his vice presidential post in 2001, Cheney asserted that there would be no 
conflict of interest on his part because “since I left Halliburton to become George 
Bush’s vice president, I’ve severed all my ties with the company, gotten rid of all my 
financial assets.” Indeed, two days before the inauguration, Dick Cheney and his wife 
gave away an estimated $8 million in stock options from Halliburton and six other 
                                                 
16 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 62, 110, 116. Tengiz is the sixth largest oil bubble in the world, containing 
about 25 billion barrels of oil, discovered in 1979. When Chevron bought a drilling concession for 
Tengiz in 1993, forming the 50-50 joint venture Tengizchevroil with Kazakhstan’s state-owned oil 
company, it became the first Western oil company to massively invest on post-Soviet territory 
(Kleveman, The New Great Game: 80 and Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 61). 
17 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 62. 
18 Briody, The Halliburton Agenda: 198, Bruce P. Montgomery, The Bush-Cheney Administration’s 
Assault on Open Government. (Connecticut: Praeger: 2008):62 and Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 62. 
19 Briody, The Halliburton Agenda: 197-198, Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 62 and Unger, House of Bush, 
House of Saud: 225-226. 
20 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 63. 
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companies. (Although he neglected to say that he was still due approximately 
$500,000 in deferred compensation from Halliburton and could potentially profit from 
his $433,333 shares of unexercised Halliburton stock options. A Congressional 
Research Service report said that unexercised options in a private corporation, as well 
as deferred salary received from a private corporation, were “retained ties” or 
“linkages” and should be reported as “financial interest.”)21 Nevertheless, Halliburton 
and its subsidiaries would benefit greatly during the George W. Bush Administration 
from non-bidding contracts following the Iraq war, as Cheney’s role was vital in 
providing for the no-bid contracts awarded to KBR, a subsidiary of Halliburton, in 
Iraq.22 Cheney’s role was also vital in devising the administration’s global energy 
policy, as he headed the Energy Task Force responsible for devising this policy, 
resulting in a global energy policy which reflected his worldview,23 his belief in the 
vital role of energy in US national security, and his belief that the US Government 
should ease the restrictions on the work of the energy sector.24 
 
As President (and Vice President), the older Bush perfected “access capitalism” and 
the so-called “revolving door” in Washington, where individuals move between the 
government sector and the business sector, especially the oil and defence industries.25 
The younger Bush would take business-government relations to a new level, as never 
before had the highest level of an administration so nakedly represented the oil 
                                                 
21 Gellman, Angler: 94 and Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud: 225. 
22 “Memorandum for Commander US Army Corps of Engineers: Subject: Justification and Approval 
(J&A) for other than full and open competition for the execution of the Contingency Support Plan”, 
February 28, 2003, (Declassified April 22, 2004), [accessed January 11, 2008] 
http://www.judicialwatch.org/archive/2004/kbr.pdf, pages 4-7. 
23 Gellman, Angler: 90. 
24 Gellman, Angler: 94. 
25 Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud: 157. 
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industry,26 leading to an extraordinary confluence of power in the public and private 
sector.27 
 
 
 
THE UNILATERAL OILMAN: 
A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO BUSH’S FOREIGN POLICY 
AGENDA 
 
Beyond the foreign policy goal of energy procurement, Bush had an existing set of 
goals even before the September 11 attacks. The Bush Administration believed that 
the advancement of its military capabilities, namely through the introduction and 
development of the NMD system, would give it protection against rogue states with 
weapons of mass destruction, and, presumably, preserve the American freedom of 
military action in a conflict including any state armed with weapons of mass 
destruction, by backing up an American first strike against, for example, North Korea 
or any other enemy state. Iraq was the one rogue state which attracted most attention 
during the early days of the Bush Administration. Iraq could be regarded as a point of 
intersection between the two strands of energy procurement and military 
advancement. That was evident in Bush’s desire to install a NMD system to face 
threats from rogue states, including Iraq, and evident in Secretary of Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld’s recommendation to pursue a military action against Iraq that would 
demonstrate the American intention to face the threats against US interests, and, at the 
                                                 
26 Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud: 222, 284. 
27 Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud: 223. 
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same time, secure Iraq’s oil resources for foreign companies which looked forward to 
invest in it. Because of this intersection of foreign policy goals, Iraq became Bush’s 
number one concern in the Middle East, instead of the Arab-Israeli peace process. 
 
Despite having the goals of energy procurement and military advancement, the Bush 
team did not produce any clear policy documents or statements of “grand strategy” or 
“national security strategy” (like George H. W. Bush’s New World Order or Clinton’s 
Engagement and Enlargement) before September 11, 2001. According to Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, “there had been little reason to expect… grand historical swings from the 
new president” when he first took office in January 2001,28 as he “initially focused on 
unfinished business: missile defence, military transformation, big power politics.”29 
The Bush Administration thus lacked a grand foreign policy vision, limiting itself to 
promoting the NMD, devising a National Energy Policy (with domestic and foreign 
elements for energy procurement), and focusing on the Iraqi question and big power 
politics.  
 
During the 2000 presidential campaign, Bush emphasized the need for America to 
conduct a humble foreign policy, promoting what Halper and Clarke call an “interest-
driven foreign policy”, as he withdrew from commitments such as peacekeeping and 
nation-building.30 As Bush ran for president, he argued that the focus of American 
efforts should shift away from Clinton-era preoccupations with nation building, 
international social work, and the incoherent use of force, and toward cultivating 
                                                 
28 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower 
(New York: Basic Books, 2008): 137.  
29 Brzezinksi, Second Chance, 139.  
30 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: 133. 
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great-power relations and rebuilding the nations’ military,31 as he said that he “would 
be very careful about using [US] troops as nation builders”32 and that “we can’t allow 
ourselves to get overextended.”33 (He was therefore eager to extract the US military 
from its nation-building efforts in the Balkans.)34 In the words of Jacob Weisberg, 
Bush was a “Unipolar Realist” who dismissed peacekeeping and nation-building not 
driven by the American interest, had little use for the “smiles and scowls of 
diplomacy” and sought to abrogate the ABM treaty in favour of deploying the NMD35 
(as he thought that the ABM treaty was a relic of the past.)36 The United States has 
previously resorted to unilateralism at many points in history, but Bush took it to a 
new level, not just as an ad hoc policy, but a new and wider strategic orientation, 37 in 
what Charles Krauthammer called a “new unilateralism,” praising the Bush 
Administration for “willing to assert American freedom of action and the primacy of 
American national interests… rather than contain American power within a vast web 
of constraining international agreements.”38   
 
Nevertheless, Bush acknowledged that “America must be involved in the world,” 
setting out his foreign policy priorities in a speech on November 19, 1999, focusing 
on relations with rising powers such as Russia, China and India, and discussing the 
                                                 
31 John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition: The Lures of Preemption”, Foreign Affairs, 
September/October 2002, Vol. 81 Issue 5.  
32 “The First Gore-Bush Presidential Debate”, Commission on Presidential Debates, October 3, 2000 
[accessed July 27, 2008] http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000a.html 
33 “The Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate”, Commission on Presidential Debates, October 11, 
2000 [accessed June 27, 2008] http://www.debates/org/pages/trans2000b.html 
34 Gordon, Cobra II: 14, Joshua Hammer, “On Patrol in Bosnia: US soldiers and the European allies 
agree Bush’s threatened pullback could mean trouble”, Newsweek, February 5, 2001: 24 and Ramesh 
Ratnesar, “Present Danger”, Time, February 5, 2001: 28. 
35 Jacob Weisberg, The Bush Tragedy: The Unmaking of a President (London: Bloomsbury, 2008): 
186-187. Also see G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition (Cambridge: Polity, 2006): 
207. 
36 Mark Thompson, “The Secretary of Missile Defence”, Time, May 14, 2001: 36. 
37 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition (Cambridge: Polity, 2006): 245-246. 
38 Charles Krauthammer, “The New Unilateralism”, Washington Post, June 8, 2001 [accessed 
December 28, 2009] http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A38839-2001Jun7?language=printer 
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expansion of NATO and weapons proliferation.39 He stopped short of declaring a 
grand vision of his own, preferring instead to focus on these unfinished issues. He 
also rejected the notion of an American empire, and called for a humble foreign 
policy: “Let us reject the blinders of isolationism, just as we refuse the crown of 
empire. Let us not dominate others with our power… And let us have an American 
foreign policy that reflects American character. The modesty of true strength. The 
humility of real greatness.”40 
 
Contrary to popular belief, and despite the fact that many of Bush’s initial unipolar 
policies coincided with the beliefs of the neo-conservatives, his administration was 
not simply “neo-conservatives came to office.”41 “When campaigning, Bush did not 
articulate a foreign policy that reflected the neo-conservative view of America’s role 
                                                 
39 George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism”, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 
Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999 [accessed October 10, 2008] 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm and “Bush backs NATO expansion”, BBC 
News, June 15, 2001, [accessed June 15, 2001] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1389581.stm. 
According to Michael Meacher, The principal objective for the continued existence and expansion of 
NATO is the encirclement of Russia and the pre-emption of China dominating access to oil and gas in 
the Caspian Sea and Middle East regions ( Michael Meacher, “The era of oil wars”, Guardian, June 29, 
2008 [accessed June 20, 2009] 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jun/29/oil.oilandgascompanies). 
40 Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism”. Nevertheless, Bush’s main agenda as he entered 
office was not foreign policy, but his tax cuts program (James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History 
of Bush’s War Cabinet. (London: Penguin Books, 2004): 290). Early in his administration, Bush 
campaigned for a 10-year, $1.6 trillion tax cuts program, as his fiscal initiative to stimulate consumer 
spending and “kick-start” the US economy out of the recession from which it suffered in 2000-2001. 
However, the program was criticized by the Democrats who said that it disproportionately favoured the 
rich, and that such a huge tax cut would return the federal government to deficit (“President Bush’s tax 
cure”, BBC News, February 12, 2001, [accessed May 12, 2007] 
http://news/bbc/co/uk/1/hi/business/1162709.stm) and thus have a negative impact on social programs 
(“President Bush’s tax cure” and “Democrats declare war on Bush cuts”, BBC News,  March 1, 2001, 
[accessed May 16, 2007] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1194600.stm). On Saturday May 
26, 2001, the House of Representatives approved Bush’s tax cuts program by a vote of 240-154. Hours 
later, the Senate approved it by a vote of 58-33. The Economic Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation 
Act (EGTTRA) thus became law, after reaching a compromise on the 11-year, $1.35 trillion tax cut 
package, which is smaller than what Bush initially proposed (“US Congress passes tax cuts”, BBC 
News, May 26, 2001, [accessed May 16, 2007] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1352719.stm). 
41 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: 14, 129, 130, and Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, America 
Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (first edition). (Washington, D.C., Brookings 
Institution Press, 2003): 15-16.   
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in the world,” said Halper and Clarke.42 Bush himself was not a neo-conservative, as 
David Frum said that Bush “was not at all an ideological man.”43 Vice President Dick 
Cheney, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, Republican Senators, various 
interest groups and Bush’s personal beliefs all had an influence on Bush’s position on 
Kyoto, the ICC and the ABM treaty.44  
 
 
FOREIGN ENERGY, ENERGY CRISIS AND  
NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
The perceived relationship between energy sufficiency and US national security had 
emerged as a significant issue during the 2000 presidential campaign,45 due to soaring 
petrol prices in the summer of 2000 and the spectre of heating oil shortage in the 
                                                 
42 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: 131.  
43 David Frum. The Right Man: An Inside Account of the Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush, 
(London: Weidnfeld and Nicolson, 2003): 57.  
44 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: 129. There were different visions among the members of the 
Bush Administration. Vice President Dick Cheney was focused on the promotion of a national energy 
strategy (as evident in his meetings with energy executives days after Bush’s inauguration), and on the 
Iraqi problem, as seen during the first NSC meeting on January 30, 2001, as Cheney was 
“uncharacteristically excited” during the meeting as CIA Director George Tenet was showing photos of 
what he said was Iraqi WMD factories (Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: 72). This was also evident in 
Cheney’s quest to outgoing Secretary of Defence William Cohen to arrange a security briefing for the 
president elect, with a focus on Iraq. (Gordon, Cobra II: 13, and George Tenet, At the Centre of the 
Storm: My Years at the CIA. (London: Harper Press, 2007): 301). Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 
priorities were multilateral agreements and using diplomacy “to repair rips in the status quo rather than 
chart a bold course” for US foreign policy (Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, America Unbound: The 
Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (first edition). (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 
2003): 46). Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld was promoting military preponderance through the 
National Missile Defence system, in order to deter against threats from rogue states, and in taking 
action against what he perceived as the Iraqi threat. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice was 
interested mainly in China and Russia, as she wrote that “for America and our allies, the most daunting 
task is to find the right balance in our policy toward Russia and China. Both are equally important to 
the future of international peace.” (Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”, Foreign 
Affairs, January/February 2000: 55). She did note, however, that “the challenges they pose are very 
different”, as China is “a rising power” while, in the case of Russia, America’s security is more 
threatened by Russia’s weakness and incoherence than by its strength (Rice, “Promoting the National 
Interest”: 55, 58-59.)  
45 Michael Klare, Resource Wars:  The new landscape of global conflict, (New York, Owl Books, 
2002): 9. 
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winter. During the presidential campaign, Dick Cheney accused Bill Clinton and Al 
Gore of leaving the United States without an energy policy. Senate Majority Leader 
Trent Lott also emphasized the energy theme, promising that Bush and Cheney would 
establish a clear approach to energy issues.46 In part, the Bush Administration’s claim 
that America was suffering from an “energy crisis” was due to the electricity cut-offs 
in California, promoting Bush and Cheney to say that they were “deeply concerned” 
about a broader energy shortage: “It’s becoming very clear in our country that 
demand is outstripping supply.”47  
 
On March 14, 2001, during a visit to the Youth Entertainment Academy in New 
Jersey, Bush repeatedly declared that the United States was suffering from an “energy 
crisis”, adding that “the reality is, the nation has got a problem when it comes to 
energy. We need more sources of energy.”48 A few days later, on March 19, Bush 
once again provoked the prospect of an energy crisis after meeting the National 
Energy Policy Development Group (the group responsible for devising a national 
energy plan, headed by Cheney), saying that “demand for energy in the United States 
is increasing, much more so than production is, and, as a result, we’re finding in 
certain parts of the country that we’re short on energy”, and adding that  “one thing is 
for certain, there are no short-term fixes; that the solution for our energy shortage 
requires long-term thinking and a plan that we’ll implement that will take time to 
                                                 
46 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 66 and “Cheney, oil executives raise $8 million for GOP”, Quest for the 
Presidency, September 28, 2000, [accessed August 12, 2002] 
http://quest.cjonline.com/stories/092800/gen_0928006149.shtml 
47 “Alaska or bust”, The Economist, February 10, 2001: 21. 
48 George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President while touring Youth Entertainment Academy”, White 
House, March 14, 2001 [accessed February 6, 2008] 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314-2.html 
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bring to fruition.”49 Furthermore, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham warned the US 
Chamber of Commerce in March 2001 that the US was facing the most serious energy 
shortage since the 1970s, citing the energy crisis as a threat to US national security. 
Without a solution, he said, the energy crisis will threaten prosperity and national 
security and change the way Americans live.50 
 
In April, the report of an independent task force cosponsored by the James A. Baker 
III Institute and The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), titled Strategic Energy 
Policy: Challenges for the 21st Century was submitted to Vice-President Cheney.51 It 
echoed Bush’s apocalyptic language, citing the energy crisis as a threat to US national 
security effects on US foreign policy:    
 
As the 21st century opens, the energy sector is in critical 
condition. A crisis could erupt at any time from any 
number of factors and would inevitably affect every 
country in today’s globalized world. While the origins 
of a crisis are hard to pinpoint, it is clear that energy 
disruptions could have a potentially enormous impact 
on the US and the world economy and would affect US 
national security and foreign policy in dramatic ways.52  
 
The Strategic Energy Policy report made it clear that the most serious threat came 
from the oil sector, and that it is the most serious oil crisis since the 1970s, saying 
that: 
                                                 
49 George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President in photo opportunity after meeting with National 
Energy Policy Development Group”, White House, March 19, 2001 [accessed February 6, 2008] 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010320-1.html.  
50 Ian Rutledge. Addicted to Oil: America’s Relentless Drive for Energy Security. (London: I. B. Tauris, 
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the world is currently precariously close to utilizing all 
of its available global oil production capacity, raising 
the chances of an oil-supply crisis with more 
substantial consequences than seen in three decades. 
These limits mean that America can no longer assume 
that oil-producing states will provide more oil. Nor is it 
strategically and politically desirable to remedy our 
present tenuous situation by simply increasing our 
dependence on a few foreign sources.53  
 
 
The CFR report also emphasized the mission of Cheney’s Energy Task Force to work 
out “how best to cope with high energy prices and how best to cope with reliance on 
foreign oil.”54 Eventually, Cheney’s efforts with the Energy Task Force led to the 
National Energy Policy: Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, 
released in May 2001, with the warning that dwindling supplies of oil and gas, an 
antiquated power grid and burdensome regulation threatened to drag the United States 
into the worst energy supply crisis since the 1970s. Taking the interests of the energy 
industry into consideration, the National Energy Policy (NEP) also “promised 
something for everyone in the world of energy business.”55  
 
Bush’s public introduction of the NEP came on May 17, 2001, after visiting a high-
tech energy generation plan, as he gave a speech at the River Centre Convention 
Centre in St. Paul, Minnesota, promoting his energy plan and stressing the link 
between foreign oil procurement and national security:  
My administration has developed a sane national 
energy plan to help meet our energy needs this year 
and every year. If we fail to act on this plan, energy 
prices will continue to rise… If we fail to act, 
Americans will face more and more widespread 
blackouts. If we fail to act, our country will become 
more reliant on foreign crude oil, putting our national 
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energy security into the hands of foreign nations, some 
of whom do not share our interests.56  
 
He added that, to protect national energy security from foreign threats and energy 
blackmail, the National Energy Policy aimed to:   
Expand and diversify our nation’s energy supplies. 
Diversity is important not only for energy security, but 
also for national security. Over-dependence on any one 
source of energy, especially a foreign source, leaves us 
vulnerable to price shocks, supply interruptions, and in 
the worst case, blackmail.57  
 
Bush also supported drilling for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) 
as a means to decrease America’s dependence on foreign oil, saying that “America 
today imports 52 percent of all our oil… we should produce more of it at home”, 
adding that “ANWR can produce 600,000 barrels of oil a day for the next 40 years. 
What difference does 600,000 barrels a day make? Well, that happens to be exactly 
the amount we import from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq”58 under the UN’s Oil For Food 
program. Similarly, the NEP stated that “ANWR production could equal 46 years of 
current oil imports from Iraq,”59 and recommended the development of ANWR 
energy resources:  
 
The NEPD Group recommends that the President direct 
the Secretary of the Interior to work with Congress to 
authorize exploration and, if resources are discovered, 
development of… ANWR. Congress should require the 
use of the best available technology and should require 
that activities will result in no significant adverse 
impact to the surrounding environment.60  
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 Justifying the need for a national energy strategy and the need for action on the 
energy procurement front, the NEP started with a grim picture of America’s energy 
situation:    
America in the year 2001 faces the most serious energy 
shortage since the oil embargos of the 1970s. The 
effects are already being felt nationwide. Many families 
face energy bills two or three times higher than they 
were a year ago. Millions of Americans find themselves 
dealing with… blackouts… Drivers across America are 
paying higher and higher gasoline prices. Californians 
have felt these problems more acutely.61 
 
The NEP acknowledged the importance of oil, since it is “the largest source of 
primary energy, serving almost 40 percent of US energy needs,”62 forecasting that, in 
2020, oil would “account for roughly the same share of US energy consumption as it 
does today.”63 It also warned that “estimates indicate that over the next 20 years, US 
oil consumption will increase by 33 percent, natural gas consumption by well over 50 
percent, and demand for electricity will rise by 45 percent.”64 The NEP also warned 
that the impact of increasing demand and decreasing domestic production would lead 
to increased need for energy imports, with negative repercussions on America’s 
foreign policy:   
We produce 39 percent less oil today than we did in 
1970, leaving us ever more reliant on foreign suppliers. 
On our present course, America 20 years from now will 
import nearly two of every three barrels of oil – a 
condition of increased dependency on foreign powers 
that do not always have America’s interests at heart.65 
 
                                                 
61 National Energy Policy: viii 
62 National Energy Policy: 1-10. 
63 National Energy Policy: 1-11. 
64 National Energy Policy: x. 
65 National Energy Policy: x. 
100 
 
The first seven chapters of the NEP focused on boosting domestic energy output, 
particularly by removing the legal barriers on greater exploitation of domestic oil, gas 
and coal, and by increasing dependence on nuclear energy. In the eighth and final 
chapter, however, the NEP shifted emphasis from conservation and energy efficiency 
to the need for foreign oil. Chapter Eight, titled Strengthening Global Alliance: 
Enhancing National Energy Security and International Relationships, started by 
saying that “US national energy security depends on sufficient energy supplies to 
support US and global economic growth”.66 The NEP pointed out to the grim fact that 
“US oil consumption will continue to exceed production”:  
 
Over the next 20 years, US oil consumption will grow 
by over 6 mbpd [million barrels per day].67 If US oil 
production follows the same historical pattern of the 
last 10 years, it will decline by 1.5 mbpd. To meet US 
oil demand, oil and [oil] product imports would have to 
grow by a continued 7.5 mbpd. In 2020, US oil 
production would supply less than 30% of US oil 
needs.68  
 
Between 2000 and 2020, US imports of foreign oil would rise by 68%, from 11 mbpd 
to 18.5 mbpd,69 (and it is forecasted that the US will import 100% of its oil by 
2050.)70 Therefore, the first recommendation in Chapter Eight was that “the NEPD 
Group recommends that the President make energy security a priority in our trade and 
foreign policy.”71 The fact that the NEP made 35 foreign policy recommendations (a 
third of its total recommendations) regarding oil imports, calling for stronger ties 
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between the United States and oil rich countries,72 and the overcoming of obstacles to 
US investments in these countries,73 showed the extent of the attention which the 
NEP paid to foreign energy sources and its impact on US foreign policy.  
 
Beyond national energy security, however, there were the interests of the powerful 
lobby of economic interests and oil companies, to which Bush, Cheney, Rice and 
others in the administration were closely linked.74  The NEP advocated the effort of 
foreign energy procurement, in cooperation with major oil firms:  
 
American energy firms remain world leaders, and their 
investments in energy-producing countries enhance 
efficiencies and market linkages while increasing 
environmental protections. Expanded trade and investment 
between oil importing and exporting nations can increase 
shared interests while enhancing global energy and 
economic security. Promoting such investments will be a 
core element of our engagement with major foreign oil 
producers.75 
 
It thus recommended opening international markets to energy firms, (in a language 
similar to William Appleman Williams’s references to an Open Door policy, Milton 
Friedman’s call for a large role for American corporations, or Kolko’s writings on 
corporatism):  
 
The NEPD group recommends that the President direct 
the Secretaries of State, Commerce and Energy to 
continue supporting American energy firms competing 
in markets abroad, and use our membership in 
multilateral organizations…to level the playing field for 
US companies overseas, and to reduce barriers to trade 
and investment.76 
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Thus, the Energy Task Force and the NEP were “creatures of Cheney’s worldview” 
which sought to redefine the relation between regulation and the marketplace,77 where 
he was a true believer that national security and economic health required a boost in 
energy production, and this, in turn, required a rollback of stifling rules and greater 
government cooperation with the energy industry.78 He also resisted legal action to 
release the documents of the energy executives and NEPDG meetings, citing his 
belief that such revelations would limit the powers of the executive and of the 
President of the United States, preventing the privacy and flexibility necessary to do 
the job.79 
 
Experts disagree, nevertheless, on whether the United States was indeed suffering 
from an energy crisis in early 2001. Some government experts doubted that a crisis 
existed. The Economist magazine said that Bush “has insisted, on absolutely no 
evidence whatsoever, from his first days in office, that America was mired in a 
serious energy supply crisis.”80 Furthermore, the National Energy Policy suggested 
drilling on ANWR to solve California’s power cuts, even though California did not 
burn oil in its power plants.81 Moreover, Paul Krugman wrote on May 20, 2001, that 
Cheney has “fabricated an energy crisis.”82 Also, Judy Pasternak wrote in the Los 
Angeles Times in August 2001 that the basic assumptions in the National Energy 
Policy were “tailored to the [energy] industry’s measures” citing that a briefing paper 
prepared for a March 19 task force meeting with Bush said that “on the whole, US 
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energy markets are working well, allocating resources and preventing shortages” 
which is different from the NEP invocation of the worst energy crisis since the 1970s. 
Pasternak adds that one staffer recalled seeing a memo that discussed “utilizing” 
California’s blackouts and the summer 2000 high prices of gasoline to press for more 
drilling for gas and oil.83   
 
One of the obvious regions affected by Bush’s energy plan for America’s foreign 
policy was the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia; a friend in the region, who also 
happened to be the on-off number one supplier of America’s foreign oil. During a 
meeting with the National Energy Policy Development Group on March 19, 2001, 
Bush commended the Saudi efforts to maintain oil prices within a reasonable range, 
saying that “the Saudi [oil] minister made it clear that he and his friends would not 
allow the price of oil, crude oil to exceed $28 a barrel. That’s very comforting to the 
American consumer, and I appreciate that gesture. I thought that was a very strong 
statement of understanding, that high prices of crude oil will affect our economy.”84  
 
Also, Baker’s Strategic Energy Policy report praised Saudi Arabia’s role in acting as a 
swing producer when Saddam Hussein cut oil supplies, especially given Saddam’s 
attempts to use of the oil weapon and become a “swing producer”, and the domestic 
pressure on the Gulf Cooperation Council states not to increase oil production:   
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Over the past year, Iraq has effectively become a swing 
producer, turning its taps on and off when it has felt 
such action was in its strategic interest to do so. Saudi 
Arabia has proven willing to provide replacement 
supplies to the market when Iraqi exports have been 
reduced. This role has been extremely important in 
avoiding greater market volatility and in countering 
Iraq’s effort to take advantage of the oil market’s 
structure.85 
 
 
However, troubles in US-Saudi relations started just before the September 11 attacks, 
as the United States and Saudi Arabia clashed over the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
global oil prices.86 In late August 2001, Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz (then 
the de-facto ruler of Saudi Arabia due to King Fahd’s ailing health) dispatched Prince 
Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the United States87 to give the Americans 
a harsh message: “If the United States continued to permit Israel to wage war on 
Palestine, Saudi Arabia would have to heed Arab public opinion,”88 adding that “it is 
time for the United States and Saudi Arabia to look at their separate interests,”89 and 
that the relations between the two nations “were at a crossroads, and Saudi Arabia 
will now look after its own interests.”90 
 
Thus, Bush discovered during his first months in office that he could be challenged by 
his regional allies, not only due to disagreements with Saudi Arabia but also due to 
the Gulf States’ refusal to subdue to America’s energy demands. Furthermore, 
Baker’s Strategic Energy Policy report warned that there were dangers in taking the 
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co-operation of Gulf Arab oil producers for granted,91 saying that “Saudi Arabia’s 
role in this needs to be preserved, and should not be taken for granted. There is 
domestic pressure on the GCC leaders to reject cooperation to cool oil markets during 
times of a shortfall in Iraqi oil production.”92 The Strategic Energy Policy report 
added the “possibility that Saddam Hussein may remove Iraqi oil from the market for 
an extended period of time and that Saudi Arabia will not or cannot replace all of the 
barrels”, saying that this “is a contingency that continues to hang over the market.”93 
Thus, the NEPD Group recommended the President to “support initiatives by Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Qatar, the UAE and other suppliers to open up areas of their 
energy sectors to foreign investors.”94 
 
At the same time that the NEPD Group recognised the central importance of the 
Middle East for global energy supplies, it devoted attention to exploring ways in 
which US dependence on the region could be reduced. According to a report issued 
by EMAP Business International Ltd on July 1st, 2001:  
The United States now imports about 10 million barrels 
a day (b/d) of oil, compared with just 4.3 million b/d in 
1985. Imports account for 51.6 per cent of total oil 
consumption, compared with 34.8 per cent in 1973. The 
Middle East supplies 24 per cent of US oil imports, with 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq the leading suppliers, at 1.6 
million barrels per day and 600,000 barrels per day 
respectively in 2000.95 
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Furthermore, the NEP noted that Middle East oil resources will always be vital to the 
United States: 
 
By 2020, Gulf oil producers are projected to supply 
between 54% and 67% of the world's oil. Thus, the 
global economy will almost certainly continue to 
depend on the supply of oil from Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members, 
particularly in the Gulf. The region will remain vital to 
US interests. Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil 
exporter, has been a linchpin of supply and reliability 
to world oil markets. Saudi Arabia has pursued a policy 
of investing in spare oil production capacity, 
diversifying export routes to both of its coasts, and 
providing effective assurances that it will use its 
capacity to mitigate the impact of oil supply disruptions 
in any region.96   
 
 
Due to the importance of Middle East oil, the NEP called on Bush to urge the Gulf 
States to open their energy sectors for foreign investment, as “the NEPD Group 
recommends that the President support initiatives by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, 
Qatar, the UAE and other suppliers to open up areas of their energy sectors to foreign 
investment.”97 Similarly, Strategic Energy Policy report recommended that “the 
Department of State, together with the National Security Council, the Department of 
Energy and the Department of Commerce should develop a strategic plan to 
encourage the reopening of foreign investment in… important states of the Middle 
East Gulf.”98 Furthermore, said the Strategic Energy Policy report, the United Sates 
should “initiate efforts to spur the reopening of countries that have nationalized and 
monopolized their upstream sectors,”99 because “if political factors were to block the 
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development of new oil fields in the Gulf, the ramifications for world oil markets 
could be quite severe.”100 
 
What made matters worse for the West was that Persian Gulf States would not want to 
invest heavily in increasing their oil production, since, according to the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) the Persian Gulf producers would have to spend $523 billion 
on new equipment and technology between 2001 and 2030 to increase their output as 
required.101 They were not willing to spend such a huge sum,102 and, despite being 
rich and being attractive candidates to loans from international banks, it was unlikely 
that they would be able to assemble such a huge sum of money without foreign 
investment in their state-controlled oil industry, which would contradict their policies 
of full control over their nationalized energy sectors.103 Furthermore, the Gulf States 
did not have the desire to increase oil production, since an increase in supply would 
decrease the price of oil, and this was simply not in their self-interest.104 Saudi Arabia 
was reluctant to increase production, and the Kuwaiti constitution prohibited foreign 
ownership of petroleum reserves while the government limited the participation of 
foreign firms in other activities. Qatar and the UAE were more open to foreign 
investment but legal and technical obstacles stood in the way of increased 
production.105 
 
However, the country which really attracted the attention of Bush and the 
administration hawks during the first few months in office was Iraq, due to the fact 
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that it was a rogue state, and due to the importance of its energy resources. Even 
before taking office, Cheney requested the outgoing Secretary of Defence William 
Cohen to arrange a security briefing for the president elect, with a focus on Iraq.106 
During the first NSC meeting, on January 30, 2001, Bush’s policy on rogue states 
came down to one: Iraq, with the main topic as the Middle East, as Bush opened the 
meeting with a reference to the region. Bush wanted to disengage from the Arab-
Israeli conflict and let both sides work it out themselves. “We’re going to tilt back 
toward Israel and we’re going to be consistent. Clinton overreached, and it all fell 
apart,” he said. Secretary of State Colin Powell said that this was hasty since it would 
unleash Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the Israeli army, with dire 
consequences to the Palestinians. Bush replied: “Maybe it’s the best way to get things 
back in balance… Sometimes a show of strength by one side can really clarify 
things.”107  
 
The Arab-Israeli peace process was not the only commitment from which Bush 
withdrew. During the first eight months in office, Bush withdrew from foreign policy 
commitments that he inherited from Clinton.108 He withdrew the US from its 
commitments to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Kyoto agreement, the International 
Criminal Court, the Korean Sunshine Policy, and peacemaking in the Colombian civil 
war.109  
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Bush, supported by others like Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, saw that it 
would be more feasible to start with Iraq.110 As Secretary of the Treasury Paul 
O’Neill noted, a “major shift” was under way in US foreign policy. After more than 
30 years of intense engagement, from Nixon to Clinton, America was now washing it
hands of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and focusing on Iraq. Rice showed a report titled 
“How Iraq is destabilizing the region,” where she noted that “Iraq might be the k
reshaping the entire region.” To support Rice’s argument, CIA Director George Tenet 
produced a picture of what he said was a chemical or biological weapons factory.
s 
ey to 
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After the January 30 meeting, the National Security Council assigned members to 
different approaches to the Iraqi issue. Powell would work on sanctions, Rumsfeld 
would examine military options which included rebuilding the military coalition of 
the 1991 Gulf War, examining the use of US ground forces in the north and south of 
Iraq and studying how the armed forces could support groups inside the country who 
could help challenge Saddam. Tenet would work on improving intelligence and covert 
operations. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill would investigate how to squeeze 
Saddam’s regime financially.112  
 
In the NSC Principals meeting on February 1st, 2001, Rumsfeld said that a regime 
change in Iraq would set an example to the rest of the region. He said “Imagine what 
the region would look like without Saddam and with a regime that is aligned with US 
interests. It would change everything in the region and beyond it. It would 
demonstrate what US policy is all about.” The hanging question was not “why should 
Iraq be targeted”, but “how.” Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld and JCS Chairman 
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Henry Shelton discussed rebuilding the 1991 Gulf War coalition, though an invasion 
was never specifically mentioned. Rumsfeld added: “It is not my specific objective to 
get rid of Saddam… I am after the weapons of mass destruction. Regime change is 
not my prime concern.” Rumsfeld believed that universally available technologies 
enabled small or medium sized states to perform dangerous asymmetrical attacks on 
US forces around the globe. His military ideology thus included the need to 
“dissuade” others from creating asymmetrical threats and to “demonstrate” America’s 
unilateral resolve, as he wrote in January 2001. He recommended increasing the US 
ability to deter the use of WMD and long-range missiles against US interests, i.e.: the 
promotion of the National Missile Defence (NMD) system. O’Neill thought that 
Rumsfeld’s ambitions on Iraq were a part of Rumsfeld’s broader ideology: the need to 
dissuade others from creating asymmetrical threats in order to demonstrate America’s 
unilateral resolve.113  Rumsfeld was also working on a new strategy to enforce the 
No-Fly-Zones as a means of weakening Saddam’s regime.114 Thus, the Pentagon 
started working on developing military options for Iraq, months before the September 
11 attacks.115  
 
Furthermore, insiders interviewed by Greg Palast for BBC Newsnight added that 
Bush’s secret planning for Iraq’s oil started “within weeks” after the Bush 
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administration took office, long before the September 11 attacks.116 Moreover, linked 
to Rumsfeld’s plans for Iraq were the Secretary of Defence’s specific intentions 
towards Iraq and its oil:  
Documents were being prepared by Defence 
Intelligence Agency, Rumsfeld’s intelligence arm, 
mapping Iraq’s oilfields and exploration areas and 
listing companies that might be interested in leveraging 
the precious asset. One document, headed “Foreign 
Suitors for Iraqi Oilfields Contracts” lists companies 
from thirty countries – including France, Germany, 
Russia, and the United Kingdom- their specialities, 
bidding histories, and in some cases their particular 
areas of interest. An attached document maps Iraq with 
markings for “supergiant oilfields”, “other oilfields” 
and “earmarked for production sharing” while 
demarking the largely undeveloped southwest of the 
country into nine “blocks” to designate areas for future 
exploration.117  
 
The link between the energy strand and other national security strands was evident in 
a top-secret document, dated February 3, 2001, where a high NSC official directed the 
NSC staff to cooperate with the National Energy Policy Development Group to assess 
the military implications of the Bush Administration’s energy plan. Jane Mayer of 
The New Yorker said that this document showed the “melding” of two seemingly 
unrelated top priorities: “the review of operational policies towards rogue states”, 
such as Iraq, and “actions regarding the capture of new and existing oil and gas 
fields.”118 Mark Medish, who served as a senior NSC director during the Clinton 
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Administration, told Mayer in response to this document that “if this little group was 
discussing geostrategic plans for oil, it puts the issue in the context of the captains of 
the oil industry sitting down with Cheney and laying grand, global plans.”119  
 
Another sign of the link between energy and other foreign policy strands was that 
Dick Cheney headed the committee that oversaw energy, as well as installing himself 
as overseer of defence and foreign policy portfolios and sitting in on the weekly 
lunches held by Rice, Rumsfeld and Powell even before the September 11 attacks.120 
Moreover, in May 2001, Bush asked Cheney to create a new office within Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to prevent terrorist acts and/or weapons of 
mass destruction attacks within the United States, and to oversee these defence 
preparations himself. The task force was just getting underway when the September 
11 attacks occurred.121 Furthermore, Cheney’s interest in the Iraqi problem was seen 
during the first NSC meeting on January 30, 2001,122 and in his quest to outgoing 
Secretary of Defence William Cohen to arrange a security briefing for the president 
elect, with a focus on Iraq.123 Thus by mid-2001, Cheney was in a position to oversee 
discussions of policy on Iraq, discussions of policy on energy, and discussions of 
policy on counter-terrorism, indicating that the strands of military preponderance, 
energy procurement and anti-terrorism (and possibly the fourth strand of overall 
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global power projection, as seen in the QDR of September 2001) were related even 
before September 11. (The Cheney vice-presidency was unique in American history, 
as all foreign policy issues went through Cheney.124 Despite not being the only source 
of foreign policy strategy, he was nevertheless the “vortex” of foreign policy,125 the 
“tie-breaker” in foreign policy making disputes.)126 
 Also, the fact that the same maps and lists were used by Secretary of Defence 
Rumsfeld and by the National Energy Policy Development Group shows the linkage 
between the strands of military preponderance and foreign energy procurement.127 
Furthermore, Rumsfeld’s interest in Iraq’s oilfields was linked to his support for pre-
emptive strikes and to his policy to use military force to “dissuade” and 
“demonstrate”:  
The desire to “dissuade” countries from engaging in 
“asymmetrical challenges” to the United States – as 
Rumsfeld said in his January [2001] articulation of the 
demonstrative value of a pre-emptive attack – matched 
with plans of how the world’s second largest oil reserve 
might be divided among the world’s contractors made 
for an irresistible combination, O’Neill said.128  
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The Bush administration’s concern over Gulf oil supplies resulted in an increased 
focus on Iraq, as Strategic Energy Policy report recommended that, in order to reduce 
Saddam’s oil threat, the United States should:  
 
Review policies towards Iraq with the aim to lowering 
anti-Americanism in the Middle East and elsewhere, 
and set the ground to eventually ease Iraqi oilfields 
investment restrictions. Iraq remains a destabilizing 
influence to US allies in the Middle East, as well as to 
regional and global order, and to the flow of oil to 
international markets from the Middle East. Saddam 
Hussein has also demonstrated a willingness to 
threaten to use the oil weapon and to use his own 
export program to manipulate oil markets. This would 
display his personal power, enhance his image as a 
“Pan Arab” leader supporting the Palestinians against 
Israel, and pressure others for a lifting of economic 
sanctions against his regime.129  
 
Furthermore, said the Strategic Energy Policy report, the US should review its policy 
on Iraq, taking into consideration military, economic, energy and diplomatic factors, 
especially that, the report implied, sanctions were not always effective:   
 
The United States should conduct an immediate policy 
review toward Iraq, including military, energy, 
economic and political/diplomatic assessments… 
Sanctions that are not effective should be phased out 
and replaced with highly focused and enforced 
sanctions that target the regime’s ability to maintain 
and acquire weapons of mass destruction.130  
 
The Strategic Energy Policy report also recommended the resumption of investment 
in the Iraqi oil sector when the time is right (especially that sanctions on oil were 
actually strengthening Saddam’s grip on his country, and that he still had sources of 
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revenue despite the sanctions) while putting into consideration the risks that lifting the 
sanctions would entitle, like encouraging Saddam to use his oil to challenge the US 
interests, and offending the Gulf States who did not want to face competition from an 
Iraqi oil production increase. However, said the report, action on Iraq’s oil was 
necessary, especially given the global importance of Iraq’s oil reserves:  
Once an arms-control program is in place, the United 
States could consider reducing restrictions on oil 
investments inside Iraq. Like it or not, Iraqi reserves 
represent a major asset that can quickly add capacity to 
world oil markets and inject a more competitive tenor 
to oil trade. However, such a policy will be quite costly 
as this trade-off will encourage Saddam Hussein to 
boast his “victory” against the United States, fuel his 
ambitions, and potentially strengthen his regime. Once 
so encouraged and if his access to oil revenues were to 
be increased by adjustments in oil sanctions, Saddam 
Hussein could be a greater security threat to US allies 
in the region if weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
sanctions, weapons regimes, and the coalition against 
him are not strengthened. Still, the maintenance of the 
continued oil sanctions is becoming increasingly 
difficult to implement. Moreover, Saddam Hussein has 
many means of gaining revenues, and the sanctions 
regime helps perpetuate his lock on the country’s 
economy. Another problem with easing restrictions on 
the Iraqi oil industry to allow greater investment is that 
GCC allies of the United States will not like to see Iraq 
gain larger market share in international oil markets… 
These issues will have to be discussed in bilateral 
exchanges.131 
 
 
Despite the Strategic Energy Policy report’s focus on Iraq, the National Energy 
Policy did not recommend any policies specifically for Iraq. “It is unbelievable how 
little attention was paid to Iraq,” said Amy Myers Jaffe, senior energy adviser at the 
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Baker Institute and one of the authors of the Strategic Energy Policy report, adding 
that “the problem of Iraq is the major underlying problem in the oil market.”132  
 
Nevertheless, between January and September 2001, the Bush Administration was 
still undecided on how to deal with Saddam, as it had three options on the table; 
enforcing the No-Fly-Zones to protect the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the 
south, regime change through an armed coup by Iraqi opposition groups, and 
enforcing the UN economic sanctions. Bush empowered three working groups to 
study each of these three options.133  
 
One of the first things that George W. Bush did when he took office was to launch air 
strikes against Iraq in February in areas outside the No Fly Zones. Speaking during 
his first presidential visit abroad, to Mexico, Bush stressed that the raids were just a 
“routine” enforcement of the NFZs, and that they were a “part of a strategy” towards 
Iraq. But while the Americans talked down the significance of the raid, analysts said 
that it looked like a warning to the government in Baghdad.134  
Parallel to enforcing the NFZs, the administration worked on the new package of 
“smart sanctions” in the hope of restoring international solidarity against Iraq’s 
acquiring military equipment or materials for weapons of mass destruction.135 On 
May 22, 2001, the United States and Britain formally presented the new Iraq 
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sanctions proposal to the U.N. Security Council.136 The “smart sanctions” aimed to 
increase the amount of legal trade with Baghdad while also cutting smuggling routes. 
They would ease restrictions on civilian goods but retain bans on military hardware, 
reviewing a list of “dual use” supplies that could be used for both military and civilian 
purposes,137 and dropping embargoes on all non-military imports to Iraq.138 Iraq's 
neighbours, Jordan, Turkey and Syria, would be allowed to import 150,000 barrels of 
oil a day under the US-British plan.139 China and France agreed that Iraq would not 
be allowed to import a core list of goods which could potentially help Iraq in buildin
weapons of mass destruction.
g 
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their proposal after Russia threatened to veto the idea at the UN,143 ending the 
immediate possibility of smart sanctions as proposed by Powell. So Iraq announced 
on July 6, 2001, that it would resume oil exports after a month-long standoff.144   
 
A third approach was advocated by the administration hawks, like Rumsfeld and his 
deputy Paul Wolfowitz, who preferred to depend on more support of the Iraqi 
opposition groups145 in order to change the regime in Baghdad.146 (Wolfowitz was the 
greatest supporter of removing Saddam.147 He believed that it was possible to send in 
the military to overrun and seize Iraq’s southern oil fields (about 1,000 wells, two 
thirds of Iraq’s oil production) which were 60 miles from Kuwait’s borders. He 
thought that if this happened, the Iraqi people would be encouraged to remove 
Saddam. Powell, on the other hand, thought that this was an absurd and unsound plan, 
and a “lunacy.”)148 Another hawk was Richard Perle, a self-described advocate of 
“regime change” in Iraq, who said at the American Enterprise Institute (API) in April 
2001 that there was “an obvious alternative to sanctions and that is to support the 
internal opposition to Saddam” and that “German intelligence has estimated that by 
2003, Saddam Hussein will have two or three nuclear weapons.”149 Perle reflected the 
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hawks’ rejection of sanctions, saying that “the sanctions policy has failed and will be 
even less effective in the future”, and adding that “we probably can’t police the 
current sanctions, much less the so-called smart ones.”150 Both Wolfowitz and Perle 
were “democratic imperialists”, calling for the active deployment of overwhelming 
American military, economic and political strength to remake the world in its image, 
not just by toppling tyrants but also by creating democracies in their wake.151 Cheney, 
too, favoured military action, as evident in his quest to outgoing Secretary of Defence 
William Cohen to arrange a security briefing for the president elect, with a focus on 
Iraq, before Bush took office.152 
 
However, the strategy was still in development stage, and on April 25, 2001, in a 
deputies meeting which included Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of State Richard 
Armitage, and Cheney’s national security adviser Lewis Libby, a draft for a military 
coup was set down for further revisions.153 On June 1, 2001, Rice chaired a meeting 
of the Principals Committee, where four options were on the table: continuing the 
current containment strategy, continuing containment while actively supporting 
Saddam’s opponents, setting up a safe haven for insurgents in southern Iraq, and 
planning a US invasion. On August 1, the deputies presented the principals with a 
secret document, “A Liberation Strategy”, which envisioned heavy reliance on the 
Iraqi opposition to pressure Saddam’s regime. However, a formal policy 
recommendation for attacking Iraq was never forwarded to Bush, no policy was set, 
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and administration officials continued to pursue their separate agendas.154 Bush 
himself was reluctant to define a course of action. A White House official stated that 
“faced with a dilemma, [Bush] has this favourite phrase he uses all the time: Protect 
my flexibility.”155 To preserve this flexibility, the NSC authorized the three working 
groups to consider covert action to topple Saddam, to consider enforcing the NFZs 
and to evaluate smart sanctions.156  
 
Nevertheless, even though Bush considered Saddam a threat to be kept in check,157 
and even though he told Clinton that Iraq, along with the missile defence system, were 
the two largest external threats that America faced, it seemed that the Bush 
Administration did not yet consider the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction an 
immediate threat. Colin Powell said in a press conference in Cairo in February 2001 
that Saddam “has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of 
mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his 
neighbours.”158 He also said “We kept him contained, kept him in his box”159. When 
asked by Time magazine in late August 2001 “Do you see Saddam as a threat?” 
Powell replied “I do not lose a lot of sleep about him late at night.”160 Moreover, 
Condoleezza Rice, despite her NSC presentation of January 2001, said in a press 
conference in July 2001 “We are able to keep arms from him [Saddam]. His military 
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forces have not been rebuilt.”161 Tenet, too, said that during the spring and summer of 
2001, the topic of Iraq “faded into the background” of his priorities as he paid more 
attention to “plenty of other issues.”162    
 
This shows that there was no coherent or unified policy on Iraq among the members 
of the Bush Administration before the September 11 attacks. Thus, the attention given 
to Iraq did not result in a clear or precise decision on what was to be done. Rather, its 
immediate significance was the marginalizing of the Arab-Israeli peace process. In a 
sharp break with Clinton, who was personally involved in negotiations between 
Israelis and Palestinians, Bush declined even to send an envoy to the last-ditch Israeli-
Palestinian peace talks at Taba, Egypt, in late January 2001. The White House 
eventually eliminated the post which Dennis Ross had held for eight years, and three 
months into the administration the NSC still did not have a senior director for Middle 
East affairs.163 In late February, Colin Powell went on his first trip abroad since 
taking office; a six-nation tour of the Middle East, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
Syria, but Iraq was the main issue of the trip, discussing the sanctions on Iraq an
American raid on Iraq in February 2001.
d the 
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Iraq was not the only rogue state with oil reserves against which the Bush 
administration had plans. Libya and Iran, too, were rogue states whose significant oil 
reserves played a role in the Bush foreign policy. US policy on rogue states was 
intertwined with the National Missile Defence system. The Bush Administration had 
motives, other than defence, for building the missile shield. The National Missile 
Defence (NMD) system would back up an American first strike against a state armed 
with ballistic missiles and/or weapons of mass destruction. This would “preserve 
freedom of action” in a regional conflict involving North Korea or any other potential 
state armed with weapons of mass destruction.165 (This was linked to the Nuclear 
Posture Review (NPR), which was “unveiled at the end of 2001 in the highly charged 
post-September 11 political climate, [which represented] an abrupt departure from the 
policies of prior post-Cold War administrations, Republican and Democratic 
alike.”)166 This “integrated, significantly expanded planning of doctrine for using 
nuclear weapons against a wide range of potential adversaries… reverse[d] an almost 
two-decades-long trend of relegating nuclear weapons to the category of weapons of 
last resort,”167 and was explicitly directed at China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, 
Russia and Syria. Indeed, Laurence Kaplan wrote in March 2001 that “missile defence 
[wassn’t] really meant to protect America,”, and that it was “a tool for global 
dominance.”168  
 
Beyond the specific issue of missile defence, the United States did not significantly 
shift its position towards rogue states under the Bush Administration, as Bush’s policy 
on rogue states was essentially the same as his predecessor Clinton, apart from Iraq to 
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which Bush gave much more attention than Clinton. 169 (Indeed, seven rogue states 
were mentioned in the 2000 campaign: Iran, Iran, Sudan, Syria, Libya, North Korea 
and Cuba.)170  Focused mainly on Iraq, the Bush Administration wanted to soften its 
line on Iran and Libya, (as seen, for example, in Bush’s initial desire to extend the 
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act for only two years instead of five).171  
 
Vice President Cheney expressed his opposition to the sanctions on Iran, a position 
complementing that of the US oil companies during his tenure as CEO of 
Halliburton.172 There were also signs that the Bush Administration was ready to 
initiate dialogue if Iran took steps to change its behaviour.173 Despite these initial 
signs, however, it was evident from the first days in office that Iran policy sunk 
quickly to the bottom of the administration’s lists of priorities.174 There was a policy 
review on Iran, but it was never concluded, and by September 11, 2001, Iran policy 
was officially “still being studied.”175  
 
On Libya, Bush was very much following the Clinton policy.176 He was anxious not 
to be seen as soft on rogue states in his first term in office, but he was also under two 
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conflicting sets of pressure from the relatives of the American victims of the Pam Am 
flight which was bombed over Lockerbie in 1988 on the one hand, and oil companies 
who were anxious to secure lucrative contracts in Libya on the other hand. The 
Washington-based lobby group USA-Engage suggests that the sanctions cost 
American companies billions of dollars in lost exports every year.177 Pro-trade groups 
such as USA-Engage and other business groups depended on Cheney as their ally on 
the issue of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, for his work against unilateral US 
sanctions when he was CEO of Halliburton.178  
The NEP called for a general reviewing US sanctions on oil-producing states, but no 
specific example was offered. Neither Iraq, Iran or Libya were mentioned by name in 
the 21-page chapter on “National Energy Security and International Relationships.” 
Instead, there was only a vague reference to reviewing overall sanctions policy,179 
stating that:  
Sanctions should be periodically reviewed to ensure 
their continued effectiveness and to minimize their costs 
on US citizens and interests… The NEPD Group 
recommends that the President direct the Secretaries of 
State, Treasury and Commerce to initiate a 
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comprehensive review of sanctions. Energy security 
should be one of the factors considered in such a 
review.180  
 
The Bush Administration did review the sanctions on Iran, but indicated that it would 
make no decisions until after their elections, scheduled in June 2001. The pro-Israel 
lobby in Congress pressed for reauthorisation of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which 
in theory had prohibited foreign companies from making new investments in Iran of 
more than $40 million but it had never been enforced in practice.181 The call for 
renewal caused a political battle between the pro-Israeli groups, who were in favour 
of renewal, and the US oil industry who argued that the law had been bad for business 
and was a political failure.182 In July 2001, the US Senate extended the sanctions for a 
further five years, but the Bush Administration argued for only two years, as this 
would give the US some flexibility to change its policy towards Libya and Iran when 
necessary. The extension of the law was also opposed by many European countries 
which have companies involved in the energy sector in Iran and Libya.183 The new 
law was criticised by the European Commission. External Relations Commissioner 
Chris Patten said that such measures threatened the open international trading system, 
and that the EU would take measures against the US through the World Trade 
Organisation if any action was taken against European companies operating in Iran 
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and Libya. Nevertheless, Bush signed the five-year extension into law in August 
2001.184 
 
Due to the problems of relying on Middle East oil, an alternative was diversification. 
The NEP added that, despite the Persian Gulf’s importance, the United States had to 
continue to diversify its resources away from the Middle East, through global 
engagement in other regions:   
Middle East oil production will remain central to world 
oil security. The Gulf will be a primary focus of US 
international energy policy, but our engagement will be 
global, spotlighting existing and emerging regions that 
will have a major impact on the global energy 
balance.185  
 
 
In an effort to achieve diversification, one of the solutions that Bush proposed was a 
hemispheric solution to the energy problem, involving cooperation with countries of 
the Western Hemisphere. During the first presidential candidates’ debate in October 
2000, Bush called for “a hemispheric energy policy where Canada and Mexico and 
the United States come together.” He restated this during the California energy crisis 
in January 2001; “The quickest way to have impact on the energy situation is for us to 
work with Mexico, and a certain extent Canada, to build a policy for the hemisphere.” 
Furthermore, prior to his visit to Mexico in February 2001, he  announced his hopes 
that energy cooperation between the United States and Mexico could help decrease 
the impact of debacles like the California burnout and liberate the United States from 
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its addiction to Persian Gulf oil.186 Similarly, the National Energy Policy 
recommended steps towards a Hemispheric solution on energy cooperation: 
 
The NEPD Group recommends that the President direct 
the Secretaries of State, Commerce and Energy to 
engage in a dialogue through the North American 
Energy Working Group to develop closer energy 
integration among Canada, Mexico and the United 
States to identify areas of cooperation, fully consistent 
with the countries’ respective sovereignties.187  
 
 
Bush, at least initially, paid more attention to Latin America than to USA’s traditional 
European allies. Indeed, Bush’s first foreign trip after taking office was a one-day 
visit to Mexico in February 2001, where Bush held talks with the Mexican president, 
Vicente Fox, discussing illegal drug-trafficking and immigration, and reaffirmed their 
common desire to boost the Mexican economy, bilateral trade,188 and Mexican energy 
exports to the United States.189 Bush and Fox spoke of a “shared prosperity” between 
the US and Mexico, but stopped short of specific commitments.190  
 
Regarding Venezuela, the NEP acknowledged that “the United States, with 
Venezuela, [was] a coordinator of the Hemispheric Energy Initiative Process”, and 
that Venezuela was “the third largest oil supplier to the United States. Its energy 
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industry is increasingly integrated into the US marketplace. Venezuela’s downstream 
investments in the United States make it a leading refiner and gasoline marketer 
here”. It also acknowledged the increasing US and international investment in 
Venezuelan energy resources, and said that Venezuela was “also moving to liberalize 
its natural gas sector.”191 Thus, the NEPD Group recommended “that the President 
direct the Secretaries of Trade and Commerce to conclude negotiations with 
Venezuela on a Bilateral Investment Treaty.”192 It also gave similar recommendations 
regarding Brazil and its energy cooperation with the United States.193  
 
To a lesser extent, the United States also had hopes for Africa, with the NEP noting 
that “Sub-Saharan Africa holds 7 percent of world oil reserves and comprises 11 
percent of world oil production. Along with Latin America, West Africa is expected 
to be one of the fastest growing sources of oil and gas for the American market.”194 
Bush did not have a policy on Africa, as he indicated in during his 2000 presidential 
campaign that Africa was not a priority,195 remarking during the campaign that “while 
Africa may be important, it does not fit into the national strategic interest, as far as I 
can see them.”196 Nevertheless, there was indeed increased military interest in the 
continent, as Deputy Commander in Chief of Eurcom (European Command, whose 
area of responsibility included West Africa) visited the small island-state São Tomé e 
Principe in July 2001 to look for possible US military base locations, since the island 
                                                 
191 National Energy Policy: 8-10. 
192 National Energy Policy: 8-11. 
193 National Energy Policy: 8-10 and 8-19. 
194 National Energy Policy: 8-11.  
195 Barnaby Mason, “Analysis: Powell’s interest in Africa”, BBC News, May 23, 2001,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1347282.stm 
196 Donald Rothchild. “The United States and Africa: Power and Limited Influence”, in Robert J. 
Lieber (ed) Eagle Rules? Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the Twenty-First Century. (New 
Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2002): 238, from Ian Fisher “Africans ask if Washington’s sun will shine on 
them”, New York Times, February 8, 2001, p. A3, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0E7DB1731F93BA335751C0A9679C8B63.   
129 
 
was close to the major West-African oil producing countries and yet had largely 
escaped the violence and conflict that have plagued mainland Africa.197  
 
One problem with the regional diversification of energy resources, however, was that 
it would not work, as regions outside the Middle East did not have enough supplies to 
break the reliance on Middle East oil. Of all the oil-producing regions in the world, 
the Persian Gulf alone had enough untapped reserves to satisfy American and global 
demand for oil, and none of the other regions would ever produce enough to reverse, 
or even slow down, dependence on Persian Gulf producers.198  
 
To fully understand the challenges facing regional diversification, one has to take a 
look at the data available to the authors of the NEP in 2001, the year the plan was 
devised. According to the data provided by the US Department of Energy in 2001, 
total world oil production would have to grow by 60% between 1999 and 2020 to 
meet anticipated world consumption of 119 mbpd. But because of flat or declining 
production in many other regions of the world, output in the Gulf would have to climb 
by 85% to satisfy the enormous rise in demand. This meant that combined Persian 
Gulf production would have to increase from 24 mbpd in 1999 to 44.5 mbpd in 
2020.199  
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The Bush Administration concluded that since the Gulf States were unable or 
unwilling to raise production, and since US interests in the region were facing dangers 
from Iraq, Iran, and terrorist attacks on US installations, then the United States would 
have to be the dominant power in the region, overseeing the politics, security and oil 
output of the region, assuming responsibility for overseeing the politics, security and 
oil output of the key producing countries. The build-up of American power and 
influence in the region had begun with Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and 
Eisenhower. It took a new level under Jimmy Carter, who said in December 1979 
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: “The Soviet effort to dominate 
Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean 
and close to the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway though which most of the world’s oil 
must flow”. He then announced the Carter Doctrine of January 1980, where he said:  
 
The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a 
strategic position that poses a grave threat to the free 
movement of Middle East oil... Let our position be 
absolutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to 
gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be 
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the 
United States of America, and such an assault will be 
repelled by any means necessary, including military 
force.200  
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Since then, American foreign policy was a continuation of the Carter Doctrine to 
secure control over Middle East oil by any means necessary.201  
 
The Carter Doctrine was applied in the 1991 Gulf War and the subsequent 
deployment of 25,000 US troops in the region after the war. But if the Bush 
Administration was to secure the oil supplies of the region, and also follow its 
military preponderance agenda, this build-up was to be taken to an entirely new 
level202 never seen before (which would happen in 2003, through the military 
invasion of a major Arab oil-producing state; Iraq). The Bush Administration, 
therefore, aimed to solve this energy dilemma through   
                                                
The establishment of a new American Imperium in the 
Middle East: one in which American-selected local 
rulers would invite American oil companies to make 
super-profits for American investors under the 
protective shield of the American military, while at the 
same time satisfying the voracious demands of the 
motorized American oil consumer.203 
 
However, given the fact that there was no justification for a further military build-up 
or increase of US influence in the Middle East, the United States had to pay more 
attention to the so-called “new Middle East”; i.e.: the Caspian region.204  
 
In the Caspian basin, Bush’s initial strategy was to be more openly friendly with the 
Taliban than Clinton, wooing them to establish the pipeline from Turkmenistan to the 
Indian Ocean, to put pressure on Iran and to open negotiations on Osama bin Laden. 
Bush invited a Taliban representative, Sayed Rahmatullah Hashemi, to the United 
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States in March 2001.205 He resumed talks on peace with the Northern Alliance, the 
establishment of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) pipeline, and the 
handing in of bin Laden.  
 
CSIS analyst Doug Blum wrote in March 2001 that there was “no indication of any 
major change in America’s Caspian policy under the Bush Administration.” Thus, 
wrote Blum, “it appears likely that the Caspian region will remain a distinctly 
secondary concern for American policymakers, one whose significance is determined 
largely by the role of the strategically important regional actors (Russia and Iran) [i.e.: 
keeping these two actors in check] as well as by prevailing perceptions of national 
security [i.e.: energy and perhaps militant Islamic threats].”206  
 
It seemed, wrote Blum in March 2001, that the key goals of US policy remained 
intact:  
1. Energy diversification; 
2. Increasing economic opportunities for US firms; 
3. Containing Russian and Iranian influence; 
4. Promoting the independence, democracy and development of the Newly 
Independent States (NIS).  
 
Bush also “remained committed to the BTC pipeline” which would “solidify relations 
with Turkey, sideline Iran, prevent Russia’s monopoly on transportation, and promote 
the independence of the NIS.” Thus, the Bush Administration continued to pressure 
                                                 
205 Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquié, Forbidden Truth: US-Taliban Diplomacy and the 
Failed Hunt for Bin Laden. (New York: Nation Books, 2002): 5-6 and Moore, The Official Fahrenheit 
9/11 Reader: 48-49. 
206 Doug Blum. “America’s Caspian Policy Under the Bush Administration”, Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, March 2001, http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm_0190.pdf.  
133 
 
US oil companies to participate by contributing finances and/or projected oil volumes, 
and also continued to exert pressure against routes which might pass through Iran or 
Russia.207 
 
This fitted with the recommendations of the National Energy Policy. Describing the 
Caspian Sea region as “a rapidly growing new area of supply,”208 the NEP 
recommended “that the President direct the Secretaries of State, Commerce and 
Energy to support the BTC oil pipeline as it demonstrates its commercial viability.”209 
Moreover, the NEP recommended strengthening the ties with countries in the Caspian 
region:  
 
The NEPD Group recommends that the President direct 
the Secretaries of Commerce, Energy and State to 
deepen their commercial dialogue with…Caspian states 
to provide a strong, transparent, and stable business 
climate for energy and related infrastructure 
projects.210  
 
To this end, US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said on August 29, 
2001, that the Bush Administration was supporting the BTC pipeline and wider 
relations with Central Asian countries as recommended by the NEP:  
 
Georgia and Azerbaijan are negotiating the terms for 
the intergovernmental agreement that allows the 
construction of a gas pipeline through Georgia to 
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Turkey [i.e.: the BTC pipeline]… We do support the 
development of the pipeline on commercially viable 
basis, as part of a broader energy policy which fits with 
the national energy policy [NEP] that we have, that we 
released this spring.211  
 
In balancing oil diplomacy and anti-terrorism necessities, Bush used a two-track 
policy on the Taliban where, on one hand, he used diplomacy and negotiations, and 
on the other hand he used pressure and coercive measures. In March 2001, for 
instance, the United States supported UN sanctions on Afghanistan due to the 
Taliban’s refusal to extradite bin Laden.212 Additionally, in the summer of 2001, the 
United Nations (with the consent of the United States) imposed two sets of sanctions 
over Afghanistan for providing sanctuary to terrorists and refusing to surrender bin 
Laden.213 Furthermore, the Taliban were promised billions of dollars in commissions 
if they formed a national unity government with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, 
extradite Osama bin Laden and protect the TAP pipeline,214 as Washington still saw 
the Taliban as a source of stability in Afghanistan who can help the TAP pipeline.215 
Also, US ambassador to the UN, Nancy Soderberg, said on February 12, 2001, that 
the United States would “find a way to have a continuing dialogue on humanitarian 
issues with the Taliban.”216   
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 However, by the summer of 2001, the limited results of negotiations with the Taliban 
frustrated the Americans. In July 2001, at a UN-sponsored meeting in Berlin, the 
Taliban were invited to attend the meeting, but they declined to send a delegate,217 
saying that the West was too biased towards the Northern Alliance.218 The Bush 
Administration did explore policy options on Afghanistan, including the option of 
supporting regime change.219 A draft presidential directive circulated in June 2001 
directed Rumsfeld to “develop contingency plans” to attack both al Qaeda and 
Taliban targets in Afghanistan. However, Rumsfeld did not order his subordinates to 
begin preparing any new plans against either al Qaeda or the Taliban before the 
September 11 attacks.220 In July 2001, the deputies committee recommended a 
comprehensive plan not just to roll back al Qaeda but to eliminate it, by going on the 
offensive to destabilize the Taliban. On September 4, the principals approved and 
recommended a plan that would give the CIA $125 million to $200 million a year to 
arm the Northern Alliance.221  
 
By September 10, the deputies formally agreed on a three-phase strategy. First, an 
envoy would give the Taliban a last chance. If that failed, continued diplomatic 
pressure would combine with a covert action program encouraging anti-Taliban 
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groups in Afghanistan to attack Taliban and al Qaeda targets. In phase three, if the 
Taliban’s still did not change their policies, the deputies agreed that the United States 
would try covert action to topple the Taliban’s leadership from within.222  
 
As in Iraq, there was no clear-cut decision on what to do with Afghanistan, as energy 
interests, which required the Taliban’s cooperation on the TAP pipeline, conflicted 
with the need to convince the Taliban into handing in bin Laden, whether through 
negotiations or coercion, and the need to defeat al Qaeda. There was also a conflict 
between negotiations, economic sanctions and military plans (including Rumsfeld’s 
contingency plans, plans on an offensive to destabilize Afghanistan and plans to arm 
the Northern Alliance). Washington therefore decided on a two-track policy where 
negotiations and the threat of sanctions (and perhaps military action) went hand in 
hand. 
  
 
CONCLUSION:  
BUSH AND FOREIGN ENERGY BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11 
 
The Bush Administration did not enter office with a comprehensive foreign policy 
agenda or “grand strategy” on foreign policy. It focused on specific cases like the 
challenge from rogue states and foreign energy procurement. It was also concerned 
with the unilateral drive to free America from its foreign commitments like the ABM 
treaty, the Kyoto agreement on climate change, the Middle East peace process, and 
peace in Colombia, as it thought that freedom from these international constraints 
would give America the freedom of action to move unilaterally on the foreign arena. 
Anti-terrorism was also a concern, but not a high-level priority.  
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 During the months between taking office and the September 11 attacks, there were 
specific cases which symbolized the quest for American global power in the Bush 
Administration. For instance, the NMD system was seen as a symbol of military 
power, foreign energy procurement was seen as a symbol of economic power, while 
focusing on the Iraqi question and reshaping the Middle East were seen as a symbol 
of Rumsfeld’s vision of global geo-political power, or global power preponderance. 
This was especially true after the embarrassing EP-3 incident with China, where the 
Bush Administration felt the need to assert military power through the pursuit of 
NMD, and geopolitical power through the Iraq question. But the Bush Administration 
was unsuccessful in tying these factors together, until September 11.  
 
There was convergence in Iraq as a point of intersection, or as a point of “melding” 
the issues of oil, rogue states and the NMD. Since taking office, Bush has been 
seeking ways to undermine Saddam Hussein.223 The fact that Bush gave everyone 
assignments on January 31, 2001, showed that there was no clear policy towards Iraq, 
yet. No real policy was made on Iraq due to divisions among the administration’s 
members.224 Beyond Iraq, there was no clear, unified policy on how to implement the 
American ambition for unipolar dominance. Instead, before September 11, Bush was 
unsuccessful in moving on key issues. The Americans were unable to establish these 
symbols of global unipolar dominance, as there was no clear policy on rogue states 
(especially on Iraq, where there were three working groups, none of whom emerged 
with the triumphant approach), no clear policy on the Middle East, and they were not 
clear on how to implement the recommendations of the NEP (an energy policy which 
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clearly adopted the Open Door approach as it called for the openness of global energy 
markets and for a large role for US energy corporations).  
 
There was also no clear policy on the oil-rich Caspian basin, and no clear, unified 
direction on Afghanistan.225 There was a contradiction in the US approach to the 
Taliban, as the Bush Administration (like the Clinton Administration before it) 
depended on imposing sanctions on the Taliban from one side, and from the other side 
they were trying to woo them in order to approve the TAP pipeline, and to hand in 
Osama bin Laden. Also in oil-rich Colombia, the Bush Administration withdrew itself 
from the peace process, instead of finding a solution to the continuous bombing of 
American pipelines in the country. The Bush Administration withdrew from the ABM 
treaty in December 2001, but they were no closer to having a viable NMD system. 
Before the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration was successful in 
unilaterally freeing itself from global constraints and commitments, but not successful 
in taking affirmative action.  
 
Nevertheless, after the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration saw an 
opportunity on which it sought to capitalize. The September 11 attacks provided an 
opportunity to declare a war on terror; a war which was used to link all foreign policy 
strands of anti-terrorism, military preponderance and energy procurement together, 
with points of intersection seen in the invasion of Afghanistan, followed by the 
eventual invasion of Iraq. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
ANTI-TERRORISM MELDS WITH ENERGY 
PROCUREMENT 
 
HOW THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS AFFECTED THE 
QUEST FOR FOREIGN OIL 
 
 
 
“Strategically, the ‘war on terror’… reflected traditional imperial concerns over 
control of Persian Gulf resources.” 
Zbigniew Brzezinski. 1 
 
 
“What [American policymakers] care about is running the world. You lose the major 
oil resources of the world, and it’s finished. And you’re not just losing them; you’re 
losing them to…  rising, competing power[s].” 
Noam Chomsky.2 
 
The September 11 attacks did not decrease the American commitment to an open 
global economy, as the Bush Administration promoted the global Open Door policy 
as a means of defeating terrorism.3 Like George H. W. Bush and William J. Clinton, 
George W. Bush has adhered to the policy of openness, as Bacevich argued that a part 
of the reason for the War on Terror was that “terrorism is a threat to openness – 
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essential for American economic expansion and, for that reason, the principle 
according to which the United States intended to organize the international order.”4 
After the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration officials linked a strong 
American economy to defeating the terrorists, as US trade representative Robert 
Zoellick wrote nine days after the September 11 attacks:  
 
Economic strength - at home and abroad – is the 
foundation of America’s hard and soft power. Earlier 
enemies learned that America is the arsenal of 
democracy; today’s enemies will learn that America is 
the economic engine for freedom, opportunity and 
development. To that end, US leadership in promoting 
the international economic and trading system is vital. 
Trade is about more than economic efficiency. It 
promotes the values at the heart of this protracted 
struggle.5  
 
Therefore, Bush’s War on Terror was at the heart of the project for creating an open 
and integrated world. “Terrorists want to turn the openness of the global economy 
against itself,” he told Asian leaders gathered in Shanghai in October 2001. “We must 
not let them.” An open economic order, wrote Secretary of State Colin Powell, 
“reinforces democracy, growth, and the free flow of ideas” in the world at large. In 
the war on terror, trade in itself is a weapon. “We will defeat them, by expanding and 
encouraging world trade” Bush said.6 The National Security Strategy of 2002 echoed 
that free trade helps fight terrorism:  
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W. Legro (eds) To Lead the World: American Strategy After the Bush Doctrine (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008): 184. 
6 Bacevich, American Empire: 232-233 and G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition”, 
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2002. 
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The United States will use this moment of opportunity 
to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We 
will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, 
development, free market and free trade to every corner 
of the world… Poverty does not make poor people into 
terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, 
and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to 
terrorist networks and drug cartels within their 
borders… Free trade and free markets have proven 
their ability to life whole societies out of poverty.7 
 
Beside the continuation of the Open Door policy, the Bush Administration’s foreign 
policy saw some amendments after the September 11 attacks. Before 9/11, the two 
foreign policy strands of the Bush foreign policy had been military advancement, (as 
symbolized by the pursuit of a National Missile Defence System) and the procurement 
of energy from foreign sources. Iraq seemed to be the point of intersection between all 
of these factors: it is a rogue state with ample oil sources, where the Bush 
Administration was considering a form of military action (albeit not yet a full-scale 
invasion). Anti-terrorism was added as a main strand after the September 11 attacks, 
and the terrorist threat happened to emanate from countries which were rich in energy 
sources and/or constituted vital routes to energy pipelines and transportation, namely 
in Central Asia. Thus, as Michael Klare has argued, the three strands merged together 
in one grand strategy with a unified design that governed US foreign policy.8  
 
In addition to the three strands, there was a fourth strand highlighted as the main 
theme of the Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR), released on September 30, 2001: 
the prevention of the rise of a rival power able to compete with the United States and 
the promotion of the American “ability to project power worldwide,” especially in 
“critical points around the globe.” It was therefore vital, said the QDR, to prevent 
                                                 
7 George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, White House, 
September 2002 [accessed April 3, 2006] http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/html 
8 Klare, “Resources”: 50-51 and Klare, Blood and Oil: 72-73.  
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“regional powers” from developing “sufficient capabilities to threaten stability in 
regions critical to U.S. interests.” The QDR mentioned a region of special interest to 
the United States; the “arc of instability that stretches from the Middle East to 
Northeast Asia,” a region which “contains a volatile mix of rising and declining 
regional powers,” where “the governments of some of these states are vulnerable to 
overthrow by radical or extremist internal political forces or movements.”9 It was 
obvious that oil-producing regions were included in the expression “critical points,”10 
and that energy resources were among the interests which the United States needed to 
protect in the “arc of instability” region. Thus, all four strands of Bush’s foreign 
policy, global power projection, military preponderance, anti-terrorism and energy 
procurement, were brought together in the QDR:  
The United States and its allies and friends will 
continue to depend on the energy resources of the 
Middle East, a region in which several states pose 
conventional military challenges and many seek to 
acquire -- or have acquired -- chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive 
(CBRNE) weapons. These states are developing 
ballistic missile capabilities, supporting international 
terrorism, and expanding their military means to 
coerce states friendly to the United States and to deny 
U.S. military forces access to the region.11 
 
Based on the passage above, which links oil resources to US military access, Klare 
argued that the NEP was reflected in the QDR and its call for global power 
projection.12 To preserve US power, the QDR also called for “preserving for the 
                                                 
9 “Quadrennial Defence Review Report”, September 30, 2001, US Department of Defence, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ 
qdr2001.pdf#search='quadrennial%20defence%20review%202001'. 
10 Klare, Blood and Oil: 71. Bromley mentioned this “arc of instability” and its link to oil resources in 
American Power, pages 132, 134, 135-138. 
11 “Quadrennial Defence Review”: 4. 
12 Klare, Blood and Oil: 71. Klare argues that “the principle thrust of the [Bush] administration’s 
military policy” is not the NMD system, but the enhancement of America’s “power projection” forces, 
meaning that US forces be able to be transported to distant combat zones, especially in energy-vital 
regions. This was evident in Bush’s citadel speech where he said that “our forces in the next century 
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President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of these conflicts – including 
the possibility of regime change or occupation [emphasis added].”13 Regime change 
and occupation would be applied in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, and with major 
links to US control over global energy resources.  
 
Taking the QDR’s military direction even further, Bush introduced the doctrine of 
pre-emption in the State of the Union Speech of January 2002, saying: “I will not wait 
on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and 
closer.”14 He reiterated his point in his West Point Speech on June 1, 2002, stating 
that “containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass 
destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist 
allies” and that “we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront 
the worst threat before they emerge.”15 The introduction of pre-emption as a doctrine 
was also mentioned in the National Security Strategy of September 17, 2002. Stating 
that deterrence would not work “against leaders of rogue states,” it declared that the 
United States would undertake pre-emptive military action, would not allow its global 
                                                                                                                                            
must be agile, lethal, readily deployable”. Bush gave top priority to US power projection while at the 
same time endorsing an NEP that entails increased US dependence on oil from areas of crisis and 
conflict. This shows that oil and military power were “merged” into a single, integrated design for 
American world dominance (Michael T. Klare, “The Bush/Cheney energy strategy: Implications for 
US foreign and military policy”, Information Clearing House, May 26-27, 2003 [accessed January 25, 
2010] http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4458.htm).  
13 Hartung, “Military”: 64, from page 18 of the Quadrennial Defence Review 2001.  
14 George W. Bush, “President Delivers State of the Union Address”, White House, January 29, 2002 
[accessed June 30, 2004] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-22.html. 
15 George W. Bush, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point, United States Military 
Academy, West Point, New York”, White House, June 1, 2002, [accessed June 30, 2007] 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html, also quoted in Daalder, America 
Unbound (first edition): 121-122. Rice downplayed the significance of Bush’s speech by saying that he 
only meant “and early action of some kind” (Daalder America Unbound (first edition) 122). Bush 
hinted in the West Point Speech that a display of military capabilities would prompt the Middle East to 
follow America’s political and economic agendas (Lucas and Ryan, “Against Everyone and No-One”: 
169), as he said that “the peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and 
opportunities as people in every nation… An advancing nation will pursue economic reform” (Bush, 
“President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point”). Again, this shows the military-economic 
link in US foreign policy.  
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military strength to be challenged, was committed to multilateral international 
cooperation but would act alone if necessary, and that the United States would spread 
democracy and human rights globally, especially in the Muslim world.16 (Indeed, 
much of the world’s energy resources lie in the Muslim world,17 which the US wanted 
to reshape).   
 
Showing the link between military security and energy security, the National Security 
Strategy of 2002 also called for the United States to focus on the control of energy 
resources. The document summarized:  
We will strengthen our own energy security and the 
shared prosperity of the global economy by working 
with our allies, trading partners, and energy producers 
to expand the sources and types of global energy 
supplied, especially in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, 
Central Asia, and the Caspian region. We will also 
continue to work with our partners to develop cleaner 
and more energy efficient technologies. Economic 
growth should be accompanied by global efforts to 
stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations associated with 
this growth, containing them at a level that prevents 
dangerous human interference with the global climate. 
Our overall objective is to reduce America’s 
greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of our 
economy, cutting such emissions per unit of economic 
activity by 18 percent over the next 10 years, by the 
year 2012. Our strategies for attaining this goal will be 
to: 
                                                 
16 Robert J. Lieber. The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005): 43-44. 
17 See, for example, Richard Nixon, Beyond Peace (New York: Random House, 1994): 141, Zbigniew 
Brzezinksi, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2005): 
42, 59, 60, Anthony Sampson, “West’s greed for oil fuels Saddam fever”, Guardian, August 11, 2002 
[accessed August 3, 2009] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/aug/11/iraq.oil and Michael 
Meacher, “The era of oil wars”, Guardian, June 29, 2008 [accessed June 20, 2009] 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jun/29/oil.oilandgascompanies. Brzezinski said that 
the US “could slide into a collision with the world of Islam” in the unstable region which he called the 
“Global Balkans”, which he defined as “the crucial swathe of Eurasia between Europe and the Far 
East… heavily dominated by Muslims.” Citing that the “Global Balkans” contains 68% of the world’s 
proven oil reserves and 41% of the world’s natural gas reserves, he said that “the combination of oil 
and volatility gives the United States no choice” but to be involved in this region (Brzezinksi, The 
Choice: 42, 59, 60).  
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• remain committed to the basic U.N. Framework 
Convention for international cooperation; 
• obtain agreements with key industries to cut emissions 
of some of the most potent greenhouse gases and give 
transferable credits to companies that can show real 
cuts; 
• develop improved standards for measuring and 
registering emission reductions; 
• promote renewable energy production and clean coal 
technology, as well as nuclear power—which produces 
no greenhouse gas emissions, while also improving fuel 
economy for U.S. cars and trucks;  
• increase spending on research and new conservation 
technologies, to a total of $4.5 billion—the largest sum 
being spent on climate change by any country in the 
world and a $700 million increase over last year’s 
budget; and 
• assist developing countries, especially the major 
greenhouse gas emitters such as China and India, so 
that they will have the tools and resources to join this 
effort and be able to grow along a cleaner and better 
path.18 
 
Furthermore, Bush hinted to his energy policy and his desire to decrease dependence 
on foreign oil, urging Congress to “act to encourage conservation, promote 
technology, build infrastructure, and… increase energy production at home so 
America is less dependent on foreign oil.”19  
 
Even though energy has always been linked to national security early in American 
history, the September 11 attacks highlighted the importance of energy and its links to 
national security. In October 2001, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham argued that 
energy security rests on three pillars: diversification, domestic sources and energy 
                                                 
18 George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, White House, 
September 2002 [accessed April 3, 2006] http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/html (emphasis added). 
Interestingly, the focus on Middle East oil was absent from the list of geographic energy regions in the 
NSS 2002. As seen above, the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia and the Caspian region were 
mentioned, but not the Middle East. It seems that Bush did not want to mention Middle East oil, due to 
the talk of the upcoming war on Iraq in the late summer of 2002 (Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 47-48).  
19 George W. Bush, “President Delivers State of the Union Address”, White House, January 29, 2002 
[accessed June 30, 2004] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-22.html. 
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infrastructure.20 He repeated the calls for regional/geographic diversification of 
America’s foreign energy resources:   
Our administration is looking beyond the Persian Gulf. 
We are expanding our relationships with other energy 
producers, and building new partnerships to strengthen 
our overall energy security. This means working with 
Canada and Mexico and other nations in the 
hemisphere to develop regional energy cooperation. 
This means encouraging development of resources in 
areas as varied such as Africa, and the Caspian 
region.21  
 
Abraham also called for diversity in the use of fuels, as “dependence on one type of 
fuel… leaves us vulnerable to price spikes, while excessive dependence on one 
supplier, or one group of suppliers, leaves us vulnerable to reductions or cut-offs.”22 
He reiterated this argument in a statement before the House International Relations 
Committee in June 2002, as he said that “energy security is national security.”23 
 
With the elevation of the link of energy to security and US foreign policy tools (such 
as military action) after September 11, Iraq was reinforced as a fundamental case. 
There were other countries where anti-terrorism was linked to military deployment, 
for instance the Philippines and Colombia, but Iraq was a more demanding case 
because of energy procurement and resources. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah was not 
as pro-American as the ailing King Fahd, and US-Saudi relations were strained due to 
                                                 
20 Spencer Abraham, “Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham’s keynote address to the Hoover 
Institution’s Conference on California’s electricity problem”, US Department of Energy, Office of 
Policy and International Affairs, October 18, 2001 [accessed September 12, 2002]  
http://www.pi.energy.gov/CA011018.html . 
21 Abraham, “Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham’s keynote address to the Hoover Institution’s 
Conference on California’s electricity problem”. 
22 Abraham, “Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham’s keynote address to the Hoover Institution’s 
Conference on California’s electricity problem”. 
23 John Morrissey,  “The Geoeconomic Pivot of the Global War on Terror: US Central Command and 
the War in Iraq”, in David Ryan and Patrick Kiely (eds), America and Iraq: Policy-Making, 
Intervention and Regional Politics (Oxon: Routledge, 2009): 114. 
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disagreements over oil prices and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The neo-conservatives 
were also worried that the US military presence in Saudi Arabia was a factor for 
instability in the kingdom. However, if the US could topple Saddam, Bush could pull 
American troops out of Saudi Arabia and decrease America’s strategic dependence on 
Saudi Arabia.24 Beyond the specific security concern was the belief in spreading 
democratic values as a means to decrease the potential of instability and anti-
American terrorism in the region (threats which could spread from the Middle East to 
a wider global scale), as neo-conservatives believe dthat US interests were best served 
by “the aggressive promotion and spread of democracy throughout the globe”25 and 
that only by restructuring the “Arab tyrannies” of the region could US energy supplies 
and regional security be ensured.26 Moreover, democracy would stabilize the region 
(and its oil resources), according to neo-conservative thought. A final geo-strategic 
goal was that Israel’s security would be enhanced, as Bush thought, wrongfully, that 
the road to Jerusalem went through Baghdad, and that awed Arabs would be 
threatened into peace with Israel.27  
 
In order to achieve these goals, Iraq had to be rebuilt into a stable, pro-US market 
democracy, and this could not be achieved without a strong Iraqi economy, which is 
very dependent on the oil sector. Thus, if Iraq’s oil was an end in itself, (in order to 
control this vital oil supply for the consumption of America and the West) then it was 
also a means for other ends. Iraq could not be a stable pro-American, democratic 
model without a stable economy, and a strong Iraqi economy is not possible without 
                                                 
24 Clarke, Against All Enemies: 283.  
25 Trevor B. McCrisken, “George W. Bush, American exceptionalism and the Iraq war”, in David Ryan 
and Patrick Kiely (eds), America and Iraq: Policy-Making, Intervention and Regional Politics (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2009): 185. 
26 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: 308. 
27 “Does he know where it’s leading?” The Economist, July 30, 2005: 23-25.   
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the development of the Iraqi oil sector. Thus, Iraqi oil was a tool that would help the 
reconstruction and democratisation of Iraq, decreasing dependence on Saudi Arabia, 
the redrawing of the Middle East map, the stabilization of the region, securing the 
region’s oil resources, the combat of terror, the enhancement of Israel’s position and 
the promotion of American empire. But first, the Bush Administration had to deal 
with the immediate issue in the post-September 11 era: the Taliban and al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan, a policy which was also vital for energy routes and the New Great 
Game.   
 
THE FOUR STRANDS MEET  
IN THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN 
 
 
“Afghanistan’s significance from an energy standpoint stems from its geographical 
position as a potential transit route for oil and natural gas exports from Central Asia 
to the Arabian Sea. This potential includes the possible construction of oil and 
natural gas export pipelines through Afghanistan.” 
An Energy Information Administration report (affiliated to the 
US Department of Energy), released a few days before 
September 11, 2001.28 
 
“[Central Asia offers] opportunities for investment in discovery, production, 
transport and refining of enormous quantities of oil and gas resources. Central Asia 
                                                 
28 George Monbiot, “America’s pipe dream”, Guardian, October 23, 2001 [accessed August 10, 2009] 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/23/afghanistan.terrorism11, also see Kleveman, The New 
Great Game: 226-227.  
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is rich in hydrocarbons, with gas being the predominant energy fuel. Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan, especially, are noted for gas resources, while Kazakhstan is the 
primary oil producer”. 
An Oil and Gas Journal report, published on September 10, 2001.29 
 
 
“How do you capitalize on these opportunities?” That was the question which 
Condoleezza Rice asked her National Security Council staff after the September 11 
attacks. She wanted to use the attacks to change the fundamentals of American 
foreign policy doctrine and thus change the world, as she told journalist Nicholas 
Lemann in the spring of 2002: 
I really think this period is analogous to 1945-1947, 
[the period when Containment doctrine took shape], 
in that events so clearly demonstrated that there is a 
big threat, and that it’s a big global threat to a lot of 
countries that you would not have normally thought 
of as being in the coalition. That has started shifting 
the tectonic plates in international politics. And it’s 
important to try to seize on that and position 
American interests and institutions and all of that 
before they harden again.30 
 
 
Rice re-emphasized the “opportunity” during a speech at the John Hopkins School of 
Advanced International Studies in April 2002, saying that “this is a period not just of 
grave danger but of enormous opportunity.”31 
 
                                                 
29 As quoted in Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 156. 
30 Nicholas Lemann, “The Next World Order”, The New Yorker, April 1, 2002, [accessed June 4, 2007] 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/analysis/2002/0401newyorker.com 
31 Kaplan and Kristol: The War Over Iraq: 113.  
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One could read Rice’s statements as an indication that the Bush Administration would 
use the September 11 attacks to promote US power on the global level. She was not 
the only one who saw an opportunity in the attacks. On the day of the attacks, Bush 
himself said that this was a “great opportunity” to improve relations with big powers 
such as Russia and China. “We have to think of this as an opportunity”, he said.32 
Powell, too, agreed that the attacks were an opportunity to reshape relationships 
throughout the world.33 Rumsfeld told the New York Times in October 2001 that the 
attacks created “the kind of opportunities that World War II offered, to refashion the 
world.”34 In fact, on the night of the attacks, and in front of live television, Rumsfeld 
said to Senator Carl Levin, then Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
that the attacks should convince the Democrats to reverse their opposition to increased 
military spending, especially on the NMD system.35 Moreover, the NSS of 2002 
stated that “the events of September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the context for 
relations between the United States and other main centres of global power, and 
opened vast, new opportunities.”36 Linking these “opportunities” to the US interests 
in Middle East oil, Bush told business executives in New York on October 3, 2001: “
truly believe that out of this will come more order in the world – real progress to 
peace in the Middle East, stability with oil-producing regions.”
I 
                                                
37 
 
Among these “opportunities” was the American invasion of Afghanistan. Not only did 
the War on Terror provide the reason for invading Kabul and ousting the Taliban, but 
 
32 Woodward, Bush at War: 32.  
33 Woodward, Bush at War: 67.  
34 David Ray Griffin, The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions. (Gloucestershire: Arris 
Books, 2005): 116, from “Secretary Rumsfeld interview with the New York Times”, New York Times, 
October 12, 2001. Also cited in David Ray Griffin “9/11, The American Empire, and Common Moral 
Norms” in David Ray Griffin and Peter Dale Scott (eds.) 9/11 and American Empire; Intellectuals 
Speak Out (Gloucestershire: Arris Books: 2007):13.  Also cited in Bacevich, American Empire: 227.  
35 Griffin, The 9/11 commission Report: Omissions and Distortions: 121.  
36 Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” 
37 Woodward, Bush at War: 194. 
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also US global power preponderance, foreign energy procurement and control over 
global energy supplies would be aided by the invasion of Afghanistan. Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, the architect of the Carter Doctrine of 1980 which called for securing 
Middle East oil,38 (in addition to being a consultant to US oil company Amoco and a 
major supporter of the BTC pipeline who played a major role in pipeline diplomacy in 
Central Asia)39 wrote in 1997 that, “in a volatile Eurasia, the immediate task is to 
ensure that no state or combination of states gain the ability to expel the United States 
or even diminish its decisive role… A benign American hegemony must still 
discourage others from posing a challenge [in Eurasia].”40 Adding that “a country 
dominant in Eurasia would almost automatically control the Middle East and 
Africa,”41 he also stated the set of goals which the American “imperial geostrategy” 
in Eurasia should achieve:  
                                                
 
[T]he twin interests of America in the short-term 
preservation of its unique global power and the long-
term transformation of it into increasingly 
institutionalised global cooperation. To put it in a 
terminology that hearkens back to the more brutal age 
of ancient empires, the three grand imperatives of 
imperial geostrategy are to prevent collusion and 
maintain security dependence among the vassals, to 
keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the 
barbarians from coming together.42  
 
 
This international hegemonic position of the United States rested on its ability to 
control the sources and transport routes for crucial energy and other strategic material 
supplies needed by other leading industrial states, necessitating the United States to 
 
38 Richard Seymour, “The Real Cost of the Iraq War”, The Middle East, May 2009: 49. 
39 Brzezinksi, Second Chance: 121 and Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 104-105.  
40 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A geostrategy for Eurasia”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 1997: 52, 
also quoted in Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 21, 150-151. 
41 Brzezinksi, “A geostrategy for Eurasia”: 50-51. 
42 Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: 40.  
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pursue a superior role in Eurasia, and to act to ensure that no other state gained the 
ability to challenge the US in this vital region.43 Developing its military presence in 
Central Asia, the United States could challenge the Russians and the Chinese and 
protect the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) project.44 The energy resources of the 
Caspian region also fitted into the strategy of regional diversification of oil res
providing “non-OPEC oil”, meaning that energy supplies from Central Asia were less 
likely to be affected by OPEC price and supply policies, eroding OPEC’s ability to 
maintain high oil prices and use oil as a political tool,
ources, 
economy.46  
                                                
45 thus decreasing OPEC’s 
clout. Furthermore, Brzezinksi added that large-scale international investment in 
Central Asian resources would increase stability, prevent the resurgence of an 
imperial Russia, and help post-imperial Russia democratise and integrate in the 
international 
 
The BTC pipeline was the main US energy project in the region, supported by the 
United States government for five main reasons. First, it would benefit Turkey’s 
economy. Second, it would not pass through Russia or Iran. Third, at an expected 
construction cost of $3.6 billion, the BTC would provide a profitable contract for US 
construction companies. Fourth, with Turkey’s Ceyhan port only 483 kilometres away 
from Haifa port in Israel, the BTC would secure oil supplies to Israel. Finally, the 
 
43 Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 21.  
44 Zalmay Khalilzad, former US ambassador to Afghanistan, was an ex-UNOCAL official (Fouskas 
and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 157 and Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 61). So was Hamid 
Karzai, the Afghan interim president. This shows Kolko’s writings on corporatism, and the business-
government carrer cycle. Also, Karzai’s personal security detail is from Dyncorp, and Guantanamo 
Bay prison was built by Brown and Root, again showing the corporate link with the US military 
(Burbach and Tarbell, Imperial Overstretch: 200, 201). This is “a convergence of political and 
economic interests under the rubric of Operation Enduring Freedom” (Fouskas and Gökay, The New 
American Imperialism: 157). 
45 Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 23, 151. 
46 Brzezinksi, “A geostrategy for Eurasia”: 57. 
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pipeline would provide a platform for further political and economic influence in the 
east,47 including the Caspian region.  
The United States continued to support the BTC pipeline after the September 11 
attacks and the invasion of Afghanistan. During a visit to Kazakhstan in December 
2001, US Secretary of State Powell said: “I see nothing in the post-September 11 
environment that leads me to think we should change the US policy on the routing of 
pipelines from Central Asia.”48 On December 15, 2001, the New York Times reported 
that “the State Department is exploring the potential for post-Taliban energy projects 
in the region.”49  
The September 11 attacks fostered the militarisation of the BTC project, linking it to 
US military aid to the countries of the region and to plans to integrate the United 
States’ Caucasian, Caspian and Central Asian dependencies (or, as Brzezinski called 
them, “tributaries”) into a unified military alliance in the War on Terror. Early in 
October 2001 Bush promised military assistance to Georgia, and by late February 27, 
2002, Washington was announcing that it would provide Georgia with $64 million in 
military aid and send 180 military advisers to train 2,000 Georgian troops. Ostensibly, 
this was to fight al Qaeda troops in the Pankrisi Gorge bordering Chechnya, but a 
Georgian Defence Ministry official announced that the US was training their rapid 
reaction force to guard strategic sites, “particularly oil pipelines.” On March 28, 2002, 
US Deputy Assistant Defence Secretary Mira Ricardel announced that the US would 
provide military aid to Azerbaijan’s navy as part of a $4.4 million aid package “to 
                                                 
47 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 115 
48 Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia. (London: Atlantic Books, 
2004): 92.  
49 Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 157. The New York Times mentioned that the 
region has more than 6 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and almost 40 percent of its gas 
reserves. These figures were based on initial over-optimistic estimates of the energy reserves in Central 
Asia, which turned out to be exaggerated (ibid).  
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counter threats such as terrorism… and to develop trade and transport corridors.” The 
United States also reversed an earlier decision that it would not intervene militarily to 
halt incursions by “Islamic terrorists” such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.50 
The US also increased economic and military aid to Uzbekistan from $50 million to 
$173 million and offered aid of $125 million to Tajikstan.51  
Moreover, while proposing grants of $51.2 million to Azerbaijan for Fiscal Year 
2005, the State Department said that “US national interests in Azerbaijan centre on 
our strong bilateral security and counterterrorism cooperation, the advancement of US 
energy security, [and] progress in free market and democratic reforms.” The State 
Department emphasized the role of private US firms in securing US energy needs, 
saying that “the involvement of US firms in the development and export of 
Azerbaijani oil is key to our objectives of diversifying world oil supplies, providing a 
solid base for the regional economy, and promoting US energy security.” Likewise, in 
requesting $108.1 million for Georgia, the State Department noted that by housing 
the BTC pipeline, the country would “become a key conduit through which Caspian 
Basin energy resources will flow to the West, facilitating diversification of energy 
sources for the United States and Europe.”52  
 
                                                 
50 Brzezinksi, The Grand Chessboard: 40 and Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 117.  
51 Ahmed Rashid, “Central Asia”, in John Feffer Power Trip: US Unilateralism and Global Strategy 
After September 11, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003): 123. Furthermore, instead of conditioning 
the aid on a timetable for political and economic reform, the United States sought only verbal assurance 
of reform (Rashid, “Central Asia”: 123). On August 26, 2002, Colin Powell testified in Congress 
hearings that Uzbekistan had made substantial progress in improving human rights conditions in the 
country, clearing the way for Congress to ratify another $45 million in aid (Rashid, “Central Asia”: 
240).  
52 Klare, Blood and Oil: 137, from the US Department of State (DoS), Congressional Budget 
Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2005 (Washington DC: DoS 2004), pp. 345, 363. 
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Based on this military-petroleum-private sector link, or what may be called a 
“military-petroleum complex,” or “petro-military complex”53 Klare wrote that it was 
“clear from government documents that the war against terrorism intertwined with 
[America’s] Caspian oil policy,” not just in Afghanistan, but in the whole Caspian 
region.54 “In fact,” he wrote, “It is getting harder to distinguish US military operations 
designed to fight terrorism from those designed to protect energy assets. And the 
[Bush] Administration’s tendency to conflate the two is obvious.” Klare also wrote 
that “the American military is increasingly being converted into a global oil-
protection service.”55 Furthermore, Anthony Sampson, author of the The Seven 
Sisters, said that “Western oil interests closely influence military and diplomatic 
policies, and it is no accident that while American companies are competing for 
access to oil in Central Asia, the US is building up military bases across the region.”56 
Similarly, Chomsky said in 2002 that establishing US military bases in Central Asia 
after 9/11 was necessary to protect US corporate interests, to ensure US control 
energy resources of the Caspian and to encircle the Middle East’s oil resources:   
 
The United States, for the first time, has major military 
bases in Central Asia. These are important to position 
US multinationals favourably in the current “Great 
Game” to control the considerable resources of the 
region, but also to complete the encirclement of the 
world’s major energy resources, in the Gulf region. The 
US base system targeting the Gulf extends from the 
Pacific to the Azores, but the closest reliable base 
before the Afghan war [in 2001] was Diego Garcia. 
Now the situation is much improved, and forceful 
                                                 
53 Johnson, Sorrows of Empire: 146. Burbach and Tarbell mention a “petro-military complex” which 
flourished “particularly under George W. Bush” (Burbach and Tarbell, Imperial Overstretch: 51, 199). 
54 Klare, Blood and Oil: 137. 
55 Klare, Blood and Oil: 7, 72, cited in Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: 69, 71.  
56 Anthony Sampson, “West’s greed for oil fuels Saddam fever”, Guardian, August 11, 2002 [accessed 
August 3, 2009] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/aug/11/iraq.oil, also cited in Johnson, The 
Sorrows of Empire: 234.  
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intervention, if deemed appropriate, will be greatly 
facilitated.57  
 
The invasion of Afghanistan thus supported global power projection not only against 
individual countries but also against larger potential rivals. For example, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) influence decreased due to the bases that the US 
established in the region.58 The individual member countries have reacted 
individually to the war in Afghanistan and established independent roles in the U.S. 
coalition in Afghanistan, rather than acting as a group, and China’s influence in
group decreased, as the Central Asian states sought to deepen their relations with the 
 the 
US.59  
 for 
 
 
ould accept the US deployment, as long as it was limited to counter-terrorism.60   
 
                                                
Beside the challenge for China, the US invasion of Afghanistan also posed a 
challenge for Russia, within the context of the “New Great Game.” The public 
rhetoric of the United States and Russia continued to announce that they would 
cooperate in the War on Terror, but American military presence was a challenge
the traditional Russian sphere of influence in the Caspian and Central Asia. For 
example, the US initially angered Russia by sending US military support and advisers
to Georgia in February 2002. After an American explanation that the aid would help 
Georgia defend pipelines and borders, Russian president Vladimir Putin said that he
w
 
57 Noam Chomsky, The Essential Chomsky (London: The Bodley Head, 2008): 345. 
58 Rashid, “Central Asia”: 122.  
59 Fiona Hill. “Areas for Future Cooperation or Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, Yale 
University Conference, "The Silk Road in the 21st Century", Brookings, September 19, 2002, [accessed 
February 16, 2006]  
http://www.brook.edu/views/speeches/hillf/20020919.htm 
60 Klare, Blood and Oil: 156 and 157.  
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However, empowered by its new military position, the US continued to gain access to 
the regions’ energy resources. A breakthrough to US energy interests in the Caspian 
region took place on May 15, 2002, as Hamid Karzai, the interim president of 
Afghanistan, signed the deal to construct the TAP (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-
Pakistan) pipeline, breaking the deadlock on the pipeline negotiations which existed 
during the days of the Taliban.61 Despite this energy breakthrough, however, the 
United States and the West still lacked a clear strategic vision for Central Asia after 
the September 11 attacks, avoiding the articulation of a more coherent strategic vision 
for Central Asia, and avoiding getting involved in the domestic politics of the 
countries.62 Far from having a plan to redraw the map of the Caspian region (like its 
ambitions for the Middle East), the Bush Administration showed a lack of interest in 
Afghanistan as preparations for actions against Iraq distracted it from Kabul.   
 
 
BUSH AND SAUDI ARABIA:  
OIL, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM  
AND THE DEMOCRATIC EXCEPTION 
 
The link between anti-terrorism and the procurement of energy resources cannot be 
discussed away from the complex American relation with Saudi Arabia. Allegations 
of a link between Saudi Arabia and the September 11 attacks caused controversy in 
Washington. This controversy was addressed in the findings of The 9/11 Commission 
Report of July 2004, which said that it found no evidence of a link between the 
September 11 attacks and the Saudi government:  
 
                                                 
61 Brisard, Forbidden Truth: 145.  
62 Rashid, “Central Asia”: 118, 127.  
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Saudi Arabia has long been considered the primary 
source of al Qaeda funding, but we have found no 
evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or 
senior Saudi officials individually funded the 
organization. (This conclusion does not exclude the 
likelihood that charities with significant Saudi 
government sponsorship diverted funds to al Qaeda).63 
 
 
Despite these controversies and complexities, the Saudis were traditional allies of the 
US. They financed American military operations, supplied the United States with oil 
and provided strategic support for the US. One immediate cause for the gentle US line 
with Saudi Arabia after the September 11 attacks was the need to stabilize the price of 
oil. The price of oil increased immediately after the attacks,64 but it later fell because 
of a drop in demand for oil65 and, more importantly, an increase in supply started by 
the Saudis on the day after the attacks. The Saudis ignored the quotas they had agreed 
with fellow producers, and for the next two weeks they shipped an extra 0.5 mbpd 
(million barrels per day) to the United States.66 The price of oil declined from $28 
before the attacks to less than $20 a few weeks after.67  
 
Despite the friendly Saudi gesture with respect to oil supplies after the September 11 
attacks, tensions persisted between the United States and the Saudi royal family, 
especially regarding Arab-Israeli tension and Islamic fundamentalism which might 
                                                 
63 Kean et al. The 9/11 Commission Report: 171. 
64 Michael C. Ruppert, “Terror in America, Asian financial markets plummet”, Centre for Research on 
Globalisation, September 11, 2001, [accessed September 14, 2001] 
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/RUP109A.html. 
65 “OPEC fails to halt slide”, CNN, November 15, 2001, [accessed November 15, 2001] 
http://europe.cnn.com/2001/business/11/15/opec/index.html. The demand for oil decreased because the 
collapse of the World Trade Centres of New York, one of the nerve centres of the global economy 
where a large share of world trade occurred had an effect of decreasing global investment, so the 
demand for oil decreased and the price decreased. Actually, the world economy was already weak and 
suffering from a recession before September 11th, but the attacks exacerbated the global economic 
slowdown (ibid). 
66 Christopher Dickey, “The Once and Future Petro Kings”, Newsweek, April 8, 2002: 37. 
67 Griffin, The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions: 85, Craig Unger, House of Bush, 
House of Saud. (London: Gibson Square, 2007): 11 and Dickey, “The Once and Future Petro Kings”: 
37. 
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lead to terrorism. Not just were 15 of the 19 hijackers Saudi nationals, but there were 
claims that the Saudi government was not fully cooperating on anti-terrorism issues, 
and claims that Washington was tolerating Riyadh’s lack of cooperation in order to 
protect the oil ties between the two countries.68  
 
Ties were further strained by Saudi anger with the lack of sufficient American focus 
on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Crown Prince Abdullah introduced an initiative in the 
spring of 2002 which called for the Arab recognition of Israel and normalization of 
relations with the Jewish state, in return for an Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 
borders, the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and 
a solution to the refugee problem. Bush paid lip service to the Prince Abdullah 
initiative, saying on April 4:  
The recent Arab League’s support of Crown Prince 
Abdullah’s initiative is promising, is hopeful, because it 
acknowledges Israel’s right to exist. And it raises the 
hope of sustained, constructive Arab involvement in the 
search for peace. This builds on a tradition of visionary 
leadership, begun by President Sadat and King 
Hussein, and carried forward by President Mubarak 
and King Abdullah [of Jordan]. 69 
 
Despite the verbal support, however, the Bush Administration was not actually 
supportive to the Saudi initiative. Cheney’s trip to the Middle East in March 2002, 
                                                 
68 For example, there are allegations that when the US Congress released the report of the bipartisan 
inquiry into the September 11 attacks in July 2003 (coincidently, a year before the 9/11 Commission 
Report of July 2004), Bush censored 27 pages that discussed the Saudi role in the attacks (Unger, 
House of Bush, House of Saud: 277, 281 and Griffin, The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and 
Distortions: 67-68, from Bob Graham Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia and the 
failure of America’s war on terror (New York: Random House, 2004): 12-13, 167, 169, 215, 223, 224, 
225, and Dana Priest “White House, CIA kept key portions of report classified”, Washington Post, July 
25, 2003). Furthermore, after the September 11 attacks, Cheney called Senate majority leader Tom 
Daschle and talked him out of any serious investigation on the intelligence failure, since a serious 
investigation would show that oil and money were more important than security (Brisard, Forbidden 
Truth: xii). 
69 George W. Bush, “President to send Secretary Powell to Middle East”, White House, April 4, 2002, 
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which sought Arab support for an upcoming war on Iraq, largely failed, because it 
took no heed of the wishes of Arab leaders who were more interested in a solution to 
the Arab-Israeli clashes,70 and a meeting between Bush and Abdullah in April 2002 at 
the ranch in Crawford, Texas, did not overcome these differences. Bush wanted to 
discuss terrorism while Abdullah wanted to discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
According to one American who was present at the meeting, the meeting was “very 
rocky and tense.”71  
 
The Americans also believed that the Saudis might not be a reliable ally when it came 
to military action on Iraq. Saudi Arabia feared that an American invasion of Iraq 
would lead to the exploration of more Iraqi oilfields, promoting a higher supply and 
increased competition against Saudi oil.72 With the kingdom struggling with soaring 
unemployment and falling standards of living, the gush of oil likely to spew from 
Iraq, the only country whose reserves could rival Saudi Arabia’s, could have proved 
devastating to the Saudi economy.73  
 
The second reason for the initial Saudi opposition to the invasion of Iraq was fear of 
the strong Islamic institutions in the kingdom, which opposed the American-led war 
on Iraq. The Saudi regime’s legitimacy is based on an alliance with the Islamist 
                                                 
70 Bronson, Thicker Than Oil: 239.  
71 Bronson, Thicker Than Oil: 238. 
72 Oil exploration in Iraq significantly slowed down since the 1980s, due to the war against Iran, the 
1991 Gulf War, and the sanctions imposed on Iraq. When analysts say that Iraq possesses 12 or 13% of 
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movements and extremely conservative Sunni sects in Saudi Arabia,74 and such 
institutions would not be happy if the royal family showed support to the American 
invasion of a neighbouring Muslim country. A third reason was the destabilizing 
effect that the removal of Saddam would have on the region.75  
 
On July 10, a report written by the RAND organization was presented to the 
Pentagon’s Defence Policy Board describing Saudi Arabia as the “kernel of evil” in 
the region, citing that fifteen of the September 11 hijackers were Saudi citizens, and 
that Saudi money was financing the spread of a highly intolerant strain of Islam 
around the world. The RAND report added that the Saudis were “active at every level 
of the terror chain… from planners to financiers, from cadres to foot soldiers, from 
ideologists to cheerleaders.” The report recommended that Washington give the 
House of Saud an ultimatum; either the Saudis would stop backing terrorism or face a 
seizure of the Saudi oilfields and financial assets in America.76 The administration 
balked at going that far, as the State Department assured Saudi Arabia that the Bush 
Administration’s views were not reflected in this independent briefing.77 Colin Powell 
and Donald Rumsfeld told the Saudis that this report was written by an independent 
                                                 
74 Leon T. Hadar, “What Green Peril?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 2, 1993: 39.   
75 There were fears that the removal of Saddam might lead to dismantling the unity of Iraq and the 
chaos that would follow, due to the Sunni-Shiite-Kurdish conflict which might result. If Iraq was 
divided, it would be divided into a Kurdish north, and a Shiite south (which can join Iran and 
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Does America need a foreign policy? 190 and Wheeler,  Saving Strangers: 147-148.)  
76 “Friend or foe”, The Economist, August 10, 2002: 43.  Similarly, Irwin Stelzer of the Weekly 
Standard said that the United States must make clear that “in the event of an upheaval in Saudi Arabia, 
we will take control of, protect, and run the kingdom’s oilfields.” (Rutlege, Addicted to Oil: 173). 
77 The Economist, August 10, 2002: 6. 
162 
 
think-tank, and that it did not represent the official stance of the American 
administration.78  
 
Similarly, the Saudis pulled back from a showdown.79 In September 2002, Saudi 
Arabia declared that it would agree to provide bases to the US military if action 
against Iraq was supported by the United Nations,80 offering the use of the Prince 
Sultan Air Base (P-SAB) for any such operation.81 Also, Riyadh agreed to give its full 
(although secret) support to an invasion if Saudi Arabia was to play a major role in 
shaping the post-invasion regime in Baghdad, and if Washington promised to 
genuinely commit to an equitable and lasting Arab-Israeli peace process.82 
 
 
IRAQI OIL: AN END IN ITSELF… AND A MEANS FOR OTHER ENDS 
(OIL MAKES IRAQ A POINT OF INTERSECTION  
OF THE FOUR FOREIGN POLICY STRANDS) 
 
 
“The strategic logic for invasion is compelling. It would eliminate the possibility that 
Saddam might rebuild his military or acquire nuclear weapons and thus threaten the 
security of the world’s supply of oil. It would allow the United States to redeploy most 
of its forces away from the region afterward.” 
                                                 
78 “Friend or foe”: 43.  
79 On August 7, 2002, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, publicly confirmed that his 
country would not allow the Americans to use Saudi military bases to attack Iraq “Friend or foe”: 43.  
80 “Who backs war?” BBC News, September 19, 2002 [accessed September 19, 2002], 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/Americas/2267767.stm.  
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Kenneth Pollack.83 
 
 
William Appleman Williams has said that economic expansion to foreign markets 
was “both a means and an end for American policy-makers,” (an end due to its 
importance to US economy, and a means to build US empire).84 In a similar fashion, 
this thesis, too, argues that invading Iraq and seizing oil was both a means and end for 
invading Iraq. Seizing Iraqi oil was an end in itself, since it would achieve the 
economic interests of US oil companies (and, by extension, US economic interests). 
But seizing Iraq’s oil was also a means towards other ends, since controlling the 
region’s oil resources would give the US imperial leverage over the oil supplies of 
other great powers like Europe, Russia and Asia, and since Iraq’s oil revenues were 
necessary to rebuild Iraq in a pro-American model, reshape the region, and secure 
Israel, thus expand America’s neo-imperial influence. 
 
 
The US invasion of Iraq, although driven by a number of factors, can be seen as part 
of a long-term drive to perpetuate America’s dominance in the Persian Gulf and 
Caspian region; it can also be read as a demonstration of America’s determination to 
retain control over the spigot of the Persian Gulf oil stream.85 Indeed, the invasion of 
Iraq was an extension of the Carter Doctrine of 1980, which stated that the US would 
use military power to protect the oil resources of the Persian Gulf.86 However, this 
aim was concealed by the official presentation of what Paul Wolfowitz called “the 
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one issue that everyone could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction as the 
core reason.”87  
 
 
THE FALLACY OF THE WMD AND AL QAEDA LINK CLAIMS: 
 
Events show that the Bush Administration built a case for Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction despite a clear lack of evidence. For instance, CIA Director George Tenet 
was pressurized by Cheney, the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans and other 
members of the Bush administration to produce intelligence reports giving evidence 
of Iraqi WMD, despite the lack of strong evidence or credible intelligence 
information.88 Rumsfeld insisted that Iraq possessed a WMD program despite the lack 
of solid evidence to support this claim, saying that “the absence of evidence is not an 
evidence of absence.”89 Furthermore, retired ambassador Joseph Wilson was sent by 
the Bush Administration to Niger in 2002 to investigate whether Saddam purchased 
uranium (yellow cake) from that country. Wilson found that no such transaction ever 
occurred. However, Bush claimed in his State of the Union speech of 2003 that “the 
British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant 
quantities of uranium from Africa.” Wilson assailed the White House credibility in a 
New York Times article. Shortly afterwards, his wife’s CIA identity was illegally 
leaked by members of the Bush Administration.90 Hans Blix, head of the UN 
                                                 
87 Paul Wolfowitz, “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz interview with Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair”, U.S. 
Department of Defence, May 9, 2003 [accessed August 10, 2009] 
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89 Pilger, John, “Iraq: The Lying Game”, The Daily Mirror, August 27, 2002: 8.  
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Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) said on August 
25, 2002 that there was “no clear-cut evidence” that Iraq possessed weapons of mass 
destruction, and that the biological weapons which Saddam possessed in the past may 
have expired, since they have an average shelf life of five years.91 Moreover, 
opposition to this propaganda over Iraq’s WMD came from the US intelligence 
community itself.92 For instance, Bob Woodward cited various US officials and 
sources who admitted “confidentially that the intelligence on WMD was not as 
conclusive as the CIA and the administration had suggested” and that the evidence 
was “pretty thin.”93  
 
Furthermore, in a testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in late 
January 2004, David Kay, the former senior US weapons inspector in Iraq, said that 
claims that Iraq possessed WMD were false, saying that “it turns out we were all 
wrong.”94 Furthermore, in late March 2005, a report by the Commission on the 
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, chaired by Laurence Silberman, said that “the intelligence community 
was dead wrong in almost all its pre-war judgements about Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction.”95 
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 Bush’s argument for war was not just based on WMD, but also on claims of Saddam’s 
alleged ties to al Qaeda, as Bush claimed in his State of the Union speech in January 
2003, that the war on Iraq was a necessary step for the elimination of weapons of 
mass destruction, and a vital part of the global War on Terror due to Saddam’s WMD 
and alleged links to al Qaeda:  
 
With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and 
biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could resume his 
ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create 
deadly havoc in that region. And this Congress and the 
American people must recognize another threat. 
Evidence from intelligence sources, secret 
communications, and statements by people now in 
custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects 
terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, 
and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his 
hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop 
their own.96 
 
Powell reiterated this argument during his presentation to the UN Security Council in 
February 2003, where he said that “we’ve learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda 
members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases.”97 However, there was no 
evidence that Saddam actually had ties to al Qaeda. Shortly after the September 11 
attacks, Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke confirmed that there was no 
                                                                                                                                            
handed in a 12,000 page report detailing its WMD history to the United Nations, members of the Bush 
Administration hurried to New York to obtain the report before anyone else would see it, in order to 
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link between the September 11 attacks and Saddam.98 Also, FBI director Robert 
Mueller said in April 2002 that there was also no evidence that Mohamed Atta, the 
chief hijacker, met an Iraqi agent in Prague in April 2001.99 On October 7, 2002, 
Tenet testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that the CIA could not find 
any evidence linking Saddam to al Qaeda, (which is the opposite of what he said 
before the same committee on February 11, 2003).100 In September 2003, Bush 
admitted that there was no evidence linking Saddam to the September 11 attacks, 
saying that “we have no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with the 11 
September attacks.”101 A 2005 CIA report said that the CIA was aware of several 
contacts between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1990s, but that these 
contacts never resulted in a serious relationship, as Saddam was “distrustful of al 
Qaeda and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, refusing all requests 
from al Qaeda to provide material or operational support.”102  
 
Therefore, CIA counter-terrorism expert Michael Scheuer said that “the US invasion 
of Iraq was not pre-emption; it was… an avaricious, premeditated, unprovoked war 
against a foe who posed no immediate threat but whose defeat did offer economic 
advantage.”103 These economic advantages were the control of the global oil supplies 
(not necessarily for American consumption, but to have influence over rival 
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economies), promoting the interests of US oil companies, and maintaining the US 
dollar as the main currency for pricing oil.  
 
 
CONTROL OF IRAQ’S OIL:  
 
In November 2002, Rumsfeld said in a CBS interview that the invasion of Iraq was 
not about oil. “It has nothing to do with oil, literally nothing to do with oil,” he 
said.104 He reiterated these statements in an interview with Al Jazeera in February 
2003:  
 
The United States is not interested in the oil in that 
region from Iraq. That’s just utter nonsense. It is not 
interested in occupying any country… We don’t take 
our forces and go around the world and try to take 
other people’s real estate or other people’s resources, 
their oil. That’s not what the United States does. We 
never have and we never will.  That’s not how 
democracies operate.105  
 
 
However, other US officials confirmed the role of oil in the invasion of Iraq. For 
instance, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said that “I am saddened 
that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war 
is largely about oil.”106 General John Abizaid, retired head of Centcom and military 
operations in Iraq, said in 2007 about the Iraq war: “Of course it’s about oil, we can’t 
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really deny that.”107 Lawrence Lindsey, Bush’s White House economic adviser, said 
in September 2002 that “Under every plausible scenario, the negative effect [of 
invading Iraq] is quite small relative to the economic benefits that would come from a 
successful prosecution of the war. The key issue is oil, and a regime change in Iraq 
would facilitate an increase in world oil.”108  
 
Like Ian Rutledge (who said that the invasion did not aim to “steal” Iraq’s oil but to 
“control” it),109 Noam Chomsky said that the Iraq war aimed primarily to seize Iraq’s 
oilfields, stressing that the purpose is not just ensuring American “access” to Iraqi oil 
for US consumption, but rather, more importantly, US “control” of Iraqi and global 
oil supplies. He agreed with Chalmers Johnson on the importance of having military 
bases at the heart of the world’s largest oil producing region, as the United States 
needed to control the world’s oil supplies. Since the 1940s the US used control of oil 
as a strategic leverage against its rivals, and today, three global economic centres are 
facing off: the United States, Europe and Asia.110 Japan is a partner whose allegiance 
to the United States is guaranteed by, among other factors, US control over its oil 
supplies from the Middle East, and China is a potential threat to US global hegemony, 
which is also checked by US control of Middle East oil supplies.111 Control over 
Iraq’s oil would enormously strengthen US control of global energy resources, a 
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crucial lever of world control and establishing an imperial grand strategy.112 If 
Washington loses control of Middle East oil supplies, the United States would 
descend to second-class power status.113 Clark agreed that access to oil and gas for 
American consumption was not the ultimate aim of the US invasion of Iraq. Rather, 
the more ultimate aim was US control over the sources of energy of its economic 
rivals – Europe, Japan, China and other nations aspiring to be more independent.114 
 
 “Not only does America benefit economically from the relatively low costs of Middle 
Eastern oil,” wrote Zbigniew Brzezinski, “but America’s security role in the region 
gives it indirect but politically critical leverage on the European and Asian economies 
that are also dependent on energy exports from the region.”115 Chomsky cited 
Brzezinksi’s statement as proof that the invasion of Iraq was about maintaining 
America’s firm hand on the oil spigot to give America “critical leverage” over Europe 
and Asia’s oil supplies.116 Brzezinski emphasized the importance of “domination” in 
the oil and gas producing regions of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Basin region, in 
order to have a “hegemonic asset” over Europe and Asia: “Since reliable access to 
reasonably priced energy is vitally important to the world’s three economically most 
dynamic regions – North America, Europe and East Asia – strategic domination over 
the area, even if cloaked by cooperative agreements, would be a globally decisive 
hegemonic asset.”117 David Harvey agreed that control over oil resources and 
strengthening America’s position in Eurasia was an aim of the Iraq war:  
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Not only does the invasion of Iraq constitute an attempt 
to control the global oil spigot and hence the global 
economy through domination over the Middle East. It 
also constitutes a powerful US military bridgehead on 
the Eurasian land mass which, when taken together 
with its gathering alliances from Poland down through 
the Balkans [for example, NATO], yields it a powerful 
geostrategic position in Eurasia with at least the 
potentiality to disrupt any consolidation of a [rival] 
Eurasian power.118 
 
Arguing that Washington was establishing an “empire of bases” near oil-rich 
regions,119 Chalmers Johnson agreed that the invasion of Iraq was a part of a US 
strategy of building military outposts in oil-rich southeast Eurasia, including Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, in order to bring the region’s oil 
supplies under US hegemony. The reason for invading Iraq, said Johnson, was not 
counter-terrorism, or democratisation, but control of oil supplies to nations which 
pose a threat to US power like Europe or China, ensuring US oil corporations’ 
interests, securing Israel, and fulfilling America’s imperialist ambitions, where Iraq 
would be the “jewel in the crown” of this grand strategy.120 Arguing that Bush’s War 
on Terror was a “variant” of the Open Door Policy to expand the US empire,121 and 
describing the invasion of Iraq as an “imperialist power grab,”122 former CIA analyst 
Stephen Pelletière agrees that the Bush Administration saw the invasion of 
Afghanistan, followed by Iraq, as a plan to establish US bases in an oil-rich region,123 
because in order for the US to maintain its imperial status, it must control oil 
resources, and thus it was necessary to invade Iraq.124 By remaining the dominant 
power in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, the United States could achieve more 
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than just the safety of future oil supply; it could also exercise a degree of control over 
the energy supply of other oil-importing countries.125 Control of oil is “the centre of 
gravity of US economic hegemony,”126 and the United States aimed to control the 
destination of Iraq’s oil exports,127 thus providing the United States with a potential 
stranglehold over the economies of potential rivals.128 Similarly, John Morrissey 
argued that the Persian Gulf region, a “geoeconomic pivot vital to US and global 
economic health,” required “a strong US military presence in key producing areas and 
in the sea lanes that carry foreign oil to American shores.” The American invasion of 
Iraq fitted into this US military-geoeconomic agenda for Persian Gulf oil, which 
aimed for “an overt geoeconomic project” where the US military was used for 
“maintaining the conditions for a US-centred global economy, defined by neoliberal 
political economic doctrine” and “defending global capitalism, free markets and [the] 
neoliberal order.”129 
 
In short, US global dominance required the US military to patrol the major sea lanes 
used by the world’s 3,500 oil tankers, and also to “physically control the regions with 
the world’s largest remaining hydrocarbons.”130  
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 CREATING INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR US ENERGY FIRMS:  
 
Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi national council, famously said that “American 
companies will have a big shot at Iraqi oil.”131 The major US energy companies are 
the indispensable means by which the government achieves its energy policy 
needs,132 and in pursuit of diversified and expanded oil resources in Iraq, the US 
could promote the interests of its own oil companies.133 Iraq could become a leading 
oil suppliers in the decades ahead, if a stable Iraqi government, willing to open o
reserves for exploitation by US oil companies, was put in power.
il 
n 
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needed to install a puppet regime in Baghdad that would align itself with US 
corporate interests, mainly to award Iraq’s oil contracts only to US and UK 
companies, thus nullifying Saddam Hussein’s contracts with French, Russian and 
Chinese firms, which were revealed by Cheney and Rumsfeld in the “Foreign Suitors 
of Iraq’s Oil” document.135 According to Klein, this showed that Iraq fitted the 
historical pattern of overthrowing regimes, under the claims of over-exaggerated 
security threats, in order to maintain America’s corporate interests.136 Moreover, if a 
new regime in Baghdad rolled out the red carpet for the oil multinationals to return, it 
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would be possible that a broader wave of de-nationalization could sweep through
global oil industry, reversing the historic changes of the early 1970s,
 the 
d nationalization of oil assets.   
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PROTECTING THE PETRODOLLAR SYSTEM FROM THE PETROEURO 
THREAT:  
 
Stressing the role of the US dollar as a main factor in US hegemony, a former UK 
government official says that “there were only two credible reasons for invading Iraq: 
control over oil and preservation of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency… Oil 
and the dollar were the real reasons for the attack on Iraq, with WMD as the public 
reason now exposed as woefully inadequate.”138 Furthermore, one financial expert 
said that: 
In the real world… the one factor underpinning 
American prosperity is keeping the dollar the world 
reserve currency. This can only be done if the oil 
producing states keep oil priced in dollars, and all their 
currency reserves in dollars assets. If anything put the 
final nail in Saddam Hussein’s coffin, it was his move 
to start selling oil for euros.139 
 
In November 2000, Saddam decided to sell oil only in contracts denominated in 
euros, marking the first time an OPEC country attempted to challenge the petrodollar 
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hegemony,140 threatening to suspend all oil exports (about 5% of the world’s total) if 
the UN’s Oil For Food program turned down his request. Shortly thereafter, Iraq’s oil 
proceeds went into a special UN account for the Oil For Food program, and were then 
deposited at Baghdad’s euro-based account at BNP Paribas. The move did not make 
economic sense, since the euro was at record lows against the dollar, thus the move 
was seen as a largely symbolic political message.141 However, Saddam’s switch to the 
euro resulted in Baghdad making profit when the value of the euro later appreciated 
against the dollar.142  
 
Although Iraq’s switch to the euro, in itself, did not have a huge impact, the 
ramifications regarding further OPEC movement towards a “petroeuro” system were 
quite profound. If invoicing oil in euros were to spread, it would create a panic sell-
off of dollars by foreign central banks and OPEC oil producers. In the months before 
the Iraq war, hints in this direction were heard from Russia, Iran, Indonesia and 
Venezuela.143 Moreover, OPEC members were considering moving away from the 
dollar to the euro, as they considered using the euro, as well as the US dollar, when 
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determining price targets for crude.144 The US dollar was weakened in 2002 due to 
the economic strain caused by the bursting of the dot-com bubble, and the corpora
scandals of Arthur Andersen, Enron, Worldcom and other similar scandals. This 
caused the euro to appreciate in value in 2002 relative to the dollar, aggravating the 
fears that OPEC might follow Iraq and move towards a petroeuro.
te 
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assets being frozen by the US Patriot Act caused Middle Eastern investors to sell 
dollar assets.146 In fact, one former US government employee said that “One of the 
dirty little secrets of today’s international order is that the rest of the globe could 
topple the United States from its hegemonic state whenever they so choose with a 
concerted abandonment of the dollar standard.”147 (It is unlikely, however, that 
industrialized countries or OPEC would risk the complete abandonment of the 
dollar,148 as such a massive sell-out of dollar assets would cause a sharp decline in the 
value of the US dollar, and their dollars assets would lose value). 
 
Therefore, regime change in Baghdad aimed to prevent further movement within 
OPEC toward the euro as an alternative oil transaction currency. In order to pre-empt 
OPEC, the US government needed to gain control of Iraq and its oil reserves, and the 
currency to price it, in order to preserve the petrodollar system.149 
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WEAKENING OPEC’S INFLUENCE IN THE GLOBAL OIL MARKET: 
 
The conventional wisdom on the relation between OPEC and the Iraq invasion was 
that invading Iraq would help roll back OPEC, which was a major objective for the 
US government.150 The neo-conservatives wanted to cripple OPEC which they 
considered “evil.”151 For instance, Claudia Rosett, influential journalist at the Wall 
Street Journal and member of the neo-conservative think-tank, The Foundation for 
the Defence of Democracy (FDD), famously called OPEC a “purely evil cartel… a 
gang of price-fixing, oil-rich thug regimes that meet and reinforce assorted terrorist-
sponsoring tyrants and gouge consumers.”152 The neo-conservatives favoured a sell-
out of Iraq’s oilfields, in order to use Iraq’s oil to destroy OPEC through massive 
overproduction above OPEC quotas. The US oil industry, on the other hand, favoured 
state control of Iraq’s oil reserves, according to Amy Jaffe (one of the authors of the 
April 2001 Strategic Energy Policy report), since the industry feared that over-
production would decrease the oil prices to hazardous levels153 (as in the 1980s). 
Former Saudi Petroleum Minister Zaki Yamani agreed that Washington would not 
actually want to see the end of OPEC.154 So did Rutledge, who said that since the 
1980s, the US never actually wanted to “bust OPEC,” since the American oil industry 
depended on prices within an optimum level, high enough for the US oil industry to 
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make profit, and low enough not to hurt the US economy.155 America’s objective, 
instead, was to “control” OPEC.156 Yergin, too, did not believe that the new Iraqi 
government would want to bust OPEC by flooding the market in oil, since Baghdad’s 
need for money would make it more interested to sell oil at $20 or $25 per barrel157 
(which was within the optimum oil price range in March 2003).158  
 
The Bush Administration resisted a US Congress resolution to sue OPEC for anti-trust 
practices and price manipulation. OPEC member states enjoy immunity from 
prosecution under US law, which states that “courts of one country will not sit in 
judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.” In 
early 2005, a group of senators led by Senator Mike DeWine (R-Ohio) introduced the 
"No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act,” or NOPEC, to amend US law to allow 
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the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to bring suits 
against OPEC for monopolistic practices.159 In April and May 2007, committees in 
both the Senate and House of Representatives voted to approve versions of the 
“NOPEC.”160 In May 2008, the House of Representatives passed NOPEC in a 324-84 
vote, enough to override a presidential veto. However, the White House opposed the 
bill, saying that targeting OPEC investments in the United States as a source for 
damage awards “would likely spur retaliatory action against American interests in 
those countries and lead to a reduction in oil available to US refiners.”161 The White 
House always maintained that it would veto the bill, arguing that it could stimulate 
retaliatory action from OPEC governments to limit US access to global oil supply, 
thus push crude oil and gasoline prices higher and damage American business 
interests abroad.162 
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While Bush wanted to increase US control over global oil supplies, and weaken any 
power that might challenge the US, including OPEC, he saw that the NOPEC bill was 
not the correct way to weaken OPEC. Rather, his way of weakening OPEC was to 
invade an OPEC member, namely Iraq, and use its vast oil resources to gain global 
influence.   
 
 
DECREASING DEPENDENCE ON SAUDI ARABIA FOR STRATEGIC AND 
ECONOMIC NEEDS:  
 
Former Saudi Petroleum Minister Sheikh Zaki Yamani said that oil was the major 
objective for the United States in seeking to occupy Iraq, because the US was aiming 
to secure its oil supplies by reducing dependence on oil from Saudi Arabia, adding 
that the September 11 attacks accelerated the American direction on the regional 
diversification of oil resources.163 Indeed, Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol said 
that invading Iraq could make it “replace Saudi Arabia as the key American ally and 
source of oil in the region.”164 Kristol specifically called for invading Iraq to decrease 
dependence on Saudi oil, saying that removing Saddam would “reduce the Saudis’ 
leverage” and that “returning Iraqi oil fully to market can only reduce the Saudi 
ability to set oil prices, and make the US bases there superfluous.”165 Kristol 
reiterated this argument in a testimony to the House of Representatives in May 2002, 
saying that Riyadh could use the oil weapon against the US, that removing Saddam 
would be “a tremendous step towards reducing Saudi leverage,” and that “bringing 
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Iraqi oil fully into world market would improve energy economics. From a military 
and strategic perspective, Iraq is more important than Saudi Arabia. And building a 
representative government in Baghdad would demonstrate that democracy could wor
in the Arab world. This, too, would be a useful challenge to the current Saudi 
k 
gime.”166 
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With Saddam gone, Bush would pull American troops out of Saudi Arabia and 
decrease Washington’s dependence on Riyadh for oil and for strategic assistance.167
Iraq’s oil might provide both a major addition to world reserves and (therefore) a 
means of reducing Saudi Arabia’s central role as the sole effective swing produc
Also, the presence of US military bases in Saudi Arabia, the land of Mecca and 
Medina, was a main cause of al-Qaeda’s attacks inside and outside Saudi Arabia. 169
In an interview with Vanity Fair in May 2003, Wolfowitz said that the US military 
deployment in Saudi Arabia “over the last 12 years has been a source of enormous 
difficulty” for Riyadh, and “a huge recruiting device for al Qaeda. In fact if you look
at bin Laden, one of his principle grievances was the presence of so-called crusader 
forces on the holy land, Mecca and Medina. I think just lifting that burden from the 
Saudis is itself going to open the door to other positive things.”170 Thus, Cary Frase
argued that seeing that Saudi Arabia was willing to distance itself from the US (as 
seen in the exchanges between King Abdullah and Bush before September 11), that 
15 of the 19 September 11 hijackers were Saudis and that the US military presence in 
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Saudi Arabia did not secure US interests, the Bush Administration decided to invade 
Iraq where one of the aims was to replace US military presence in Saudi Arabia wit
US military presence in Iraq.
h 
i oil supplies, which would blackmail the West by 
cutting off its energy supplies.172  
if 
 
ion, the 
udis felt compelled to cooperate in the war on Iraq, albeit secretly.173  
EBUILDING THE IRAQI ECONOMY AND DEMOCRATISING IRAQ:  
ast 
                                                
171 There was also a fear of Islamist extremists taking 
over control of Riyadh and of Saud
 
The Saudis were initially against the war on Iraq, fearing that removing Saddam 
would open Iraq’s oilfields as a competitor to Saudi oil, that removing Saddam would 
cause disturbance in the region by encouraging the Kurds and the Shiites to have their 
own states, and that the strong Islamist current in the Kingdom would cause trouble 
the Saudi royal family supported the war. However, following the RAND report of
July 2002, which described Saudi Arabia as the “kernel of evil” in the reg
Sa
  
 
R
 
In implementing the Bush Doctrine’s call for spreading democracy in the Middle E
as a means to fight terrorism, and redrawing the region’s political map to Israel’s 
favour, Bush saw Iraq as a potential model for democratisation, as it had an educated 
population and a strong economic and strategic potential that could set an example for 
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democratisation. Richard Perle thought that Iraq provided the best hope for the 
democratic experiment in an Arab country. “I think there is a potential civic culture in 
the Arab countries that can lead to democratic institutions, and I think Iraq is probabl
the best place to put that proposition to the test because it’s a sophisticated educated 
population that has suffered horribly under totalitarian rule.”
y 
witz 
 Haass, the State Department director of policy planning, said in December 
002:  
 
olicy will be more actively engaged in 
supporting democratic trends in the Muslim world than 
ever before.176  
he 
 be as 
 
                                                
174 Similarly, Wolfo
said that Iraq was the best place to test democracy.175 The Bush Administration 
believed that democratization would help fight terrorism and stabilize the region. 
Richard
2
By failing to help gradual paths to democratisation in 
many of our important relationships – by creating what 
might be called a “democratic exception” – we missed 
an opportunity to help these countries become more 
stable, more prosperous, more peaceful, and more 
adaptable to the stresses of a globalizing world. It is 
not in our interest  - or that of the people living in the 
Muslim world – for the United States to continue the 
exception. US p
 
For decades, however, democratisation in the Middle East was complicated by the 
Democracy Conundrum; the need to maintain despotic but pro-American regimes to 
stabilize the region and its oil resources.177 The United States did not want to take t
risk of full democratisation, lest it brought to power a regime that would not
lenient towards the US interests. Charles Krauthammer acknowledged that 
Washington ignored Middle East democratisation, due to fear of disrupting oil 
supplies: “Oil is why America kept its distance from the region for so long. Ever since
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Franklin Roosevelt made alliance with Saudi Arabia, the US chose to leave the A
world to its own political and social devices so long as it remained a reasonably 
friendly petrol station. The arrangement lasted a very long time.”
rab 
s, 
 
 
the fact that democracies would be 
ore willing to fight terrorism and secure Israel.  
ght 
at 
nce “Arab repression [fueled] Islamist terror and anti-American 
ntiments.”183  
 
                                                
178 In other word
the two regions that remained exempt from democratising impulse of the United 
States were Africa and the Middle East, “because of oil and apparent benignity.” The 
reason for the war on Iraq was that, after September 11, the United States realized that
“the old offshore, hands-off, over the horizon policy” towards the Middle East would 
not work, that it needed to get more involved in the Middle East, and that “Iraq [was] 
the beckoning door” to this hands-on approach.179 The neo-conservative rationale was 
that only by restructuring the “Arab tyrannies” of the region could US energy supplies
and regional security be ensured,180 in addition to 
m
 
After the removal of the Saddam regime in Iraq, next on the neo-conservative list of 
regime change were Syria, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, 
and perhaps even Egypt.181 Richard Perle said that “if a tyrant like Saddam is brou
down, the others will start to think.”182 Similarly, Kaplan and Kristol argued th
democratisation in the Middle East became a matter of national security after 
September 11, si
se
 
178 Charles Krauthammer, “Coming ashore”, Time, February 17, 2003: 27. 
179 Krauthammer, “Coming ashore”: 27. 
180 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: 308. 
181 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: 309.  
182 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: 156.  
183 Kaplan and Kristol, The War Over Iraq: 101. They dismiss the “war for oil theory”, insisting that 
the real reason is imposing democracy to fight terrorism: “Characterizing the US effort to oust Saddam 
as a war for oil, critics of the Bush Doctrine at home and abroad try to portray the United States as a 
bully state intoxicated by the arrogance of power” (ibid: 104). 
185 
 
To achieve a stable, strong and democratic Iraq, Iraq’s oil exports, as they help 
rebuild Iraq’s economy, would also help build Iraq’s market democracy and fulfil 
America’s objectives. Paul Wolfowitz testified before the House of Representatives 
on March 27, 2003:  
 
There’s a lot of money to pay for this, that doesn’t have 
to be US taxpayer money, and it starts with the assets of 
the Iraqi people... and on a rough recollection, the oil 
revenues of that country could bring between $50 and 
$100 billion over the course of the next two or three 
years… We’re dealing with a country that can really 
finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.184  
 
Thus, Iraq’s oil became more than just a resource to be controlled; oil exports were 
seen as the “cash lifeline” or the “cash crop”185 that would provide funds for 
economic and political development in Iraq, thus trigger a democratic dominos effect 
in the region. (However, a February 2003 report by the US State Department’s Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research, titled Iraq, the Middle East and Change: No Dominoes, 
said that the invasion of Iraq would not likely lead to democracy in Iraq or the Middle 
East, as Iraq was made of several ethnic groups deeply hostile to one another. Even if 
some form of democracy took place in Iraq, said the report, it would probably be 
manipulated by anti-American Islamic groups, and it would not lead to the spread of 
democracy throughout the Middle East. The US State Department declined to 
comment on the report, saying that it did not reflect the Department’s opinion.) Also, 
George Tenet was sceptic about a democratic dominoes effect, saying at a hearing in 
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Capitol Hill: “I don't want to be expansive in, you know, a big domino theory about 
what happens in the rest of the Arab world.”186  
 
In any case, democratization continued to be an official justification for the war, as 
the neo-conservatives argued that democratization would stabilize the region, and that 
democratic governments would be more willing to cooperate on the War on Terror 
and make peace with America’s ally in the region: Israel. Given that Bush and the 
neo-conservatives had staunch pro-Israel views, the security of Israel and scaring the 
Arabs into peace with Tel Aviv was part of the justification for invading Iraq. 
 
 
ADVANCING THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS, AND SECURING 
ISRAEL:  
 
Bush said in June 2002 that, by removing Saddam, “our ability to advance the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process would be advanced.”187 Kaplan and Kristol argued that 
removing Saddam and installing a pro-American regime would improve Baghdad’s 
relations with Israel.188 Bush thought, wrongfully, that the road to Jerusalem went 
through Baghdad, and that awed Arabs would be threatened into peace with Israel,189 
where it would be easier to impose on the Palestinians a peace agreement acceptable 
to the neo-conservatives’ Israeli allies, Ariel Sharon and the Likud. Thus, remaking 
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the whole region on a pro-American model would strengthen Israel.190 Furthermore, 
Israel hoped that the invasion of Iraq would next lead them to Iran and Syria. “The 
war in Iraq is just the beginning,” former Prime Minister Shimon Peres said in 
February 2003.191   
 
Therefore, US control over Iraq’s oil was an end in itself (due to the economic and 
business benefits to the US) and a means for other greater ends (first, advance US 
imperial grip on global oil supplies, and, second, Iraq’s oil revenues would help 
rebuild Iraq according to Washington’s mould, serve as a model for the Arabs, secure 
Israel and help fight terrorism). All four of the Bush foreign policy priorities (energy 
procurement, military advancement, War on Terror and global power projection) were 
seen in the arguments for the invasions of Iraq (although, obviously, the War on 
Terror as a motive to invade Iraq was only false rhetoric, since there were no links 
between Saddam and al Qaeda, and since he had no WMDs). Therefore, it was Iraq’s 
oil which made Iraq the point of intersection of the four strands of foreign policy, as 
military advancement and global power projection were linked to Iraq’s oil, and War 
on Terror rhetoric was used to justify the invasion. 
 
 
IRAQ POLICY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 
 
Before September 11, the Bush Administration was still undecided on how to 
pressurize or overthrow Saddam, considering the three options of regime change 
through an armed coup by Iraqi opposition groups, enforcement of the UN economic 
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sanctions, and enforcement of the No-Fly-Zones to protect the Kurds in the north and 
the Shiites in the south. Bush empowered three working groups to study each of these 
options.192 However, the smart sanctions approach, favoured by Secretary of State 
Colin Powell, faded away in July 2001, amidst UN Security Council disagreement.  
 
It took 24 hours for the proponents of regime change to cite 9/11 as the foundation for 
military action. During the NSC meeting on September 12, Rumsfeld said that 
Afghanistan did not have decent targets for bombing, but Iraq did, so the United 
States should bomb Iraq. Richard Clarke, US Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, thought 
that Rumsfeld was joking, but was surprised to see that he was actually serious. Bush 
replied that the Americans had to change the government in Iraq, not just hit it with 
missiles.193 Rumsfeld pressed ahead, instructing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Richard Myers to find out as much as he could about Saddam Hussein’s 
possible responsibility for the attacks.194  
 
Bush repeated the wider possibilities of a post-9/11 response to his advisors. On 
September 16, Bush told Rice that the focus would be on Afghanistan, although he 
still wanted plans for Iraq, in case Iraq somehow took advantage of the September 11 
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attacks, or in case it turned out that it was involved in the attacks.195 During an NSC 
meeting on September 17, he said: “I believe that Iraq was involved, but I’m not 
going to strike them now. I don’t have the evidence at this point” adding that he 
wanted the NSC to keep working on plans for military action in Iraq but indicating 
that there would be plenty of time to do so.196 He thus ordered the Pentagon to be 
ready to deal with Iraq if Baghdad acted against US interests, with plans to include 
possibly occupying Iraqi oilfields,197 while working on Afghanistan.198 On September 
20, Bush told British Prime Minister Tony Blair that, although Iraq was not the 
immediate problem at the time, he was seriously considering attacking Iraq, saying: 
“Iraq, we keep for another day.”199 
 
“There must be a Phase Two”, wrote Richard Perle head of the Defence Policy Board 
in November 2001. “At the top of the list for Phase Two is Iraq.”200 Eventually, Iraq 
was marketed to the public as “Phase Two” of the War on Terror.201 Other possible 
targets were eliminated.202 Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Georgia, and the Philippines 
were often mentioned, and in some instances Washington dispatched Special Forces 
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to help train local armies in anti-terror campaigns.203 On November 16, Bush 
privately asked Rumsfeld to create a secret plan for Iraq.204 On November 21, Bush 
ordered Rumsfeld to update the war plans for Iraq.205 Then, in January 2002, Bush 
gave his Axis of Evil speech, where he falsely accused Saddam of supporting 
terrorism and seeking weapons of mass destruction, claiming that “the Iraqi regime 
has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a 
decade,” 206 in order to justify the neo-conservative plans to invade Iraq, reshape th
Middle East and protect oil supplies. “F**k Saddam! We’re taking him out!” Bush 
reportedly told R
e 
ice in early March 2002.207  
                                                
 
However, Bush could not attack Iraq in the spring of 2002, due to political and 
military obstacles. First, Osama bin Laden was not captured yet, (even though Bush 
said in March 2002 that he was “truly… not that concerned about him.”208) 
Furthermore, military action against Iraq would have been a large-scale operation, so 
Bush needed time to mobilize the military and move troops and equipment to the 
region and obtain international support. Moreover, there was a major conflict going 
on in the Middle East in the spring of 2002: the Arab-Israeli military clashes, and 
these needed to be calmed down in order to ensure Arab support to an American 
invasion of Iraq. (Cheney’s trip to the region in the spring of 2002 failed to reach such 
agreement, as the Arab rulers were more interested in solving the ongoing Arab-
Israeli problem than in a military action against Iraq). Finally, there was another 
global conflict in the spring of 2002: the Indian-Pakistani military clashes which 
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almost led to a nuclear war between the two countries. Bush was hoping to invade 
Iraq in the autumn of 2002, but he decided to delay to March 2003 in order to build up 
America’s petroleum reserves to counter the expected oil price shock, and to re-stock 
the hi-tech weapons which were used up in the Afghanistan war.209 
 
Despite these obstacles, the Bush Administration’s focus remained upon Iraq. Richard 
Haass, director of policy planning at the State Department, met with Rice in July 2002 
in one of their regular meetings, and asked her whether Iraq really should be front and 
centre in the administration’s foreign policy, given the War on Terror and other 
issues. Haass recalls Rice saying “That decision’s been made, don’t waste your 
breath.”210 The signal for the renewed American campaign against Iraq came in late 
August 2002, when Dick Cheney delivered a speech saying that if Saddam built a 
nuclear weapon, the Iraqis would “seek domination of the entire Middle East” and the 
world’s oil supplies. Cheney also opposed the inspectors’ return to Iraq, saying that it 
“would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow back in the box”. He also 
warned that Saddam could use control over oil to threaten US interests, as he could 
“take control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies, directly threatening 
America’s friends throughout the region, and subjecting the United States or any other 
nation to nuclear blackmail” if he was not stopped, and that Saddam would continue 
to develop WMD using his oil wealth.211  
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By the end of August 2002, the final and irrevocable decision to attack Iraq was 
made, with the signing of the necessary documents on August 29, 2002.212 However 
Bush continued to pursue a diplomatic route, at least in appearance.213 In an attempt 
to expand the coalition for the Iraq war, he told the UN General Assembly on 
September 12, 2002, that the UN should pass a resolution authorizing the American 
war on Iraq, saying that “We will work with the UN Security Council for th
necessary resolutions”, but hinting that the United States would go alone if it had t
asking “will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be 
irrelevant?”
e 
o, 
 
ecessary.215  
nto 
aq 
ion 
Agency (IAEA). Both agencies reported in early 2003 that they found no “smoking 
                                                
214 clearly stating that the United States was ready to act unilaterally if
n
 
Saddam initially forestalled military action by suddenly allowing the inspections i
Iraq in mid-September.216 But the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 
anonymously on November 8, 2002, which specified “serious consequences” if Ir
was found in material breach of the UN terms.217 The first inspections started on 
November 27, under the supervision of the United Nations Monitoring, Verificat
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy 
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gun” or evidence for Iraq’s WMD program,218 and that they needed six more months 
to complete their investigation.  
 
Thus, the die was cast, as the US rejected the pursuit of a second UN resolution, and 
on March 19, 2003, the United States started its invasion of Iraq. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
US commitment to the Open Door policy of informal imperialism did not wane after 
the 9/11 attacks, as the Bush Administration promoted trade and global economic 
openness as a means to fight terrorism. In fact, the practice of using the military to 
protect US corporate and economic interests has increased after the attacks, as the US 
increasingly used its armed forces to spread military bases close to the world’s energy 
regions. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were part of a global strategy to reassert 
US dominance in the international system219 and maintain the Open Door empire, 
(except replacing China and the Far East with Central Asia and the Persian Gulf,220 
and the fact that Karzai and Khalilzad were former Unocal employees was a sign of 
corporatism). After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Doctrine, based on the idea 
that America was in a War on Terror, called for taking the war to the enemy, pre-
emptive strikes, and spreading democracy as a way to fight terror. The Bush 
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Administration saw Iraq as an optimum starting point for its democratisation program. 
It saw Iraq as a the key point of intersection that linked the four strands of US foreign 
policy, bringing together US military power, the control of oil supplies and the 
prospect of democratisation with the extension of US presence in the Persian Gulf, 
making Iraq (rather than other rogue states) the focal point of US foreign policy. 
Iraq’s oil had become an end in itself, and a means for the wider ends; rebuilding Iraq 
as a democratic model for the Middle East, securing Israel, substituting Saudi Arabia 
as a strategic ally and main oil supplier, fighting terrorism, and extending US empire.  
 
Nevertheless, there were differences between Iraq as a point of intersection of the four 
strands, and the Caspian region as another point of intersection. A first difference was 
that, in the case of Iraq, it was Iraqi oil which made Iraq a point of intersection, while 
in the case of the Caspian, it was not oil, but rather the War on Terror, which brought 
all the strands together after the September 11 attacks. (The War on Terror did exist in 
the Iraq case, but only as rhetoric, or as a false claim, if not an outright lie). A second 
difference was that, in the case of the Caspian, the Bush Administration did not seem 
to have a vision to redraw the map of the Caspian region, as was the case with Iraq 
and the Middle East region (where the US intervention was meant to be a 
demonstration to establish and confirm US power, and extend it to the rest of the 
region, in effect redrawing the map of the entire Middle East). On the global level, it 
was the War on Terror, not oil procurement, which brought all strands together. The 
September 11 attacks were the catalyst which linked the four US foreign policy 
strands of military preponderance, energy procurement, anti-terrorism and global 
power projection, under the rhetorical umbrella of the War on Terror. The attacks also 
facilitated the conversion of the Bush Administration’s ambitions into actions, as the 
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US invaded Afghanistan, established bases in Central Asia and prepared for regime 
change in Iraq. Subsequently, success or failure in Iraq was not only significant for 
the fulfilment of the four strands in that country. Rather, it would mark whether the 
US would be able to defend and extend its influence elsewhere because, at that point, 
the Bush Administration made US foreign policy too dependent on success in Iraq.  
 
Following the invasion of Afghanistan, the Caspian region was ignored, in favour of 
the Persian Gulf. Even after 9-11, the United States and the West still lacked a clear 
strategic vision for Central Asia.221 The American foreign policy refocused on the 
Persian Gulf, and by the spring of 2002, the four strands of US foreign policy came 
together in the Persian Gulf, where invading Iraq would help all four strands (the link 
between Saddam and terrorists being false, of course). Iraq’s oil (being an end in itself 
and a means for other ends) was the factor which turned the country into the point of 
intersection of all foreign policy strands, as oil would help the economic 
reconstruction, and thus democratisation, of Iraq, turning Iraq into a model after 
which the whole region should be reshaped in accordance to US interests.  
 
However, the US invasion of Iraq failed to exploit Iraq’s oil resources as it planned, 
and failed to come up with a reliable Phase IV plan for a stable political and economic 
structure for Iraq,222 and thus failed to redraw the Middle East as desired. And as Iraq 
moved after April 2003 not towards democracy and order, but towards instability, it 
would put not only US control of energy, but also its pursuit of preponderance of 
power into doubt. 
                                                 
221 Rashid, “Central Asia”: 118.  
222 Phase I of a military conflict is the preparation for combat. Phase II consists of initial operations. 
Phase III is the main combat stage, and Phase IV is concerned with post-combat operations (Thomas E. 
Ricks. “Army Historian Cites Lack of Postwar Plan”, Washington Post, December 25, 2004, page A01, 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24891-2004Dec24.html) 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
“A BIG SHOT” AND “A LOT OF MONEY”: 
 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND  
US FOREIGN ENERGY POLICY 
 
 
“American oil companies will have a big shot at Iraqi oil.” 
Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi National 
Council.1 
 
If oil was one of the main reasons for the invasion of Iraq, then it was both an end in 
itself and a means to other ends. Iraq’s vast resources made it a candidate to be a 
starting point for the neo-conservative plan to trickle down democracy to the Middle 
East. Democracy would lead to more stability and thus more security for the region’s 
energy supplies, while decreasing the threat of global terrorism. This would not be 
possible without Iraq’s oil, as Iraq cannot be a stable, pro-American democratic model 
without a strong and stable economy, and a stable Iraqi economy is not possible 
without Iraqi oil.  
 
Donald Rumsfeld said in an interview with Fortune magazine in November 2002 that 
the cost of Iraq’s reconstruction would be “a very different situation from 
Afghanistan” since “Iraq has oil.”2 He said in testimony before the Senate 
                                                 
1 Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: 98 and Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 179.  
2 Donald Rumsfeld and Rik Kirkland, “Don Rumsfeld talks guns and butter”, Fortune, November 18, 
2002, [accessed July 4, 2008] 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2002/11/18/332271/ and 
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=5&hid=15&sid=f1a96962-8b4e-4c6e-86ff-
5e1ae5fc7590%40sessionmgr2 
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Appropriations hearing on March 27, 2003 that he did not believe that the United 
States had the responsibility for reconstruction, since reconstruction funds could 
come from “various sources”, including “frozen assets, oil revenues, and a variety of 
other things including the Oil for Food program.”3 His deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, had 
overoptimistic expectations for Iraq oil revenues, as he testified before a House of 
Representatives committee on the same day that “there’s a lot of money to pay for 
this” from the Iraqi oil revenues, not American taxpayers’ money.4 Also on the same 
day, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage testified to a House of 
Representatives committee: “This is not Afghanistan. When we approach the question 
of Iraq, we realize here is a country which has a resource. And it’s obvious, it’s oil. 
And it can bring in and does bring in a certain amount of revenue each year… $10, 
$15 or even $18 billion… this is not a broke country.”5 State Department official 
Alan Larson added in a Senate Foreign Relations hearing on April 6, 2003: “On the 
resource side, Iraq itself will rightly share much of the responsibilities. Among the 
sources of revenue available are $1.7 billion in invested Iraqi assets, the found assets 
in Iraq… and unallocated Oil For Food money that will be deposited in the 
development fund.”6 Andrew Natsios, administrator for the Agency for International 
Development, repeated the $1.7 billion figure in an interview with Ted Koppel on 
April 23, 2003, saying that the cost for the US of rebuilding Iraq would be only $1.7 
                                                 
3 “Past comments about how much Iraq would cost”, [accessed July 4, 2008] 
http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/sf/iraqwarcost.htm, from House of Representatives, [accessed July 
20, 2006] http://www.house.gov/schakowsky/iraqquotes_web.htm. 
4 “Rep Ellen Tauscher decries logic used by DOD Deputy Wolfowitz”, House of Representatives, June 
22, 2004 [accessed July 4, 2008] http://www.house.gov/tauscher/press/06-22-04.htm 
5 “Past comments about how much Iraq would cost”, [accessed July 4, 2008] 
http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/sf/iraqwarcost.htm, from House of Representatives, [accessed July 
20, 2006] http://www.house.gov/schakowsky/iraqquotes_web.htm. 
6 Ibid. Furthermore, Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said at a White House press briefing on February 18, 
2003: “The reconstruction costs remain... an issue for the future. And Iraq, unlike Afghanistan, is a 
rather wealthy country. Iraq has tremendous resources that belong to the Iraqi people. And so there are 
a variety of means that Iraq has to be able to shoulder much of the burden for their own reconstruction” 
(Ibid.) 
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billion, and that the rest of the cost would be paid by international pledges and by 
Iraqi oil revenues:  
The rest of the rebuilding of Iraq will be done by other 
countries who have already made pledges, Britain, 
Germany, Norway, Japan, Canada, and Iraqi oil 
revenues, eventually in several years, when it’s up and 
running and there’s a new government that’s been 
democratically elected, will finish the job with their 
own revenues. They’re going to get $20 billion a year 
in oil revenues. But the American part of this will be 
$1.7 billion. We have no plans for any further... funding 
of this.7  
 
 
When further asked by Koppel “As far as the reconstruction goes, the American 
taxpayer will not be hit for more than $1.7 billion no matter how long the process 
takes?” Natsios replied “That is our plan and that is our intention.”8  
                                                 
7 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: 223, Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Blimes, The Three Trillion Dollar 
War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict. (London: Allen Lane, 2008): 7-8 and “Nightline: Project 
Iraq”, Foundation of American Scientists, April 23, 2003 [accessed February 22, 2008], 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/temp/natsios042303.html.   
8 Stiglitz and Blimes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: 7-8 and “Nightline: Project Iraq”, Foundation of 
American Scientists, April 23, 2003 [accessed February 22, 2008], 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/temp/natsios042303.html. Interestingly, Lawrence Lindsey was fired from the 
Bush Administration for saying in September 2002 that the cost of the war might reach $200 billion 
(Stiglitz and Blimes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: 7, Linda Blimes and Joseph Stiglitz, “Is this any 
way to rebuild Iraq?”, Los Angeles Times, August 15, 2008 [accessed May 10, 2010] 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-bilmes15-2008aug15,0,4432303.story, Linda Blimes and 
Joseph Stiglitz, “The Iraq war will cost us $3 trillion, and much more”, Washington Post, March 9, 
2008 [accessed May 10, 2010] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/03/07/AR2008030702846.html, Linda Blimes and Joseph Stiglitz, “The US in 
Iraq: An economics lesson”, Los Angeles Times, July 2, 2009 [accessed May 10, 2010] 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/02/opinion/oe-bilmes2, Linda Blimes and Joseph Stiglitz, “War’s 
price tag”, Los Angeles Times, March 16, 2008 [accessed May 10, 2010] 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/16/opinion/op-bilmes16, Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Blimes, “$3 
trillion may be too low”, Guardian, April 6, 2008 [accessed May 10, 2010] 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/apr/06/3trillionmaybetoolow, Joseph Stiglitz and 
Linda Blimes, “Ask a question: The Three Trillion Dollar War”, McClatchy, April 15, 2008 [accessed 
May 10, 2010] http://www.mcclatchydc.com/qna/forum/three_trillion_dollar_war/index.html, Joseph 
Stiglitz, “It’s not the economy, stupid”, Financial Times, September 28, 2004 [accessed May 10, 2010] 
http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/opeds/Economy_Stupid.pdf, Joseph Stiglitz, 
“The Three Trillion Dollar War”, Project Syndicate, March 7, 2008 [accessed May 10, 2010] 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz97/English, Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Blimes, 
“The Three Trillion Dollar War”, Times Online, February 23, 2008 [accessed May 10, 2010] 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article3419840.ece, Joseph 
Stiglitz and Linda Blimes, “The $3 Trillion War”, Vanity Fair, April 2008 [accessed May 10, 2010] 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/stiglitz200804, Joseph Stiglitz, “War at any cost? 
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 These aspirations were evident in the fact that the Iraqi oil ministry was the only 
government building heavily guarded by US troops during the looting which took 
place after the occupation.9 The relation between Iraqi oil and US foreign policy was 
thus more than just a war to seize Iraq’s oil resources. Oil was an end in itself, and a 
means for other ends. 
These statements by US officials were based on ambitions which went back to the 
start of the administration in 2001, as seen in the documents used by the Energy Task 
Force with detailed descriptions of Iraq’s “super giant oilfields”, oil pipelines, 
refineries, and tanker terminals.10 Tom Fitton, President of Judicial Watch (a public 
interest law firm that investigates government corruption) said that the presence of 
such maps and lists on Iraq’s oil projects showed that “Iraq was on the minds of at 
least some of the members of the [Energy] Task Force long before the war [on Iraq]” 
and that one could not talk about the Middle East oil situation without talking about 
Iraq.11 The declassified documents also included maps of Saudi and UAE oilfields, 
refineries, pipelines and tanker terminals, with supporting charts detailing major oil 
                                                                                                                                            
The total economic costs of the war beyond the federal budget: Testimony before the Joint Economic 
Committee”, Columbia University, February 28, 2008 [accessed May 10, 2010] 
http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/papers/Stiglitz_testimony.pdf, Peter Wilson, 
“Stiglitz: Iraq war ‘caused slowdown in the US’”, The Australian, February 28, 2008 [accessed may 
10, 2010] http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/iraq-war-caused-slowdown-in-the-us/story-e6frg6tf-
1111115661208). 
9 Hiro, Secrets and Lies (2005 edition): 274, Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: 234 and Rutledge, 
Addicted to Oil: 181. Also, the oilfields around Kirkuk were secured, which produced a third of Iraq’s 
oil output, were secured by 173rd Airborne Divisoin (Hiro, Secrets and Lies (2005 edition): 234, 281). 
After the capture of Qaim, US troops cut off an oil pipeline to Syria (Hiro, Secrets and Lies (2005 
edition): 292).  
10 Gellman, Angler: 106, Juhasz: The Bush Agenda: 180, Mayer, “Contract Sport”, Mayer “Jane Mayer 
on her article in The New Yorker about Dick Cheney’s relationship with Halliburton” and “Cheney 
energy task force documents feature map of Iraqi oilfields” Judicial Watch, July 17, 2003 [accessed 
January 11, 2008] http://www.judicialwatch.org/printer_iraqi-oilfield-pr.shtml. The revelation of the 
documents was a result of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit by Judicial Watch, a public-
interest group that investigates government corruption and abuses. 
11 Paul Sperry, “White House energy task force papers reveal Iraqi oil maps: Judicial Watch lawsuit 
also uncovers list of foreign suitors for contracts” World Net Daily July 18, 2003 [accessed December 
20, 2007] http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=33642. Also see Gellman, 
Angler: 106. 
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and gas development projects. The fact that the same maps and lists used by Secretary 
of Defence Rumsfeld (when he was arguing for his “dissuade and demonstrate” 
doctrine) were used by the National Energy Policy Development Group showed the 
linkage between the strands of military preponderance and foreign energy 
procurement.12   
The importance of Iraq’s oil was revealed in surprising detail by one of the key 
participants only a few weeks after the invasion of Iraq, as Wolfowitz said at an Asian 
security summit in Singapore: “The most important difference between North Korea 
and Iraq is that, economically, we just had no choice in Iraq. The country swims on a 
sea of oil.”13 Wolfowitz added to Vanity Fair in May 2003 that Saddam’s “criminal 
treatment of the Iraqi people” was, “by itself… a reason to help the Iraqis but… not a 
reason to put American kids’ [i.e.: American soldiers’] lives at risk, certainly not at 
the scale we [the Bush Administration] did.” As for Saddam’s imminent threat, 
Wolfowitz confessed to Vanity Fair that “the truth is that, for reasons that have a lot 
to do with the US government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone 
could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason.”14  
 
                                                 
12 “Cheney energy task force documents feature map of Iraqi oilfields” Judicial Watch, July 17, 2003 
[accessed January 11, 2008] http://www.judicialwatch.org/printer_iraqi-oilfield-pr.shtml. The maps 
and lists are found on the following websites: “Foreign suitors for Iraqi oilfield contracts as of 5 March 
2001 part 1”, http://www.judicialwatch.org/IraqOilFrgnSuitors.pdf, “Foreign suitors for Iraqi oilfield 
contracts as of 5 March 2001 part 2”.  http://www.judicialwatch.org/IraqOilGasProj.pdf, “Iraqi oilfields 
and exploration blocks”, http://www.judicialwatch.org/IraqOilMap.pdf, “Saudi Arabia major oil and 
natural gas development projects”, http://www.judicialwatch.org/SAOilProj.pdf, “Selected oil facilities 
in Saudi Arabia”, http://www.judicialwatch.org/SAOilMap.pdf, “Selected oil facilities of the United 
Arab Emirates”, http://www.judicialwatch.org/UAEOilMap.pdf, “United Arab Emirates major oil and 
gas development projects”,  http://www.judicialwatch.org/UAEOilProj.pdf 
 
13 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: 155, (from “Wolfowitz: Iraq war was about oil”, Guardian, June 
4, 2003).  
14 Paul Wolfowitz, “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz interview with Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair”, U.S. 
Department of Defence, May 9, 2003 [accessed August 10, 2009] 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2594 
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On May 22, 2003, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1483, which 
recognized USA and UK as occupying powers and ended UN sanctions on Iraq. The 
Resolution approved transferring 95% of revenues on Iraqi oil to the Development 
Fund for Iraq (DFI, which was controlled by the United States until authority for the 
fund was transferred to the Iraqi government on June 28, 2004),15 adding that the 
money be spent in the interest of the Iraqi people and that all accounts related to the 
oil revenues should be independently audited.16 UNSCR 1483, adopted by 14 votes to 
zero, with Syria abstaining, provided the legal framework for Iraqi oil exports to 
resume.17  
 
On the same day, May 22, the Bush Administration issued Executive Order 13303, 
which gave oil contractors lifelong exemption from lawsuits and legal proceedings in 
the US. The order applied to Iraqi oil products that are “in the United States, hereafter 
come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or 
control of United States persons.”18 According to Jim Vallette, an analysts with the 
Sustainable Energy & Economy Network of the Institute of Policy Studies in 
Washington, the Executive Order “reveals the true motivation for the occupation: 
absolute power for US interests in Iraqi oil,”19 adding that the Executive Order gave 
US companies complete immunity from legal accountability:  
 
Anything that happened before with US oil companies 
around the world – a massive tanker accident, an 
                                                 
15 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 189, Joel Bainerman, “How much will the war on Iraq cost the US 
taxpayer?” The Middle East, February 2006: 17, Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 320-321. . 
16 Bainerman, “How much will the war on Iraq cost the US taxpayer?”: 17. It took until April 2004 to 
appoint an auditor to the DFI (ibid). 
17 Dilip Hiro. Secrets and Lies: The True Story of the Iraq War. (London: Politico’s, 2005): 310.  
18 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 189 and Pratap Chaterjee, Iraq, Inc.: A Profitable Occupation. (New 
York: Seven Stories Press, 2004): 179.  
19 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 190. 
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explosion at an oil refinery, the employment of slave 
labour to build a pipeline, murder of locals to 
corporate security, the release of billions of tons of 
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, or lawsuits by 
Iraq’s current creditors or the… Iraqi government 
demanding compensation – anything at all, is immune 
from judicial accountability.20  
 
UNCR 1483 and Executive Order 13303 were complemented by Order 39, the official 
order concerned with foreign investment, issued by Paul Bremer, head of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on September 19, 2003. The Order included 
the following provisions:  
 
1) Privatisation of Iraq’s state-owned enterprises (except the oil reserves); 
2) 100% foreign ownership of Iraqi business; 
3) “National Treatment”, which meant that it was not necessary to require giving 
Iraqis preference over foreigners; 
4) Unrestricted, tax-free remittance of all profits and other funds, authorizing 
investors to transfer abroad all funds associated with their investment, 
including shares, profits, dividends, proceeds… etc, thus giving no obligation 
to re-invest in Iraq;   
5) 40-year ownership licenses: Baghdad could deny foreign investors the right to 
own real property (land, buildings… etc). However, it granted foreigners 40-
year licenses with unlimited renewal options to lease Iraqi real estate;  
6) Dispute settlement: Foreign companies have the right to reject Iraq’s domestic 
courts and turn to international tribunals instead.21 
                                                 
20 Chaterjee, Iraq, Inc.: 179, and Rutledge, Addicted to Oil, 189-190.  
21 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 211-221 and Richard Seymour, “The Real Cost of the Iraq War”, The 
Middle East, May 2009: 50. The transformation of the laws of an occupied country is illegal under the 
Geneva Conventions and US Army rules, Therefore, too, are the contracts signed based on these 
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 Order 39 was a practical application of neo-conservative theories which believed in 
the elimination of the state-run economic sector and “shock therapy” economic 
revolution according to Milton Friedman’s teachings.22 However, Order 39 had 
important exclusions, namely in Iraq’s energy sector, as it stated that extraction and 
initial processing of oil in Iraq were excluded from the provisions of Order 39:  
 
Foreign investment may take place with respect to all 
economic sectors in Iraq, except… the natural 
resources sector involving primary extracting and 
initial processing remains prohibited. In addition, this 
Order does not apply to banks and insurance 
companies.23  
 
 
Thus, Bremer changed Iraq’s laws to implement an economic model preferred by the 
Bush Administration that, according to its “corporate globalisation” agenda, could 
ensure increased profits for the corporations without consideration to the welfare of 
the Iraqi economy and people.24 Vital to this agenda was getting rid of the Baathists 
in order to eliminate the opponents of the liberalization of Iraq’s national economy 
and remove all remnants of state economic control, implementing privatisation to 
open Iraq for foreign investment, and bringing in foreign companies and an Iraqi 
                                                                                                                                            
changes in Iraq’s law in favour of the US companies (Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 318-320). Thomas C. 
Foley, an investment banker, a major Republican donor and Bush’s former classmate at Harvard 
Business School, was the CPA official in charge of Iraq’s privatisation. When he was told that 
international law prevents the sale of assets by an occupation government, he said “I don’t give a sh*t 
about international law. I made a commitment to the president that I’d privatise Iraq’s business” (Rajiv 
Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Baghdad’s Green Zone, (London: 
Bloomsbury Publishins Plc, 2008): 106, 140).    
22 Kolko, The Age of War: 149 and Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 11, 56-57, 253. 
23 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 212. 
24 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 197. In fact, before the invasion, Bremer used to work for Kissinger 
Associates, and was chairman and CEO of insurance company Marsh and McLennan’s Crisis 
Consulting Practice, specializing in risk assessment and services for multinational corporations. In a 
November 2001 report which he wrote, he said that privatisation would be hazardous to locals, but 
beneficial to the multinational corporations (Juhasz, The Bush Agenda, 191, 192).   
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bourgeoisie whose prosperity would inspire Syrians, Iranians an others to seek the 
same. Thus, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 1, “De-Baathification of Iraqi 
Society,” signed by Bremer on May 16, 2003, was necessary for this economic 
agenda. De-Baathification also aimed to eliminate the political opponents of Ahmed 
Chalabi25 who was a main supporter of American business in Iraq. The provisions of 
Order 39 were emphasized on September 21, 2003, when Iraq’s Finance Minister 
Kamil al-Kilani confirmed during an IMF-World Bank meeting in Dubai that Order 
39 had opened up all non-oil sectors in Iraq to foreign investors who could own 100% 
of any enterprise.26  
 
The awarding of new contracts was not a new strategy. It followed months of 
discussion on the economic model for the oil industry after the invasion, where the 
US Government, the Iraqis in exile and the US companies all agreed, in principle, that 
Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) would be the contract type used instead of full 
privatisation of Iraqi oil resources. US officials decided to keep the Iraqi oil sector 
under state control, since privatisation would give an impression of imperialism, 
would cause widespread opposition among the Iraqi people, and would sharpen 
opposition to the occupation.27 Furthermore, Iraqi advisers warned that any move to 
privatise the state oil company or to lay claim to untapped reserves before an Iraqi 
                                                 
25 David L. Phillips. Losing Iraq: Inside the postwar reconstruction fiasco. (New York: Basic Books, 
2005): 147, see also Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 201, and Bremer, My Year in Iraq: 40 and 44. 
26 Dilip Hiro, Secrets and Lies: The True Story of the Iraq War (London: Politico’s, 2005): 419. At the 
same meeting, Ali Allawi, the Iraqi trade minister, said that 100% ownership of Iraqi enterprises would 
be allowed, but oil and natural resources would be excluded. However, he added that foreign 
ownership of Iraq’s oil industry was not ruled out. (Andrew Walker, “Iraq oil assets up for sale”, BBC 
News, September 22, 2003 [accessed September 23, 2003], 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3130776.stm) 
27 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 253, 254, Klare, Blood and Oil: 103, and Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 182-
184, 187-188, 192.  
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government was in place would be seen as an act of war.28 Thamer Ghadban, an Iraqi 
oil expert who worked with the US-controlled Office of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), was sceptical about privatisation of the state oil 
company, saying during the World Economic Forum meetings in June 2003 that 
“privatisation does not ring a bell inside of Iraq. The economy and people’s livelihood 
revolve around the oil industry. Privatisation is not only premature, it is 
unacceptable.”29 Furthermore, Philip Carroll, former Shell executive who was 
appointed by the Bush Administration to run Iraq’s oil industry, opposed 
privatisation, telling Bremer: “There was to be no privatisation of Iraqi oil resources 
or facilities while I was involved.”30 Bremer’s Order 39 also avoided the privatisation 
of oil resources or facilities because Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani held that minerals 
belonged to the “community”, meaning the state.31  
 
Production Sharing Agreements differ from privatisation because of two distinctive 
features. The first feature of a PSA is that privatisation is not necessary; the foreign 
company would not actually own the oilfields, or the oil reserves. This is a crucial 
political feature of the PSA, which enables the host country to maintain the principle 
of national sovereignty over its petroleum resources. However, accounting principles 
and regulations allow the company to book the oil reserves of the host country, to 
which they will eventually become entitled as they extract the oil, in the company’s 
accounts, even though the company do not actually own these reserves. This feature is 
                                                 
28 Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 345. Nevertheless, the occupation authority did take possession of $20 
billion worth of revenues from Iraq’s national oil company to spend as it wished (ibid). 
29 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 188. 
30 Dilip Hiro, Blood of the Earth: The global battle for vanishing oil resources. (London: Politico’s, 
2007): 145, from Greg Palast, “Secret US plans for Iraq’s oil”, BBC Newsnight, March 17, 2005 
[accessed May 29, 2008] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/4354269.stm.    
31 Hiro, Blood of the Earth: 146. 
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particularly important to the company, since stock markets have the propensity to 
value the company according to the size of its proven reserves.32  
 
The second distinctive feature of PSAs is that oil is divided into “cost oil” and “profit 
oil” as follows; the company is compensated for its costs by the “cost oil” which it 
takes and sells in the international market, or perhaps back to the state oil company. 
When the sales recover the company’s costs, the amount of oil left in the field, which 
is the “profit oil”, is divided between the company and the country according to an 
agreed proportion, for instance 40% to the company and 60% to the country.33 
 
Thus, foreign firms would not be able to purchase existing fields but would be 
allowed to collaborate with the state-owned oil company to joint rehabilitation and 
development projects,34 i.e.: they could participate in upstream activities without 
actually owning the fields.   
 
Nevertheless, the broad arrangement to link private enterprise to Iraq’s oil industry 
was fundamentally flawed. Numerous Iraqi commentators and oil experts, like Fouad 
                                                 
32 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 184.  
33 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 184. There is usually a cap on the annual amount of “cost oil” that can be 
recovered, for example 40% of total production. If such a cap exists, and the amount of oil extracted 
does not cover the company’s costs, then the difference is carried over into the next financial year and 
added to that year’s costs (Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 235). PSAs are highly unusual in the Middle East, 
where the oil industry in Saudi Arabia and Iran is state controlled (Danny Forston, Andrew Murray-
Watson and Tim Webb, “Future of Iraq: The spoils of war”, Independent, January 7, 2007 [accessed 
January 11, 2007] http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2132569.ece). Nevertheless, 
PSAs are not new to Iraq, as PSAs, or Production and Developments Contracts which are very similar 
to PSAs, have been used in Iraq in 1997 with Russian, Chinese and Brazilian companies, although for 
reasons which were more political than commercial, to try to convince these countries to break the 
embargo on Iraq. However, these contracts failed to break the embargo on Iraq (Al-Amir, Fouad. 
“Discussion on the Iraq law” [accessed Mach 1, 2007] http://www.al-ghad.org/2007/02/20/discussion-
on-the-iraq-oil-law/ and  
“Effect of production sharing agreements on Iraq revenues”, Al Jazeera, October 8, 2007 [accessed 
January 13, 2008] http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/80E8DE78-A0E4-4268-9547-
3D4D89D0E930.htm and “Future of Iraq: Oil and Energy Working Group: Considerations relevant to 
an oil policy for a liberated Iraq”, January 27, 2003: 6).  
34 Klare, Blood and Oil: 103-104.  
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Qassem al Amir, Tariq Shafiq and others, criticized Production Sharing Agreements, 
saying that they would give much leverage to the foreign oil companies vis-à-vis the 
national Iraqi oil company. They argued that such agreements were useful only for 
countries where the extraction of oil is very costly and/or difficult, or where the state 
did not have the monies necessary for the extraction operations, given that extraction 
cost in Iraqi oilfields did not exceed $2/barrel.35 Furthermore, they argued that Iraq 
did not actually need foreign investment to develop its oil resources, and that it could 
obtain the monies necessary to do these investments through international loans, 
without the need for foreigners.36 Essam al Jalabi, Iraqi oil minister under Saddam 
Hussein, argued that it was all right to bring in foreign investment if it could provide 
technology, know-how and other services, but not for production sharing.37 Experts 
also noted that Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, and the UAE never used Production 
Sharing Agreements, and that Venezuela and Russia were gradually getting rid of 
their own PSA deals.38 Moreover, Production Sharing Agreements favour private 
companies at the expense of the exporting government, therefore only 12% of world 
oil reserves are subject to Production Sharing Agreements, compared to 67% 
developed solely or primarily by national oil companies.39  
 
PSAs would provide Iraq with higher revenues than the concessions provided to 
foreigners during the first half of the twentieth century. However, these PSAs did not 
                                                 
35 “Effect of production sharing agreements on Iraq revenues”.  
36 Al-Amir, “Discussion on the Iraq law” and “Effect of production sharing agreements on Iraq 
revenues”.  
37 “Evaluation of new Iraqi oil law”, Al Jazeera, July 17, 2007 [accessed January 13, 2008] 
http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/311D9F61-D2DD-4004-80CC-
AD6A9A5AB6F0.htm?wbc_purpose=Basic 
38 Al-Amir, “Discussion on the Iraq law” and Sean Michael Wilson and Lee O’Conner, Iraq: 
Operation Corporate Takeover (London: War on Want/Boychild Productions Books, 2007): 37.  
39 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 325, from Greg Muttitt, “Crude Designs”. Juhasz argued that it is not 
obvious that Iraq needed foreign investments, since the end of the American occupation in itself would 
bring the stability necessary for Iraq investment, and Iraqis had the expertise and skills necessary to 
invest on their own (Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 325).  
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provide Iraq with as much revenue as the technical services contracts which were 
used following the nationalization of Iraq’s oil in 1972. Furthermore, using PSAs with 
American companies could lead to contractual conditions which would not be 
beneficial to Iraq’s interests.40 Companies could force the Iraqi government to 
guarantee very high compensations to the foreign companies for their costs and high 
risks, thus decreasing the sum allocated to the state, and the more unstable the security 
situation became, the more the companies would pressurize the state for a higher ratio 
of profits to compensate for risks and costs.41  
 
These criticisms did not prevent the advent of PSAs. Before the invasion, the US State 
Department organized a number of meetings known as the Future of Iraq Project, 
involving Iraqi exiles, administration officials and corporate executives and 
consultants.42 The project was supervised by Thomas Warrick of the department’s 
Office of Northern Gulf Affairs, with the help of the Working Group on Oil and 
Energy which was filled with expatriate Iraqi oil officials sympathetic with 
Washington’s war aims.43 In September 2002, a State Department official said that oil 
was not on the agenda of the Future of Iraq meetings,44 while, in fact, State 
Department and Vice President Cheney convened two “Oil and Energy Working 
Group Meetings”; the first in December 2002 and the second in January-February 
2003.45 In the first meeting the State Department convened the Iraqi opposition 
                                                 
40 Al-Amir, “Discussion on the Iraq law” and “Effect of production sharing agreements on Iraq 
revenues” and “Evaluation of new Iraqi oil law”  
41 “Effect of production sharing agreements on Iraq revenues” and Greg Muttitt, “Crude designs: The 
rip off of Iraq’s oil wealth”, Global Policy Forum, November 2005 [accessed May 28, 2008] 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/oil/2005/crudedesigns.htm 
42 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 178. 
43 Klare, Blood and Oil: 99, from David Rieff “Blueprint for a mess”, New York Times Magazine, 
November 2, 2003   
44 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 178.  
45 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 179, from US Department of State, Press Release, December 19, 2002.   
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leaders to discuss the future of Iraqi oil “to meet the needs of the Iraqi people.”46 State 
Department officials also said that Iraq “should be opened to international oil 
companies as quickly as possible after the war.”47  
 
The Future of Iraq Oil and Energy Working Group’s report, Considerations Relevant 
To An Oil Policy For A Liberated Iraq, dated January 27, 2003, stated that “the 
political, social and economic well-being of a liberated Iraq depend on Iraq rapidly 
and substantially increasing its volume of oil production.”48 Arguing for the 
decentralization of Iraq’s oil industry, the document said that “war and sanctions are 
not the reason that Iraq’s oil industry has chronically failed to achieve its potential 
output,”49 and that “we can reject any suggestion that Iraq’s low level of oil 
production is due primarily to war and sanctions,”50 stating that war and sanctions 
have reduced Iraq’s oil production only by a “modest” amount, as war and sanctions 
have reduced Iraq’s oil production from an average of 3.5 mbpd (in 1979) to an 
average of 2.4 mbpd, while the real potential for Iraq is around 8 mbpd.51 Rather, said 
the document, the reason why Iraq did not reach its potential of 8 mbpd was because 
Iraq was using the wrong policy; the monopoly of a national oil company instead of 
decentralization:  
 
It may be relevant to note that, five of the six countries 
with the highest production yields have highly 
decentralized oil industries. By contrast, five of the six 
countries with the lowest production yields have highly 
centralized oil industries dominated by politically 
                                                 
46 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 179-180, from US Department of State, Press Release, December 19, 
2002.  
47 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 253. 
48 “Future of Iraq: Oil and Energy Working Group: Considerations relevant to an oil policy for a 
liberated Iraq”, January 27, 2003 [accessed January 11, 2008] 
http://www.thememoryhole.org/state/future_of_iraq/future_oil.pdf: 2 
49 ibid: 1.  
50 Ibid: 2.  
51 Ibid: 2.  
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controlled, monopolized, nationalized oil industries. 
Formulation of an oil policy that has as its goal the 
delivery of the full benefits of Iraq’s enormous oil 
reserves to the Iraqi people, must involve a critical 
analysis of the role, consequences of and alternatives to 
the monopoly rights of the centralized national oil 
company (NOC).52   
 
 
(This statement was not true, however, as Saudi Arabia, for instance, does not allow 
foreign investment in upstream activities. Aramco, which was nationalized in 1976, 
performs all upstream activities, and it produces 8 or 9 mbpd. The same applies to all 
Gulf States) 
 
It was this “monopoly status,” argued the document, which resulted in 
“underproduction”, and it was necessary to increase production to alleviate Iraq’s 
economic impoverishment, especially as it was “inconceivable” that the non-oil sector 
in Iraq could generate the economic growth necessary to alleviate Iraq’s poverty 
within a politically acceptable timeframe.53 The oil industry was “the one industry in 
Iraq that has the possibility of inducing the enormous amount of foreign direct 
investment that is necessary to alleviate the impoverishment of the Iraqi people”, and 
it was thus necessary to “restructure” the oil industry in order to raise production 
above 3.4 mbpd.54 “The regime change provides the opportunity to liberate not only 
the country but also the economy,” added the report.55  
 
                                                 
52 Ibid: 2-3, and 5.  
53 Ibid: 3 
54 Ibid: 5 
55 Ibid: 9 
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IRAQI OIL AND THE  
AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 
 
 
“We know where the best reserves are [and] we covet the opportunity to get those 
some day.” 
Chairman of ConocoPhillips, referring to Iraqi oil, 
February 2003.56  
 
“I think this is very promising to the American investors and to American enterprise, 
certainly to oil companies.” 
Adel Abdul Mahdi, Interim Finance Minister, 
Washington, D.C., December 2004.57  
 
As with Central Asia, the US government had encouraged US private companies to 
invest in Iraq and its oil to help reconstruct the Iraqi economy, leading to the 
realization of the US agenda for Iraq and the region. On December 10, 2003, 
Wolfowitz said that companies from countries opposed to the war on Iraq would not 
be allowed to bid for new Iraq rebuilding contracts worth $18.6 billion, and that this 
step was necessary to protect America’s “essential security interests.” (The Bush 
administration hinted, even before the war, that countries opposed to the war would 
pay a price during post-war reconstruction.)58 But on January 13, 2004, during a 
                                                 
56 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 179.  
57 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 255-256. He added that adding that foreign companies may be allowed in 
“downstream” and “maybe even upstream” oil investment in Iraq (ibid). 
58 “Iraq tenders only for US allies,” BBC News, December 10, 2003, [accessed December 10, 2003] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3305505.stm. Moreover, Paul Bremer made it clear from the outset 
that London’s reconstruction remit would not include the Iraqi oil industry; that would be run by the 
Americans. The exclusivity of American influence caused deep unease back in the boardrooms of 
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meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin in Mexico (during negotiations 
over an Americas summit over trade and a proposed Free Trade Area for the 
Americas FTAA), Bush said that Canada would be “eligible to bid” for reconstruction 
projects in Iraq, even though Canada opposed the war.59  
 
Philip Carroll (former head of Shell’s US operations, appointed by the Bush 
administration to head a team of experts to run Iraq’s oil industry)60 hired more 
American oil executives to devise an “American-style” corporate management 
structure that would oversee the Iraqi oil industry.61 (Carroll quit his post in 
September 2003, due to the chaos in Iraq, and was replaced by Robert McKee III, 
Chairman of Enventure Global Technology, a company owned jointly by Halliburton 
and Shell).62 Working closely with US defence contractors like Halliburton, these 
executives established Team RIO (Restore Iraqi Oil) to undertake the rehabilitation of 
Iraq’s infrastructure.63 The RIO program had two goals. The first, the re-opening of 
old refineries and facilities, has been accomplished. The second goal, which is to 
increase Iraq’s ability to export fuel,64 would be harder to achieve given the security 
situation in Iraq.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
British and European oil companies. Fearing that they would lose out to their American competitors, 
British oil companies held talks with 10 Downing Street before the invasion about the post-war 
distribution of contracts, insisting on a level playing field. (Julian Borger, Terry Macalister, and Martin 
Chulov, “Iraq: the legacy – Basra’s failed oil bonanza”, Guardian, April 15, 2009 [accessed June 20, 
2009] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/15/iraq-oil-legacy). 
59 “US lets Canada bid for Iraq work”, BBC News, January 14, 2004, [accessed January 14, 2004] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/Americas/3393113.stm 
60 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 188 and Klare, Blood and Oil: 102. 
61 Klare, Blood and Oil: 102.  
62 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 192.  
63 Klare, Blood and Oil: 103.  
64 “Iraq plans to double liquid petroleum gas output through Restore Iraqi Oil program”, Portaliraq, 
November 25, 2004 [accessed  June 26, 2006] 
www.portaliraq.com/news/Iraq+plans+to+double+liquid+petroleum+gas+output+through+Restore+Ira
qi+Oil+program__653.html 
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The RIO program was complemented by the The Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program (LOGCAP) program where, in December 2001, anticipating the coming 
invasion, Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), a subsidiary of Halliburton, signed the 
LOGCAP contract with the Department of Defence to repair the oilfields. The 
contract stipulated that KBR would “put out well fires and assess the facilities, clean 
up oil spills or other environmental dangers at the sites, repair or reconstruct damaged 
infrastructure and operate facilities and distribute products.”65 According to 
California Democrat Representative Henry Waxman, the terms of the vague and 
open-ended LOGCAP contract “would allow Halliburton to profit from virtually 
every phase of the war.”66  
                                                
 
The RIO and LOGCAP programs were not competitively bid; they were given to 
Halliburton “out of convenience” because they already had plans to distinguish oil 
fires. Bob Faletti, spokesperson of the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the 
department of the army overseeing RIO, said that “it made sense” to award the 
contract to KBR, since awarding without competition helped “save time and 
money.”67  
 
But this has led to accusations of favouritism in the Bush administration towards 
certain companies. An iconic case was that Halliburton, (the US oil services company 
whose CEO was Dick Cheney between 1995 and 2000, and in which the Bush family 
has business interests,)68 and Bechtel (who had business connections to some 
 
65 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 181. 
66 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 181-182.  
67 Briody. The Halliburton Agenda: 221. 
68 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 121-122. 
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members of the Bush Administration),69 benefited from the war and won non-bid 
contracts. Many company officials who benefited from postwar Iraq contracts were 
also members of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq (CLI), which was founded 
in 2002 as an extension of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and 
supported the Iraq invasion, whose members included George Shultz of Bechtel70 
(who was Secretary of State under Ronald Reagan). The CLI disbanded after the 
invasion.71 (Democrat Henry Waxman was the leader of the Democratic opposition to 
Halliburton, as he was concerned about the government issuing non-bid contracts to a 
company that had clear ties to Cheney.)72  
 
For the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), KBR was “the only source capable 
of developing a contingency support plan” to extinguish oil well fires in case the Iraqi 
army sets them on fire, in addition to the fact that “KBR, by virtue of its familiarity 
with the Centcom operational plans, related Logistics Support Plans73… is the only 
contractor that can satisfy a requirement for immediate execution of the contingency 
support plan.” A USACE memo also mentioned the time factor to justify the no-bid 
contract to KBR. “Because the Iraqi economy depends on oil revenue, the well-being 
of the Iraqi people depends on continuity of oil production and distribution. Any 
delays in providing support required by US Centcom will result in significant negative 
international repercussions,” stated the USACE memo.  Thus, explained the memo, 
                                                 
69 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 129 and Sean Michael Wilson and Lee O’Conner, Iraq: Operation 
Corporate Takeover (London: War on Want/Boychild Productions Books, 2007): 30.   
70 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 181. Shultz wrote an article in the Washington Post in September 2002, 
saying that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, and that, by removing Saddam, “a model can 
emerge that other Arab societies may look to and emulate for their own transformation and that of the 
entire region.” (Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 183).  
71 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 183.  
72 Briody, The Halliburton Agenda: 231. 
73 KBR has had a role in devising the LOGCAP program in 1992, and has worked under its umbrella in 
several locations around the world. See Dan Briody, The Halliburton Agenda: The politics of oil and 
money. (New Jersey: Wiley, 2004): 177-189, Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 226 and Kolko, The Age of 
War: 156. 
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“no delay can be tolerated”, since “these specialized services can be available only 
from KBR in the time available.” Furthermore, the USACE was instructed to “plan 
for competition for the execution effort at the earliest reasonable opportunity 
consistent with the needs of the mission.”  The memo also said that this decision was 
agreed “w vp” i.e.: with the Vice President’s office.74 Similarly, Wolfowitz defended 
the no-bid procedures, saying that “it is necessary in the public interest to use other 
than competitive procedures” for the contracts awarded by the Department of Defence 
for the rebuilding of Iraq.75  
 
                                                 
74 “Memorandum for Commander US Army Corps of Engineers: Subject: Justification and Approval 
(J&A) for other than full and open competition for the execution of the Contingency Support Plan”, 
February 28, 2003, (Declassified April 22, 2004), [accessed January 11, 2008] 
http://www.judicialwatch.org/archive/2004/kbr.pdf, pages 4-7. New York Times columnist Maureen 
Dowd has spoken of “a secret 500-page document prepared by Halliburton on what to do with Iraq’s 
oil industry – a plan it wrote several months before the invasion of Iraq, and before it got a no-bid 
contract to implement the plan.” (Maureen Dowd, “Vice axes that 70’s show”, New York Times, 
December 28, 2005 [accessed March 12, 2008] 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F00E4D61230F93BA15751C1A9639C8B63&scp=2
&sq=maureen%20dowd%20vice%20axes%20that%2070’s%20show&st=cse). In June 2004, 
Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy and Vice President Cheney had a “brief but fierce exchange” in the 
US Senate where Leahy criticised Halliburton’s no-bid contracts in Iraq and Cheney’s ties to 
Halliburton. Cheney’s reply to Leahy was an obscenity: “F**k yourself!” (Gellman, Angler: 95 and 
Helen Dewar and Dana Milbank, “Cheney dismisses critic with obscenity”, Washington Post, June 25, 
2009 [accessed March 23, 2008] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3699-
2004Jun24.html). Interestingly, in December 2003, two of Halliburton’s divisions (KBR and DII) 
declared bankruptcy due to lawsuits made by people harmed from inhaling asbestos, although the KBR 
unit did not include the government contract division working on Iraq reconstruction because it did not 
have any asbestos liabilities.(David Teather, “Halliburton units file for bankruptcy”, Guardian, 
December 17, 2003 [accessed June 20, 2009] 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/17/iraq.dickcheney). But thanks to the Iraq contracts, 
Halliburton was saved “from the brink of bakruptcy” (Juan Cole, “Critique of US policy in Iraq”, 
Informed Comment, May 24, 2006 [accessed June 20, 2009] 
http://www.juancole.com/2006/05/critique-of-us-policy-in-iraq-bush.html). In October 2004, 
Bunnatine Greenhouse, the chief contracting officer at the USACE, went public with allegations that 
the USACE unfairly awarded KBR with the no-bid contract. This led to an investigation by the FBI 
into the legality of the no-bid contract to KBR, and why the deal was not open to competition (“FBI 
studying Halliburton deals” BBC News, October 29, 2004 [accessed October 1, 2007] 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3963967.stm). In the end, however, Saddam did not order the torching of 
the oil wells (Hiro, Secrets and Lies (second edition): 393). He never actually planned to torch the Iraqi 
oil wells, as his miscalculations were so great that he never expected to lose the war (Gordon, Cobra II: 
505). This showed that there were great flaws in planning on the American side, as well as on the Iraqi 
side (Gordon, Cobra II: 504-506). However, US troops claim that Iraqi troops did set some oilwells in 
Rumeila on fire, and tried to set other oil facilities on fire but did not have the time (Hiro, Secrets and 
Lies (2005 edition): 186 and 195). 
75 “Wolfowitz declares non-competitive bids in Iraq to be in the public interest”, US Foreign Aid 
Watch, December 9, 2003 [accessed February 18, 2009] 
http://www.foreignaidwatch.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=542 
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Halliburton, KBR’s parent company who contributed $1,146,248 to the Republican 
Party between 1998 and 2003, received at least $19.3 billion in Iraq’s single-source 
contracts, and Halliburton’s stock price increased by 229% since the war began.76 
Furthermore, in late October 2003, a report by the Centre for Public Integrity (CPI) 
said that many of the US firms which won Iraqi reconstruction contracts were major 
donors to George W. Bush’s political campaigns, especially the 2000 campaign. 
However, the US Army Corps of Engineers and the USAID, the bodies jointly 
responsible for allocating the contracts, rejected any suggestions of favouritism. “We 
have made sure that it is not politically motivated,” a USAID spokesperson said.77  
 
Naomi Klein argued that “the lack of competition on awarding contracts has been one 
of the distinguishing features of the Bush years,”78 (not just in Iraq, but also in US 
domestic security contracts).79 This leads us back to Klein’s analysis of Milton 
Friedman’s economic “shock treatment,”80 and “disaster capitalism,”81 where crisis 
was needed to promote his fundamentalist form of capitalism,82 showing the 
convergence of national and corporate interests.83 
 
 
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ 
                                                 
76 Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Blimes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict. 
(London: Allen Lane, 2008): 15.  
77 “Iraq contracts won by Bush donors”, BBC News, October 31, 2003 [accessed November 1, 2003] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3231345.stm. 
78 Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 298.  
79 For more information on how private US corporations are profiting from US domestic security 
contracts, read Klein, The Shock Doctrine, chapters 14 and 15.  
80 Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 7. 
81 Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 6. 
82 Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 9.  
83 Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 309. She wrote, sarcastically: “What role did the benefits to contractors 
such as Halliburton, Bechtel and oil companies such as ExxonMobil play in the Bush team’s 
enthusiasm for invading Iraq? These questions of motivation are impossible to answer with any 
precision, because the people involved are notorious for conflating corporate interests with the national 
interest, to the extent that they themselves are seemingly incapable of drawing distinctions.” (ibid).  
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 Despite the agreement between the State Department and the Department of Defence 
on PSA, there was tension between the development of the oil industry and the 
establishment of a post-invasion political system. Jay Garner, the first US 
administrator in post-war Iraq, said in a BBC interview in April 2004 that he was 
sacked partly because he wanted to hold elections whereas his superiors wanted first 
to privatise Iraq’s oil.84 Garner stated: “My preference was to put the Iraqis in charge 
as soon as we can, and do it with some form of elections… I just thought it was 
necessary to rapidly get the Iraqis in charge of their destiny.”85 Garner also disagreed 
with many of the Bush Administration’s economic proposals, such as full 
privatisation of Iraq’s 192 state-owned enterprises, arguing that the Iraqis should be in 
charge of determining their own economic fate.86  
 
So there was a contradiction, or a gap, in the Bush Administration’s political and 
economic strategy. It held that Iraq should be democratised but, despite calling for 
democracy, the administration was initially against elections and paid little attention 
to political development in Iraq. The calls for elections by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, 
Iraq’s most respected Shiite cleric, was a serious challenge to Bush’s vision for Iraq, 
as they could lead to an Iraqi constitution based on Islamic Shari’a law and so 
threaten the secularisation of Iraqi governance. In addition, the United States was 
                                                 
84 Hiro, Secrets and Lies: The True Story of the Iraq War: 419, from New York Times, April 24, 2004.  
There was a lot of speculation over the replacement of Garner by Paul Bremer. One reason might have 
been the bureaucratic competition between the State Department and the Department of Defence, as 
Paul Bremer was working for the State Department while Jay Garner was a retired army lieutenant 
general. According to Jay Garner, however, the reason for the change had more to do with differences 
over how far the US should dominate the political and economic process in Iraq (Juhasz, The Bush 
Agenda: 189). 
85 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 189 from Greg Palast’s BBC television interview with Jay Garner, March 
14, 2004.  
86 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 190 and David Leigh, “General sacked by Bush says he wanted early 
elections”, Guardian,  March 18, 2004 [accessed July 2, 2009] 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/18/iraq.usa.  
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worried that Islamic Shiite leaders in Iraq might form an anti-American partnership 
with the Mullahs in Iran,87 and undermine US plans for controlling Iraqi oil.88 Bremer 
was also opposed to holding elections, fearing that elected Iraqis would produce a 
constitution that would not separate the mosque from the state, might not provide 
equal rights to women, or might not follow any of the other principles supported by 
the White House which wanted Iraq to be a model for democracy in the Arab world.89 
The United States wanted an orderly political transition to the Iraqis that it could 
control; a system that would be a model to the Arab world.90 Moreover, polls showed 
that if Iraqis were allowed to vote, they would vote for candidates who would limit 
the powers of US troops and the US multinationals.91 
 
On June 28, 2003 Sistani issued a fatwa calling for elections, saying that the 
constitution should be written by officials elected by the Iraqi people, not a council 
                                                 
87 Phillips. Losing Iraq: 179. A document entitled “Should Islam be the religion of the New Iraqi 
State?” was circulated among the staff of the civilian administration in Baghdad in May 2003. Having 
stated that “our liberation of Iraq gives us the opportunity to revolutionize Muslim thinking on the role 
of Islam in the state,” the document sets out two options; either “agree that Islam be declared the state 
religion” or “ensure that Islam is not declared the state religion”. The document said that the advantage 
of the first option was “denying the Wahhabis, Iranian Mullahs and other fundamentalists the 
opportunity of claiming the US is trying to make Muslims into non-believers”. But the disadvantage of 
that option was that it raised the question of “what type of Islam” should the state support: Sunni or 
Shiite? Thus, the document concluded that “only as a last resort should we agree that Islam should be 
the religion of the state”. The document was sent to Wolfowitz, Perle, Bernard Lewis, Feith, Paul 
Bremer (not then US Administrator in Baghdad) and others (Halper and Clarke, America Alone: 21). 
Article 2(A) of the Iraqi constitution says that Islam would be the “basic source of legislation”, but 
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(“Full Text of Iraqi Constitution”, MSNBC, October 16, 2005 [accessed June 16, 2008] 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9719734/). Furthermore, in October 2004, Bush said that he would 
accept an Islamic government in Iraq as a result of free elections. “I will be disappointed, but 
democracy is democracy”, he said. This contradicted earlier remarks from his administration which 
rejected calls, soon after the fall of Saddam’s regime, for the creation of an Islamic state similar to that 
of Iran (“Bush: I would accept Islamic Iraq” BBC News, October 19, 2004 [accessed October 20, 
2004], http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3755850.stm). 
88 Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 195. 
89 Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: 207. 
90 Phillips, Losing Iraq: 178-179. 
91 Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 364.  
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appointed by the US occupation as Paul Bremer planned.92 Sistani also questioned the 
legitimacy of a security agreement between an un-elected Iraqi government and the 
United States. However, the Bush Administration had decided that early elections 
would be a recipe for civil war. If elections were held before political parties had time 
to establish themselves, well-organized Baathists and Islamic parties with ties to Iran 
would dominate the outcome. Sistani’s demands were thus seen as impractical, as Iraq 
lacked a population census and an electoral law, and it would take months to lay the 
infrastructure for a nationwide ballot.93  
 
Justifying his opposition to early elections, Bremer explained why he was more 
concerned with privatisation than with elections:  
 
We’re not going to rush into elections because Iraq 
simply has none of the mechanisms needed for elections 
– no census, no electoral laws, no political parties, and 
all the related structure we take for granted. We’ve also 
got to get this economy moving and that’s going to be a 
helluva challenge. A stable Iraq will need a vigorous 
private sector.94  
 
Bremer said elsewhere that he was “not opposed” to elections, but that he wanted the 
elections to be held “in a way that takes care of our concerns. Elections that are held 
too early can be destructive. It’s got to be done very carefully. In a situation like this, 
if you start holding elections, the people who are rejectionists tend to win.”95 In late 
September 2003, he argued against early elections during his testimony before the 
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94 Paul Bremer, My Year in Iraq: The struggle to build a future of hope. (New York: Simon and 
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Senate Armed Forces Committee, saying that elections should come after the 
constitution was ratified, not vice versa:  
 
Some, including members of the Iraqi Governing 
Council, suggest we should give full sovereignty to an 
Iraqi government immediately or very soon. I firmly 
believe that such haste would be a mistake. No 
appointed government… can have the legitimacy 
necessary to take on the difficult issues the Iraqis face 
as they write their constitution, elect a government and, 
I might add, undertake a major economic 
reconstruction effort. The only path to true Iraqi 
sovereignty is through a written constitution, ratified 
and followed by free democratic elections.96  
 
 
By the fall of 2003, however, the Bush Administration was forced to reconsider. With 
Iraqi support for the occupation decreasing, the transition of power to the Iraqis had to 
be speeded up,97 especially as scores of angry Iraqis were joining the insurgency in 
opposition to the occupying American forces on Iraqi territory and anger over the lack 
of security, jobs, and electricity. Mindful of the growing anti-American sentiment, the 
members of the Governing Council called for the end of the American occupation, 
saying that the council should assume sovereignty and administer the country until 
elections could be held.98  
 
Robert Blackwill, a senior member of the National Security Council and a policy 
planning coordinator for Iraq, decided that Bremer’s seven-step plan for the 
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restoration of Iraqi sovereignty was untenable.99 Blackwill told Rice that the White 
House needed to take more control, and they both told Bremer that his plan seemed 
no longer viable, telling him to think of a way to speed up the handover process and 
wondering if the open-ended occupation was fuelling the insurgency. Bush agreed, as 
he did not want the American forces to be involved in a bloody guerrilla war as the 
American people voted in the presidential elections of November 2004. The State 
Department and the Pentagon also pressed Bremer to speed up the handover process, 
as the Pentagon told Bremer to hand over sovereignty to an expanded version of the 
Governing Council by the following spring. However, Bremer resisted, telling 
Rumsfeld: “I don’t think it would be responsible to turn over sovereignty to a non-
elected Iraqi body with no constitution in place. We’d risk Iraq falling into disorder or 
civil war, with no constitution to shape Iraq’s political structure and to guarantee 
individual and minority rights.”100 However, by mid November, Bremer, under 
pressure from both the White House and Ayatollah Sistani, abandoned his seven-step 
plan.101  
 
Bush decided on November 12, 2003, that the United States should pursue early 
sovereignty in Iraq.102 The November 15 agreement, which the CPA wrote and then 
obliged the Governing Council to sign, set June 30, 2004 as the day when sovereignty 
would return. Both the CPA and the council, which most Iraqis correctly saw as 
unrepresentative and ineffective, would then dissolve. An interim assembly, chosen 
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through a complex process of nationwide caucuses, would govern Iraq until elections 
in early 2005. The elected government would then write the new constitution.103  
 
Even with this adjustment in US policy, Bush’s hopes that democracy in Iraq would 
reshape the region failed to materialize, neither at the Iraqi level nor on the regional 
level. The root failure lay in post-invasion planning and operations.104 According to 
Major Isaiah Wilson III, former war planner in Iraq, “there was no Phase IV plan”, 
with no one producing a strategy to deal with the situation after major combat 
operations ended.105  
 
Bush and his team began to focus on the post-war phase only shortly before the war 
started in March 2003, and only with little attention compared to the attention given to 
the invasion plan.106 Jack Keane, one of the top US military commanders in Iraq, said 
that the Americans failed to plan for the insurgency, and admitted that this was not 
just an intelligence failure, but also a failure of senior military leaders, including 
himself.107 The primary cause of this haphazard planning was the Bush 
Administration’s disdain for nation building.108 David Kay (ex-CPA official and 
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security expert who lead the CIA effort to investigate Iraq’s missing weapons of mass 
destruction) said that “there was a reluctance to divert resources to post-conflict 
maintenance of law and order” in Iraq.109 Rumsfeld did not want the Iraqis to develop 
a “culture of dependency”, where they would rely upon the United States to take care 
of their security, as had allegedly happened in Kosovo. Therefore, the focus of 
postwar planning was not how to build a democratic Iraq, but how to get the US 
troops out of Iraq as soon as possible,110 since, according to a senior Pentagon 
planner, Rumsfeld wanted to “do war on the cheap” where a small, lightly armed 
force could take over Iraq.111 Moreover, the Pentagon saw postwar planning as a 
block standing in the way of war, since it attracted attention to costs and potential 
problems, which might have weakened the case for launching the war.112 In fact, the 
CIA conducted several war games in late spring 2002, concluding that civil disorder 
would likely occur after Saddam’s removal, but the Pentagon was not pleased with 
these results and ignored them.113  
 
Secretary of State Colin Powell did raise the issue of insufficient troops and the 
difficulties that would face the Americans in the post-war phase. If these concerns 
were taken more seriously, then perhaps a more efficient post-war planning would 
have taken place.114 Instead, a small group of Pentagon planners took over the 
planning and ignored the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project.115 Another sign 
of departmental strife was that Rumsfeld wanted the DoD to overtake the 
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reconstruction process, in part, it appears, in order to spite Powell.116 Rumsfeld 
rejected the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project because he wanted the DoD, 
not the State Department, to lead Phase IV. (The State Department was working with 
one group of Iraqis, and Wolfowitz with another.)117 The situation was compounded 
by the absence of healthy debate between the State Department and the Department of 
Defence. Rumsfeld and Franks dominated planning, marginalizing JCS Chairman 
Richard Myers and keeping away those who differed.118 
 
Failure to rely on the Future of Iraq Study had deprived Jay Garner and his team of a 
vital blueprint at a critical moment. David L. Phillips, former senior adviser to the US 
State Department who worked on the Future of Iraq Project, wrote that “the Future of 
Iraq Project did not have all the answers. However, its findings, had they been 
heeded, could have provided useful guidance enabling the US to fulfil its promise of 
liberation. Ignoring it was just the first in a series of mistakes.”119  
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 The Bush Administration did have a Phase IV plan, but it was neither practical nor 
realistic enough:  
The violent chaos that followed Saddam’s defeat was 
not a matter of not having a plan, but of adhering too 
rigidly to the wrong one. From the start, American 
political objectives were bold and extraordinarily 
ambitious. The military operation was intended to 
strike a blow at terrorism by ousting a long-standing 
adversary, eliminating Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction, and implanting a moderate and pro-
American state in the heart of the Arab world. It was 
also to be a powerful demonstration of American power 
and an objective lesson (for Iran, Syria and other 
would-be foes) of the potential consequences of 
supporting terrorist groups and pursuing nuclear, 
biological and chemical arms. The United States would 
not just defeat a dictator. It would transform a region 
and send the message that the American intervention in 
Afghanistan [in 2001] was not the end but just the 
beginning of Washington’s global war on terror.120  
 
In order to achieve these goals, Washington had to rebuild a strong and democratic 
Iraq, using Iraq’s oil revenues to rebuild the country. However, Paul Bremer later 
wrote that the development of the Iraqi oil sector suffered from problems like 
sabotage, Washington’s contradicting bureaucracy, the slow Iraqi bureaucracy, and 
smuggling, adding that Iraq had 4,000 miles of pipelines, and it was impossible to 
protect them all.121 Furthermore, the civilian leadership at the Pentagon had been 
made well aware before the war that Iraqi oil was not a ready source for 
reconstruction, despite the opposite impression given by Congress testimonies. Amy 
Myers, one of the authors of the April 2001 Strategic Energy Policy report, was 
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consulted by the government before the war, and she and her group concluded in 
December 2002 that oil revenues would certainly not be sufficient to cover the cost of 
reconstruction, due to years of deterioration and sanctions.122  
 
Bremer wrote that “reality on the ground made a fantasy of the rosy pre-war scenario 
under which Iraq would be paying for its own reconstruction through oil exports 
within weeks or months of ‘liberation’.”123  Generally speaking, the CPA lacked the 
resources necessary to perform good post-war management, and it also lacked the 
understanding of the Iraqi social/political apparatus.124 This failure in Iraq had 
repercussions on Bush’s plan to remake the Middle East.  
 
 
THE MIDDLE EAST IN MAY 2003: 
A NARROW WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 
 
After the removal of Saddam Hussein under the guise of democratization and the free 
entry of US business corporations into Iraq, Bush was hoping to spread the 
democratization and free enterprise program to the rest of the region. Bush called for 
democratization in Iraq and the Middle East in a major speech at the American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI) on February 26, 2003,125 arguing that the “liberation”, 
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rebuilding and democratisation of Iraq would lead to the democratisation of the whole 
region:  
A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to 
transform that vital region, by bringing hope and 
progress into the lives of millions. America's interests 
in security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead in 
the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq…Iraq, 
with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled 
and educated people, is fully capable of moving toward 
democracy and living in freedom… There are hopeful 
signs of a desire for freedom in the Middle East. Arab 
intellectuals have called on Arab governments to 
address the "freedom gap" so their peoples can fully 
share in the progress of our times. Leaders in the 
region speak of a new Arab charter that champions 
internal reform, greater politics participation, 
economic openness, and free trade... A new regime in 
Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example 
of freedom for other nations in the region.126   
 
On November 6, 2003, Bush reiterated these ideas at the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), where he announced that accepting dictatorship in the Middle 
East had not yielded any positive results, and that his administration had “adopted a 
new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East” which cited the lack of 
democracy as a cause for the spread of weapons of mass destruction and to terrorism: 
  
Sixty years of Western nations excusing and 
accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East 
did nothing to make us safe because in the long run, 
stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. 
As long as the Middle East remains a place where 
freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of 
stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. 
And with the spread of weapons that can bring 
catastrophic harm to our country and to our friends, it 
would be reckless to accept the status quo. Therefore, 
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the United States has adopted a new policy, a forward 
strategy of freedom in the Middle East… We believe 
that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that 
liberty is the direction of history.127  
 
The fact that he gave this speech before the US Chamber of Commerce (a major 
participant in the NED programmes) and that the event was sponsored by AT&T and 
AIG, showed that US business interests backed the type of democracy that Bush and 
his administration were promoting.128 Of course, this drive for democratization and 
openness for business started with Iraq, as Bremer said in late May 2003 that Iraq was 
“open for business.” Arguing for the imposition of the free market formula in Iraq, he 
said that “history tells us that… resources protected by private property [and] private 
rights are the best protection of political freedom. Building such prosperity in Iraq 
will be a key measure of our success here.”129 This would start with Iraq’s oil sector, 
as the link between Iraq’s oil and the corporate agenda for Iraq was evident in 
Bremer’s statement to the US Department of Defence in June 2003, where he said that 
“Now that [our] sanctions have been lifted, it’s important for Iraq to re-enter the 
world economy. The most obvious example of that is the sale of Iraqi oil.”130 (Of 
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course, the sale of Iraqi oil was switched back to the US dollar shortly after the 
invasion.)131  
Furthermore, Bush wanted to spread his “model of imperial-style corporate 
globalisation” from Iraq to the rest of the Middle East,132 since Bush’s speeches 
associated democracy in the Middle East with the elimination of trade barriers and 
promoting the Open Door Policy, free trade, and the corporate globalisation policy. 
On May 9, 2003, he announced that he would work on establishing a US-Middle East 
Free Trade Area “within a decade,” putting Cheney’s daughter Liz in charge of that 
project.133 Robert Zoellick, the main architect of MEFTA,134 wrote in the Wall Street 
Journal in October 2004 that trade would help spread democracy and fight terrorism:  
 
America has been attacked by those who want us to 
retreat from world leadership. Let there be no 
misunderstanding: the United States will continue to 
advance the values that define this nation – openness, 
opportunity, democracy and compassion. Trade 
reinforces these values, serving as an engine of growth 
and a source of hope for workers and families in the 
United States and the world.135  
 
Nevertheless, Robert Lawrence (international trade expert and former economic 
adviser to Bill Clinton) pointed out that there is no solid evidence that links poverty to 
terrorism, arguing instead that terrorism arises from “political conditions and long 
standing feelings of indignity and frustration.” However, he added that “even if 
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reducing poverty does not automatically reduces terrorism,” he maintained that a 
“lack of opportunity,” in combination with a lack of political expression, could 
“surely breed frustration and provide a fertile breeding ground” for terrorism.136 More 
importantly, Lawrence presented the Bush Administration’s argument that trade could 
stabilize the economically vital Middle East and its oil resources:  
 
US interest in the MEFTA reflects geopolitical and 
security considerations based on concerns about the 
Middle East’s central role in global oil markets, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, and violent clashes between the 
West and militant Islamic fundamentalists. The United 
States has an interest in a stable and friendly Middle 
East because the American economy is highly 
dependent on imported oil. It is vulnerable to high 
prices and disruptions caused by political turmoil, wars 
and terrorist attacks... The MEFTA initiative reflects 
that US interests cannot be advanced through purely 
military or political initiatives. To be effective in the 
battle for hearts and minds in the region, the policy 
needs an economic component.137 
 
 
He stressed that these goals would not be achieved if the US resorted to mercantilist 
policies, or did not adhere to lifting trade barriers as stipulated by the MEFTA.138 
However, there is no guarantee that the US will not resort to mercantilist policies, (as 
it has repeatedly resorted to such tools with its other free trade agreements with other 
regions).139  
US business coalitions showed interest in the MEFTA, like the National Foreign 
Trade Council (NFTC), arguably the most powerful US corporate lobbying 
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association on international trade, whose members include Bechtel, Chevron, 
Halliburton and others.140 Another business coalition interested in the MEFTA was 
the Business Council for International Understanding (BCIU).141 Charles Dittrich of 
the NFTC said that “the [Bush] administration looks at the MEFTA as a key 
component of its Middle East policy.”142 Thus, democratisation was Bush’s method 
of promoting the Open Door. 
                                                
 
There was indeed a brief wave of democracy in the Middle East in early 2005. In 
February, Egyptian president Mohammad Husni Mubarak announced that he would 
allow multi-candidate presidential elections in September. In Saudi Arabia, elections 
for local councils were held for the first time. In Kuwait, the parliament passed a law 
to allow women the same political rights as men. In Palestine, presidential elections 
took place, (claimed to be free elections despite Israeli pressure on candidates other 
than Abbas). In Lebanon, the Cedar Revolution, following the assassination of Rafiq 
Harriri, led to the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon. Finally, in Iraq, free 
parliamentary elections took place in January. It was, according to analysts, the “Arab 
Spring.” The Bush Administration claimed that its policies, especially the invasion of 
Iraq, were behind this “Arab spring.” Bush mentioned that in his Inauguration 
Address in January 2005, where he argued for his new policy, the Freedom Agenda, 
saying that “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of 
democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate 
goal of ending tyranny in our world.” He said that the United States “will encourage 
reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations will require 
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the decent treatment of their own people. America’s belief in human dignity will 
guide our policies”, citing that “America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are 
now one.”143  The idea which he wanted to communicate was that the future of 
America and the security of America depend on the spread of liberty.144 He 
reaffirmed these ideas in his State of the Union address in February 2005, as he 
argued that democratisation in the Middle East would help eliminate the cause
global terror
s of 
ism:   
                                                
 
In the long-term, the peace we seek will only be 
achieved by eliminating the conditions that feed 
radicalism and ideologies of murder. If whole regions 
of the world remain in despair and grow in hatred, they 
will be the recruiting grounds for terror, and that terror 
will stalk America and other free nations for decades. 
The only force powerful enough to stop the rise of 
tyranny and terror, and replace hatred with hope, is the 
force of human freedom. Our enemies know this, and 
that is why terrorist Zarqawi recently declared war on 
what he called the “evil principle” of democracy.145  
 
American pressure was indeed a factor in the wave of democracy which took place in 
the Middle East in early 2005. However, the connection between the invasion of Iraq 
and the steps towards democracy in parts of the region was tenuous at best,146 as the 
“Arab Spring” was caused by internal factors in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, 
Palestine, and Lebanon, not by the invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, this “Arab Spring” 
did not provide any real change in the region, nor did it substantially help fight 
terrorism or promote US business interests in the region. Bush had no coherent policy 
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to use the narrow window of opportunity, which the Arab Spring provided, to 
promote US interests in the region.  
 
On the Arab-Israeli peace process, too, a narrow window of opportunity came to the 
Bush Administration in the form of Arafat’s death on November 11, 2004 (only a few 
days after Bush’s re-election) which, thought Bush, would pave the way for a new 
Palestinian leadership, and a new hope for peace.147 However, even after Arafat’s 
death in November 2004 and the election of Abbas as president, Bush did not offer 
any real plan to promote Arab-Israeli peace (beyond the Annapolis conference of 
2007, which did not lead to any real progress).  
 
 
CONCLUSION: 
IRAQI OIL AND THE ARAB SPRING: 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE BUSH VISION 
 
 
If the Bush Administration managed to impress the world with the easy victory over 
Iraq, it squandered the narrow window of opportunity to devise a realistic policy to 
remake the Middle East. Iraq had held the four US foreign policy strands together, 
with the country seen as a model for a transformed Middle East, and Iraq’s oil sector 
was central to rebuilding Iraq into a model for the region. When Iraq collapsed, the 
ambitions of the Bush Administration collapsed with it, as it was too dependent on 
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success in Iraq, and the failure in Iraq made the Bush Administration more dependent 
on Saudi oil and strategic assistance. 148  
 
In Iraq, US control of Iraq’s oil resources was not absolute. Foreign oil companies 
could not obtain the PSAs they were hoping for, as the Iraqi parliament preferred the 
technical services contracts which are not as profitable for the companies.149 Oil 
production remains at about 2.4 mbpd, which is not much different from the pre-
invasion level. 150 Also, Russian,151 Chinese152 and French153 companies are investing 
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in Iraq’s oil sector, even though Washington aimed to prevent their investments 
because they opposed the war. The Iraqi oil sector is hampered by years of military 
clashes (and sabotage of oil installations), corruption, and smuggling of Iraq’s oil.154 
The oil sector is also suffering from brain drain; under Saddam’s regime, many oil-
sector employees who held technical jobs were members of the Baath Party, and 
many of them fled abroad, were arrested or were killed after the American invasion, 
leaving the ranks severely depleted.155 The insurgency also had its toll on Iraq’s 
security and oil sector, as the insurgency is financed by revenues from oil 
smuggling.156 Security has improved after the US troop surge in 2007, but these gains 
are described by US officials as “fragile” and “reversible”, especially that the collapse 
in oil prices in late 2008-early 2009 has decreased Baghdad’s revenues.157 Tehran’s 
influence is evident in Iraq, through the Shiite government and pro-Iranian 
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militants.158 Armed skirmishes still occur between Sunnis and Shiite, as they battle 
for influence in Baghdad.159 Similarly, Arab-Kurdish tensions over the oil-rich 
Kirkuk province (and over production sharing agreements which Irbil signs with 
international oil companies without Baghdad’s permission) resulted in military 
clashes between predominantly Arab Iraqi army units and the Kurdish Peshmerga 
forces.160 Iraqi oil, as the “cash lifeline” or the “cash crop,”161 did not help 
democratise the region, due to the failures in post-war planning.162 (The Bush 
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administration assumed that Iraq’s physical and administrative infrastructure would
be largely intact after the war.)
 
lan on what to do in case Iraq failed.  
                                                                                                                                           
163 Iraq thus failed as a demonstration case to become a 
stable, democratic, pro-American country, and the Bush vision was so reliant on 
success in Iraq, that it had no back-up p
 
Despite the setbacks in the Iraqi oil sector, many US companies have made huge 
profit in Iraq, particularly those working in the security field and in the reconstruction 
field. The corporatist political economy was clear in the pre-war planning phase, and 
in the dependence on private corporations to run Iraq in the post-invasion phase. 
According to Rutledge, “US policymakers and oil executives seemed to be working as 
closely together… as they had sixty years earlier.”164  
 
Former senior official at the US departments of defence, state and energy Anthony 
Cordesman criticised the contracting system in Iraq, as he reported to Congress in 
November 2004, “US economic aid has lagged behind the need for urgent action, has 
wasted vast resources on an impractical contracting effort.”165 One example of that 
“impractical contracting effort” was what Stuart Bowen Jr., the US Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), said in October 2007; there were long-
standing contract administration problems within the US State Department bureau that 
awarded contracts, since there was a “lack of controls” and “serious contract 
 
government too lazy to create a real economy, and would result in a government detached from the real 
needs of the people. Thirdly, rule of law has to be established, which is absent in Iraq given the security 
situation (Fareed Zakaria. “Elections are not democracy”, Newsweek, February 7, 2005: 13.)   
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management issues.”166 Similarly, in November 2007, an independent panel strongly 
criticised the US Army’s management of contracts to supply its troops in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, saying that there were high levels of fraud and waste in relation to 
contracts worth $4 billion a year, that only about half the army's contracting staff were 
properly qualified, and blaming the fraud and waste on a lack of oversight.167 
Furthermore, wrote Cordesman, US economic aid was “made worse by an almost 
completely dysfunctional reporting system within the US government that does not tie 
plans to realistic requirements.”168  
 
After the failure in Iraq, the Bush Administration thought that Iran (the next member 
of the Axis of Evil) would replace Iraq as the next terror-sponsoring state, as it linked 
Tehran to the major threats in the Middle East; Tehran’s nuclear program, terrorism 
(due to Iran’s support to Hamas and Hezbollah) and regional influence in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian Territories.169 Condoleezza Rice 
described Iran as “the single most important, single-country challenge… to US 
interests in the Middle East and to the kind of Middle East that we want to see.”170 
But Bush had limited options on Iran. He could not use the military option due to fear 
of Iran’s retaliation by closing the Strait of Hormuz,171 as Iran had the ability to 
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impede shipping through the vital Strait of Hormuz, through which 14 million barrels 
of oil (a fifth of total global production, or 43% of total global exports) pass every 
day, making it “the world’s most important oil checkpoint” according to the US 
Department of Energy.172 Regime change was not a realistic option, either, as there 
was no substantial opposition group in Tehran to receive Washington’s support.173 On 
the diplomatic side, Bush needed Tehran’s cooperation to stabilize Iraq, where 
Tehran’s influence in Baghdad has increased after the invasion.174 On a wider global 
level, Iran used its energy resources to spread its influence and gain the friendship of 
US rivals like Russia and China,175 and US allies like India, Pakistan,176 Turkey,177 
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Malaysia,178 and some European countries.179 Had Washington’s power not been 
consumed by Iraq, the Bush Administration could have had more influence over Iran. 
(Similarly, Sudan, another state on Washington’s terror list, is using Chinese 
investments in Sudan’s oil sector to evade Washington’s sanctions and influence).180 
 
Another consequence of the failure in Iraq was the Bush Administration’s increased 
dependence Saudi energy and strategic support.181 Saudi Arabia is no longer the 
number one supplier of US oil imports,182 but it is still the most important ally in the 
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Gulf region (due to strategic assistance and its role as oil’s “swing producer”). But 
again, Russian and Chinese influence in Saudi Arabia was rising, as Moscow was 
increasingly selling arms to Riyadh,183  and as Saudi Arabia was supplying China 
with 17% of its imported oil needs, making it China’s largest foreign oil supplier.184 
Even after the invasion of Iraq and the US troop withdrawal from the kingdom, S
Arabia still has a potential for instability. In May 2003, a terrorist bomb struck a 
foreign workers compound in Riyadh, killing many. The US completed the 
withdrawal of its troops from Saudi Arabia in August 2003, but this did not ease the 
situation, as another bomb struck Riyadh in November 2003. In late May 2004, a 
group affiliated to al-Qaeda attacked the Al-Waha business compound in Khobar, 
killing 22 people, wounding 25, and taking hostages. The hostages were released after 
a Saudi security offensive. Furthermore, several terrorist attacks on oil facilities in the 
Kingdom were foiled in 2005 and 2006, causing more concern about the safety of 
Saudi Arabia and its oil resources.
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185 Moreover, Riyadh was not very eager to raise 
oil production as much as the Bush Administration wanted in January and May 200
 
the United States, after Canada, Mexico and Nigeria. The fifth largest is Venezuela, and the sixth is 
Iraq (“Decline in American oil imports”, Al Jazeera, April 9, 2010 [accessed April 9, 2010] 
http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/33D177BA-C531-4A09-B162-DA92986F309C.htm).  
183 Ed Blanche, “Claws of the bear,” The Middle East, April 2007: 6-10. 
184 Eamonn Gearon. “Red Star in the Morning, Business Warming”, The Middle East, July 2006: 26 
and Jad Mouawwad, “China’s growth shifts the geopolitics of oil”, New York Times, March 19, 2010 
[accessed March 19, 2010] http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/20/business/energy-
environment/20saudi.html?th&emc=th. 
185 The Saudi oil installations, too, are threatened by terrorist attacks. In late February 2006, for 
instance, the Saudi authorities foiled a plot by al Qaeda to bomb the world’s largest oil processing plant 
at Abqaiq, which handles about two-thirds of Saudi Arabia’s oil production. Al Qaeda advised 
followers to attack oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia, but not the oil wells, since al Qaeda would 
need the oil revenues if they took over the country. (Ghaida Ghantous. “Saudi Qaeda ideologue sets 
rules for oil wars,” Yahoo News, March 2, 2006, [accessed March 2, 2006] 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060302/ts_nm/energy_saudi_qaeda_dc.) Furthermore, in April 2007, 
the Saudis foiled a plot to carry out air attacks on oil installations and military bases, arresting 172 
suspects linked to the plot. (“Saudis foil air attack plotters,” BBC News, April 27, 2007, [accessed April 
27, 2007] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6599963.stm, and “Saudi Arabia confirms 
continued threat of al Qaeda”, Al Jazeera, April 28, 2007, [accessed June 21, 2008] 
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=1042539.) Interior Ministry spokesman 
General Mansur al Turki said that some of the suspects were sent to other countries to study aviation to 
carry out attacks on oil installations and refineries (ibid).  
242 
 
when global oil prices were escalating to record highs,186 and Riyadh continued to 
reject foreign investment in the Saudi upstream oil sector.187 During the period 
between 1999 and 2009, total oil production in the Persian Gulf states still averaged 
around 20 mbpd,188 showing no sign of rising to 44.5 mbpd by 2020, as the NEP of 
May 2001 desired.189 Had Bush succeeded in reshaping Iraq to replace Saudi Arabia 
as the main ally and oil source in the region, he would not have faced these 
difficulties in Riyadh.  
 
The Bush Administration tried to use the Arab-Israeli peace process as a way to rally 
Arab support to counter Iran (in addition to arms sales to the Gulf states in 2007). 
Again, Bush depended mainly on Saudi (not Iraqi) support in the Arab-Israeli peace 
process. The Annapolis summit of November 2007 promised Arab-Israeli peace and a 
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Palestinian state before Bush left office, but such promises were not met, as the Bush 
Administration had no serious policy to follow-up on these promises. 
 
 
THE TRAGEDY OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE: 
 
Bush was a follower of the Open Door Policy, where he used over-exaggerated threats 
to justify military intervention in Iraq to promote America’s strategic, economic and 
corporate interests. According to Williams, an American foreign policy based on the 
Open Door Policy could have hazardous effects on US interests, causing a “tragedy of 
American diplomacy,” where America’s policies in the quest for economic openness, 
(policies which are usually made by an elite few without accountability, and which 
usually involve the betrayal of America’s own democratic and human rights values) 
could lead to the rise of nationalist, anti-American movements frustrated with 
America’s interference in their national affairs and economic benefit.190 Kolko 
agreed, arguing that by dragging the US into such dangerous conflicts, US foreign
policy would always be in “perpetual crisis”, as the “traditional US solutions to g
problems will be increasingly futile” in the face of “the uncontrollable nature of the 
international situation.”
 
lobal 
                                                
191 (Indeed, Ikenberry argued that Bush’s neo-imperial agenda 
to invade Iraq would lead to imperial overstretch,192 which would be discussed in the 
conclusion of this thesis). Such was the tragedy of the Bush Doctrine. Bush’s invasion 
of Iraq was planned by elite neo-conservative groups and oil industry members, who 
presented the public with false information on an over-exaggerated Iraqi threat 
without accountability, thus betraying the US principles of transparency at home, and 
 
190 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: passim. 
191 Kolko, Main Currents in Modern American History: 243-244, 349.  
192 G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2002. 
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international law and human rights abroad. The invasion therefore led to more anti-
American feelings and the rise of more anti-American militant groups. The cost of the 
war and its financial strain was also a factor in the decline of US power.  
 
The Bush Doctrine was different from George H. W. Bush’s New World Order and 
from William J. Clinton’s Engagement and Enlargement because while the 
democratisation goals of the New World Order and Engagement and Enlargement 
were limited and restrained by the need for Middle East oil, the Bush Doctrine stated 
that democratisation would take place despite the need for Middle East oil, and that 
democratisation would actually stabilise the region. In other words, the New World 
Order and Engagement and Enlargement were limited by what could be called the 
“Democracy Conundrum”; the contradiction between American calls for 
democratisation and American support of the non-democratic regimes of its allies.193 
Unlike the New World Order and Engagement and Enlargement doctrines, the Bush 
Doctrine tried to surpass and defeat the Democracy Conundrum by invading Iraq and 
imposing democracy on it, thus hoping to start a democratic dominos effect in the 
region and reshape the region in America’s favour.  
 
However, the Bush Doctrine has failed in several ways. First, it depended too much 
on success in Iraq. When intervention in Iraq failed, the Bush Doctrine (and its plans 
for democratisation) collapsed with it. Second, the Bush Doctrine could not defeat the 
Democracy Conundrum, as the failure in Iraq forced the Bush Administration to 
continue supporting undemocratic regimes in the Middle East in return for oil and 
                                                 
193 Pinto, Political Islam and the United States: x. The matter is often resolved by arguing that Islamic 
societies are resistant to democratization either because of antagonistic values or because they have not 
attained the kind of economic and social development that allowed democracy to emerge in the West 
(ibid). 
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strategic cooperation. Third, Iraq’s oil became one of the financial sources of different 
anti-American Iraqi militias, whether Sunnis, Shiites or groups affiliated to al Qaeda. 
The threat of global terrorism has increased after the war on Iraq, due to the failure of 
democratisation, the establishment of the invasion of Iraq as a cause celebre for 
terrorists, and the effect of the Iraq war in diverting Western efforts away from 
fighting terrorism.194 William Appleman Williams would have called this increase in 
anti-Americanism as a result of the invasion of Iraq a “tragedy.” 
 
Due to the lack of political stability, rule of law, and basic security in Iraq, the US oil 
companies are struggling to get the “big shot” that they expected. And, even in 2010, 
we are still waiting for the “lots of money” from the Iraqi oil sector to pay for the 
reconstruction of Iraq, which would, according to neo-conservative hopes, give it the 
strong economy needed to turn it into a stable, pro-American democratic model, as 
advocated by the Bush Doctrine’s democratisation drive to fight terrorism. In fact, by 
the time of the Republican losses in the Congressional elections of November 2006, 
Bush effectively abandoned the “freedom agenda,” had no functioning foreign policy 
doctrine, and followed a haphazard foreign policy.195 This haphazard, ad hoc policy 
would be reflected in the decline of US power and the Bush Administration’s lack of 
real solutions to this decline. 
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CONCLUSION: 
OVERSTRETCH, DECLINE OF ENERGY SECURITY AND 
THE FALL OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 
 
 
BUSH, THE OPEN DOOR AND OIL CAPITALISM: 
 
“You and your predecessors in the oil and gas industry played a large role in making 
the twentieth century the ‘American Century’.” 
Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, remarks before 
the American Petroleum Institute, Texas, June 2002.1 
 
The concept of US imperialism is far from new. But the policies of the Bush 
Administration confirmed Williams’ and Kolko’s writings on an informal American 
empire based on the Open Door policy, deploying the US military to protect 
America’s economic and corporate interests, maintain open global business for the 
advancement of the political economy of the large corporation, and protect US access 
to global energy resources.2 This has been seen as America’s military involvement in 
the world increased after the September 11 attacks to make up for relative economic 
decline, to pursue the renewed Open Door policy, and to protect oil-rich regions in the 
                                                 
1 Klare, Blood and Oil: 10.  
2 Bacevich, American Empire: 11-31, Bacevich, “Tragedy renewed” and Thomas McCormick “What 
would William Appleman Williams say now?” 
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Middle East and Central Asia,3 and as Washington (especially under the Bush 
Administration) replaced access to Asian (and Chinese) markets with access to 
Persian Gulf oil through building military bases in and around Afghanistan and Iraq:    
 
Call it variations on a theme. Instead of access to Asian 
markets, access to Persian Gulf oil had become the 
main issue. The Open Door Notes of 1899-1900 found 
their functional equivalent in the Carter Doctrine [of] 
1980. In place of China, US policymakers [under 
George W. Bush] were soon to fixate on Iraq.4 
 
George W. Bush distinguished himself from previous administrations by giving 
special attention to energy resources from his first days in office. Bush sought the 
foreign policy strands of US military enhancement and global power projection at the 
same time that he endorsed the energy strand, with a strategy that sought increased 
US dependence on oil from unstable regions. Although arising from different sets of 
concerns - one energy-driven, the other security/military driven – “these two strategic 
principles have merged into a single, integrated design for American world 
dominance in the 21st Century”5 (or, as the NSC document discussed by Jane Mayer 
would say, these two priorities were “melded.”)6 Bush used the September 11 attacks 
(which raised the strand of anti-terrorism) as an “opportunity” to advance this agenda 
and take the Carter Doctrine to another level; invading Afghanistan (thus establishing 
US bases in Central Asia for the first time) and Iraq (hoping to strengthen US position 
in the Gulf) to secure energy routes and supplies. The September 11 attacks thus 
                                                 
3 Fouskas and Gökay, The New American Imperialism: 28, 71, 72, 135, 136, 321, Bacevich, “Tragedy 
renewed.  and McCormick, “What would William Appleman Williams say now?” 
4 Bacevich, “Tragedy renewed.”  
5 Bromley, American Power: 101-102.  
6 Klare, Blood and Oil: 70, Jane Mayer. “Contract Sport: What did the Vice-President do for 
Halliburton?”, The New Yorker, February 16, 2004, [accessed May 17, 2007] http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/executive/form?_index=exec_en.html&_lang=en&ut=3361601930 and Jane Mayer, “Jane 
Mayer on her article in The New Yorker about Dick Cheney’s relationship with Halliburton”, February 
19, 2004, web.lexis-nexis.com/executive/form?_index=exec_en.html&_lang=en&ut=3361601930 . 
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facilitated Bush’s geopolitical, corporate, military, and economic agendas.7 Had 
William Appleman Williams been alive, he would have stressed the centrality of US 
control of global oil resources (especially Middle East oil) to maintain US global 
domination over supplies to Europe and Asia, citing Iraq as an example of deploying 
US military in order to secure the Open Door for US participation in Iraq’s oil and 
banking enterprises as a form of “pell-mell privatisation,” in addition to citing the 
importance of the dollar-euro competition in the international oil market.8 
 
Bush was indeed committed to the Open Door model, which “found a new lease on 
life in the Long War [the War on Terror]” as it pursued the interests of US 
corporations,9 especially the “petro-military complex,” which is particularly powerful 
under George W. Bush, as it sought to expand with the US imperial order.10 The no-
bid contracts to favoured corporations showed that “crony capitalism” went hand in 
hand with US empire-building under the Bush Administration,11 and the Bush 
Agenda of promoting corporate globalisation (especially in the field of oil) throu
war showed that military and economic interests went hand in hand to further 
America’s interests, especially in expanding US corporate access to the Middle 
East.
gh 
italism”:  
                                                
12 US military dominance is thus linked to “oil cap
 
The United States is using its military power to fashion 
a geopolitical order that provides the political 
underpinning for its preferred model of the world 
economy: that is, a relatively open, liberal international 
order. US policy has aimed at creating an oil industry 
 
7 Burbach and Tarbell, Imperial Overstretch: 15. 
8 McCormick, “What would William Appleman Williams say now?” 
9 Burbach and Tarbell, Imperial Overstretch: 202, Bacevich, “Tragedy renewed” and McCormick 
“What would William Appleman Williams say now?”. 
10 Burbach and Tarbell, Imperial Overstretch: 16, 17, 51, 199, 200. 
11 Burbach and Tarbell, Imperial Overstretch: 173 and 200. 
12 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 276. 
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in which markets, dominated by large multinational 
firms, allocate capital and commodities. State power is 
deployed not just to protect present and future 
consumption needs of the United States and the profits 
of US ‘oil capitalism’, but also to guarantee the general 
preconditions for a world oil market. So, to the 
[considerable] extent that the openness and stability of 
the international oil market are premised on American 
geopolitical and military commitments… the military 
power and geopolitical influence of the United States 
provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
stable operation of the international oil market. This 
system has, of course, been designed for US interests.13  
 
 
The role of the military in maintaining US control of global energy resources was 
especially evident under the Bush Administration and its plans for Iraq. However, 
Bush failed to shape Iraq in America’s image. This failure had consequences beyond 
the Middle East, according to Zbigniew Brzezinksi: “Beyond destabilizing the Middle 
East, the Iraq war had a further, much more important consequence. It made the 
success or failure of US policy in the Middle East the test case of American global 
leadership.”14 This “test case” failed to bring democracy to Iraq or to the region, and 
the main aim of Washington in Iraq now is stability, which now looks fragile and 
sensitive to any disturbance or violence in the country. 
 
Nevertheless, in pursuing the energy strand, Bush prioritised preponderance and 
empire over economic and energy interests in cases where both goals conflicted. This 
was evident in the fact that Bush never allowed US oil investments in anti-American 
rogue states like Iran, Sudan, Libya (before 2003-4) and Cuba15 despite pressures 
                                                 
13 Bromley, American Power: 142.  
14 Brzezinski, Second Chance: 159.  
15 A US Geological Survey report published in 2005 estimated that 4.6 billion barrels of oil and 9.8 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas could lie within that zone. Canadian firm Sherritt, India’s ONGC and 
Norway’s Norsk Hydro already have investments in this region. In the summer of 2006, Republicans 
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from the oil lobby. Thus, (despite the strong link between the national interest, 
economic interests and energy interests), the national interest had priority over 
economic interests in case of conflict, showing that Bush’s priority was a 
preponderance of power.  
 
Beyond Iraq, Bush’s quest for a global empire was primarily centred on redrawing the 
map of the vast region extending from the Caucasus of Europe to central and south-
western Asia, including the Persian Gulf, North Africa and the Middle East, 
projecting massive military power in this region.16 He also endeavoured to remake the 
societies and politics of Muslim states in America’s image, in order to spread the neo-
liberal model and promote the Open Door for US investments.17 Bush believed that 
he had the mission of spreading freedom and democracy in “the darkest corners of ou
world,” and, according to Bacevich, “the world’s darkest corners coincided with the 
furthest reaches of the Islamic world, which, not coincidently, contained the world’s 
most significant reserves of fossil fuels.”
r 
                                                                                                                                           
18  
 
The democratization project failed. Due to the instability and corruption in Iraq, Iraq’s 
oil sector failed to help Iraq develop economically or democratically, to act as a 
model for other Islamic states to reshape their democratic systems and liberalize their 
economies for US investment. Bush’s implementation of the Open Door policy by 
 
Jeff Flake and Larry Craig introduced bills to the US House of Representatives to exempt US oil firms 
from the sanctions on Cuba and allow investment in the region, saying that “Our policy does not serve 
our energy needs, environmental concerns, or economic principles.” Two Florida Democrats, Senator 
Bill Nelson and Congressman Jim Davis, opposed this call to exempt US oil firms, citing 
environmental concerns over possible deep-water oil spills, and the threat to the tourism industry in 
Florida. The Cuban-American lobby also pressed to maintain the sanctions on Cuba (Laura Smith-
Spark, “Cuba oil prospects cloud US horizon”, BBC News, September 11, 2006 [accessed September 
12, 2006] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/Americas/5321594.stm) 
16 Burbach and Tarbell, Imperial Overstretch: 201. 
17 Burbach and Tarbell, Imperial Overstretch: 202. 
18 Bacevich, “Tragedy renewed.” 
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invading Iraq went wrong, as his administration presented false justifications for the 
war to the American public and neglected putting a sound postwar plan for the 
management of Iraq, leading to the loss of hearts and minds of the Iraqi people (and 
the Arab and Islamic world). He ignored serious warnings that the invasion would not 
result in democratization, and that the invasion might result in chaos and ethnic 
violence. He also ignored the needs of the Iraqi people and focused on the needs of 
the US corporations. Bush’s corporate globalization agenda was hazardous for the 
Iraqi people. First, Iraqi companies were excluded from the rebuilding operation, even 
though they had the necessary skills, in favour of foreign companies. Iraqi companies 
were hired by US companies, but only as subcontractors, and for short-term projects, 
thus making very little money compared to US companies. Furthermore, US 
contractors did not hire Iraqis in reconstruction jobs; instead, they import workers 
from India, Nepal, Indonesia, since they were cheaper, and the Iraqis were considered 
a security threat. The reconstruction process is not succeeding, because, first, the US 
companies are putting their profits in mind, not the immediate needs of the Iraqi 
people, and, second, the insurgency caused by hatred towards the invaders.19 
Unemployment among Iraqis reached 25-40%.20 This led to more violence and the 
deterioration of the security situation, making international oil companies hesitant to 
invest in Iraq at times, despite their eagerness to invest in Iraq’s oil. 21 
 
                                                 
19 Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: 224, 225, 226, 238, 317, 321 and Richard Seymour, “The Real Cost of the 
Iraq War”, The Middle East, May 2009: 50. 
20 Stiglitz and Blimes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: 142.  
21 Martin Chulov, “Shell wins rights over vast Iraqi oilfield as foreign firms get access”, Guardian, 
December 12, 2009: 38, Patrick Cockburn, “Rush for Iraq’s oil in defiance of bombers”, Independent, 
December 12, 2009: 28, Carola Hoyos, “Shell wins ‘gold rush’ Iraqi oilfields auction”, Financial 
Times, December 12, 2009: 8, “Iraq oil development rights contacts awarded”, BBC News, December 
11, 2009 [accessed December 11, 2009] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8407274.stm, “Lukoil 
wins Iraq oilfield contract”, Al Jazeera English, December 12, 2009 [accessed December 13, 2009] 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/12/2009121294447518191.html, “Oil firms awarded 
Iraq contracts”, Al Jazeera English, December 11, 2009 [accessed December 11, 2009] 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/12/200912117243440687.html. 
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The deteriorating situation in Baghdad absorbed the Bush Adminsitration’s effort and 
made the job of implementing the American agenda in Iraq and the region even 
harder, making Washington less powerful vis-a-vis its challengers (Iran, Russia, and 
China) who were trying to expand their influence in the region.  
 
Furthermore, the United States today is less secure regarding its energy resources. As 
Iraq’s oil resources are still underdeveloped, the Middle East is in turmoil, the War on 
Terror is more difficult to win due to the invasion of Iraq, energy facilities in the 
Middle East and elsewhere are under the constant threat of militant attacks from al 
Qaeda and other groups (or even threatened by war, as in the 2008 war in Georgia), 
and the US is facing tough competition over energy from China and Russia.   
 
 
FAILURE IN IRAQ LEADS BACK TO AD HOC POLICY 
 
“As a nation, America has accepted for too long an ad hoc approach to energy and 
foreign policy.” 
Former Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, 2005.22 
 
 
“For the first time in three decades, energy has become a central problem in foreign 
policy… A foreign policy weakened by oil dependence is a national security 
problem.” 
 
                                                 
22 Bill Richardson, Bill, “Foreword”, in Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn (eds) Energy and 
Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy, (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2005): 
xvii. 
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James Schlesinger and John Deutch, 2006.23 
 
“For too long our nation has been dependent on foreign oil. And this dependence 
leaves us more vulnerable to hostile regimes, and to terrorists – who could cause 
huge disruptions of oil shipments, and to raise the price of oil, and do great harm to 
our economy.” 
George W. Bush, State of the Union speech, January 23, 200724 
 
 
Due to the failure to reshape Iraq, and due to the military quagmire in Iraq, the Bush 
Administration failed to use the invasion as a platform to link the four strands of US 
foreign policy together, or to reshape the region in America’s image. Global terrorism 
has increased due to the invasion of Iraq,25 and the oil sector in Iraq was not reshaped 
according to Washington’s wishes. The quagmire in Iraq also took its economic and 
military toll on Washington, leading to the decline of Washington’s regional and 
global influence, and the empowerment of actors rival to the United States, namely 
Iran, Russia, China and (in the Latin American region) Venezuela.  
 
Bush’s foreign policy meant to secure America’s vital oil supplies, not only in the 
Middle East, but also on a global level through the regional diversification of oil 
                                                 
23 James Schlesinger and John Deutch, “The petroleum deterrence”, Newsweek Issues 2007, December 
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24 George W. Bush, “President Bush delivers State of the Union address”, White House, January 23, 
2007 [accessed January 9, 2008] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070123-2.html 
25 Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, (Washington, D.C.: 
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resources away from the Persian Gulf. One of the alternative regions was Central 
Asia, where the West is unable to make a serious start on the TAP pipeline project, 
due to the swelling insecurity in Afghanistan,26 where the Taliban are still posing a 
serious threat against pro-American interests. The Bush Administration could not pay 
the necessary attention to Afghanistan or Central Asia, as Iraq consumed most of the 
administration’s efforts and attention, and due to the lack of a clear foreign policy 
direction in the Bush Administration. (Ahmad Rashid said that the United States and 
the West still lacked a clear strategic vision for Central Asia, even after the American 
invasion of Afghanistan.27 Former EU envoy to Afghanistan Francesc Vendrell 
agreed, saying in September 2008 that the Bush Administration (and the West in 
general) did not have a coherent plan to stabilize Afghanistan.)28 Even the BTC 
pipeline, inaugurated on May 25, 2005, was not without risk, as it runs through the 
volatile Caucasus and will require constant surveillance to protect it from attack,29 
due to the Chechnyan conflict and the ethnic conflict in the breakaway regions
Georgia,
 of 
                                                
30 as seen during the war in Georgia in 2008. So far, the BTC is the only 
pipeline which the United States has built to cut the Russian monopoly on 
transporting Caspian energy resources.31 Moreover, Caspian oil will not last like 
Middle East oil, since the Caspian contains only 4-5% of global oil reserves,32 
compared to 65% in the Middle East. Wood Mackenzie forecasted that Caspian oil 
 
26 Ed Blanche, “Pipeline politics”, The Middle East, October 2008: 25.  
27 Rashid, “Central Asia”: 118.  
28 “Ex-envoy attacks Afghan strategy”, BBC News, September 9, 2008 [accessed September 9, 2008] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7605869.stm and Paul Reynolds, “Countering the 
Taleban’s 20-year war”, BBC News, September 9, 2008 [accessed September 9, 2008] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7605888.stm 
 
29 “Giant Caspian oil pipeline opens”, BBC News, May 25, 2005 [accessed May 26, 2005] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4577497.stm 
30 Klare, Blood and Oil: 130-131, Stephen Williams, “The paradox of plenty”, The Middle East, April 
2007: 44-47 and Kieran Cooke, “Caspian oil set for fast flow to the West,” BBC News, May 5, 2005 
[accessed May 5, 2008] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4508633.stm.  
31 Owen Matthews, “Russia’s big energy secret,” Newsweek, December 31, 2007: 55.  
32 Blum, “America’s Caspian policy under the Bush Administration”. 
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production might reach a peak of around 2.5-2.8 mbpd by 2015, then decline.33 
Caspian oil is also three or four times more expensive to extract than Middle Eastern 
oil.34 Nor was Washington assured of cooperation from Central Asian states like 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, whose loyalty tend to swing between 
Washington and Moscow.35  
 
Also, with the US military mired in Afghanistan and Iraq, and unwilling to enter a 
military conflict with Russia on its border, the Bush Administration had little options 
to deal with the Russian offensive on Georgia in August 2008, apart from sending 
Condoleezza Rice to Georgia and promising aid.36 This war had repercussions over 
the region’s energy routes, as Georgia was a main transport route for several major oil 
and gas pipelines, including the BTC pipeline, the Baku-Supsa pipeline and the Baku-
Erzurum pipeline (all managed by BP). Before the war, Georgia was championed as a 
reliable country through which pipelines could avoid both Russia and Iran.37 Even 
though the pipelines themselves were not attacked, the claim of Georgia’s reliability 
as an energy transport route was put into doubt by the Russian offensive, since the 
BTC pipeline is only 35 miles from the South Ossetian border. The conflict also 
called into question America’s efforts to diversify its oil supplies away from the 
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Middle East or gain access to more Central Asian energy resources.38 The offensive 
was seen as a part of Russia’s pipeline competition with the West, where Washington 
is promoting oil routes which do not pass through Iran or Russia, like the BTC or 
Nabucco, while Moscow is promoting other pipelines which pass through Russian-
friendly territories, like Nord Stream and South Stream.39  
 
In Latin America, another energy-rich region alternative to the Middle East, Bush’s 
efforts were marked by the failure of the April 2002 coup in Venezuela, (a coup 
partially caused by fears over oil boycotts, fears that Chavez might price his oil in 
euros, and opposition to a new hydrocarbon law which imposed higher royalties on 
US oil companies).40 Chavez used his oil money to improve relations with China,41 
                                                 
38 Ed Blanche, “Oil’s troubled waters”, The Middle East, November 2008: 44, Richard Seymour, “A 
tangled web”, The Middle East, November 2008: 26, “The dangers of the safe route”, The Economist, 
August 16, 2008: 25, Claire Soares, “Battle for oil: EU’s hope to bypass Russian energy may be a pipe 
dream”, Independent, August 12, 2008 [accessed September 12, 2009] 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-battle-for-oil-eursquos-hope-to-bypass-russian-
energy-may-be-a-pipe-dream-891499.html, “Oil prices rise after Turkish pipeline is bombed”, Al 
Jazeera, August 8, 2008 [accessed August 13, 2008] http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/F4347784-
182F-4C18-AC50-3BFD3250AA9B.htm, and  Jad Mouawad, “Conflict narrows oil options for West”, 
New York Times, August 13, 2008 [accessed August 14, 2008] 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/14/world/europe/14oil.html?ref=europe 
39 Daniel Freifeld, “The great pipeline opera”, Foreign Policy, September/October 2009: 123-124, 
“Dead souls”, The Economist, May 17, 2008: 52, “Balkan boost for Russian gas plan,” BBC News, 
January 18, 2008 [accessed January 19, 2008] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7195522.stm, 
Nabucco gas pipeline is approved,” BBC News, June 27, 2006, [accessed June 28, 2008] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5121394.stm, and Vafa Fakhri, “Europe’s pipeline politics”, BBC 
News, June 7, 2009 [accessed June 7, 2009] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8083511.stm, 
“Russian gas pipeline to Germany faces Baltic opposition”, Al Jazeera, October 29, 2007, [accessed 
June 21, 2008] http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=1073179, Tristana Moore 
“Gas pipeline stirs up Baltic fears”, BBC News, December 31, 2007, [accessed May 5, 2008] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7153924.stm. 
40 Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: 137, Nikolas Kozloff. Hugo Chavez: Oil, politics and the challenge to 
the US. (Hampshire:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 25-27, John Perkins, Confessions of an Economic Hit 
Man: The shocking inside story of how America really took over the world. (London: Ebury Press, 
2005): 201, Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: 91-96, Juan Forero, “Documents show CIA knew of a Coup Plot 
in Venezuela”, New York Times, December 3, 2004 [accessed March 2, 2008] 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/03/international/americas/03venezuela.html?ex=1259816400&en=9
3049610b0d32146&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland, Greg Palast “OPEC chief warned Chavez about 
coup”, Guardian, May 13, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/oil/story/0,11319,714504,00.html. 
41 “Energy focus for Chavez in China”, BBC News, August 22, 2006, [accessed August 22, 2006] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5276260.stm, “Venezuela seeks to strengthen economic ties with 
China”, Al Jazeera, August 22, 2006, [accessed June 21, 2008] 
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=336036, “Venezuela signs agreements to 
257 
 
Russia,42 and Iran,43 and spread his socialist, anti-Washington agenda in Latin 
America,44 and has imposed partial nationalization on US oil firms in Venezuela.45 
And even though the Venezuelan economy is heavily dependent on oil exports to the 
US, (where Venezuela supplies between 12-14% of US oil imports,46 or 1.5 mbpd, 
which amounts to approximately 50% of Venezuela’s oil, to the United States47), the 
Bush Administration did consider adding Venezuela to the list of terror-sponsoring 
states in September 2008 (accusing Caracas of supporting FARC in Colombia), but 
decided against it, fearing that it might affect oil imports from Venezuela.48 
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 Even cases like Canada show the limits of US foreign policy, as Canada’s tar sands 
cannot replace Middle East oil, due to the expenses of extracting oil from tar sands, 
and its low EROEI (Energy Return on Energy Invested, which is the ratio of the 
energy spent on extracting a barrel of oil, compared to the energy provided by that 
barrel of oil). The EROEI of Canada’s tar sands is only 1.5 or 3, which is very low 
compared to the average EROEI of Middle East oil, which is 30.49 According to a 
Council on Foreign Relations report on Canadian oil sands in May 2009, Canadian tar 
sands cannot free the United States from its dependence on Middle East oil.50 
Therefore, Canada’s tar sands, despite the billions of barrels in reserves, will never be 
a panacea for US energy needs.51    
 
There were small success stories in Bush’s foreign policy. One example was Libya, 
who possesses the largest oil reserves in Africa (the ninth largest in the world), close 
to 39 billion barrels, or 3% of the world’s oil reserves. It is Africa’s third largest oil 
producer (after Nigeria and Angola) where the oil and gas industry contributes to 70% 
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of Libya’s GDP,52 where Libyan oil has a production cost of only $1 a barrel. 
Moreover, most Libyan oil is low sulphur, sweet crude, making it easy to refine. 
Libya’s coming in from the Cold in December 2003, and allowing in US energy 
investments after decades of sanctions,53 was a rare and small success for Bush, but it 
was mostly due to the decade of economic sanctions, not due to the invasion of Iraq.54 
Also, Bush’s relatively successful visit to Africa in March 2008 managed to improve 
relations with oil-rich African regions.55 However, despite providing as much foreign 
oil to the US as the Persian Gulf, (indeed, 2005, the United States imported more oil 
from Africa than from the Middle East, and it imported more oil from the Gulf of 
Guinea than it did from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait combined56), Africa would not be a 
reliable oil supplier in the long run, as it suffers from instability and corruption, and 
its resources are not as massive as the Persian Gulf’s.57 
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 Based on these experiences, the US discovered that energy resources outside the 
Middle East were neither sufficient in amount, nor cheap to extract and transport.58 
Even if the non-Middle East regions raised production as the NEP hoped, they would 
still be vulnerable to instability and conflict, just like the Persian Gulf.59 None of 
these alternative regions are safe from instability.60 Thus, regional diversification 
would not avoid dangers and would not decrease dependence on the Persian Gulf,61 
 of 
 
il 
                                                                                                                                           
forcing Washington to return to the Middle East as its main test case for the success
US foreign policy, and as its main source of energy supplies. As Cheney said as CEO
of Halliburton in the fall of 1999, “While many regions of the world offer great o
opportunities, the Middle East with two thirds of the world’s oil and the lowest cost, 
is still where the prize ultimately lies.”62 Also, Sarah Emerson of Energy Security 
Analysis Inc., said in 2002 that “the trouble with diversifying outside the Middle 
East… is that this is not where the oil is.”63 
 
As seen with Iran, Sudan, Canada, Central Asian states and the Gulf States, oil 
producers are using their oil wealth to acquire the friendship of great powers other 
than the United States, most importantly Russia and China, who are competing with 
the US over control of global energy supplies. This has decreased Washington’s 
influence over these oil-producing countries. Also, rising global oil prices in 2007-
 
the world’s oil and gas market, but it will nevertheless continue to be an important source of additional 
supplies to the United States and the world market.” (Michael Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: 
How Scarce Energy is Creating a New World Order. (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008): 148). 
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2008 has increased the incomes and the clout of oil-rich countries with anti-American 
agendas, like Venezuela, Iran and Russia, enforcing them to crack down on 
opposition and/or spend their oil money on anti-American policies.64  
 
Bush has tried to use the War on Terror as a pretext to advance the Bush Agenda of 
global power preponderance and economic/energy preponderance. However, Bush’s 
policies, based on the rhetoric of the War on Terror, failed to advance America’s 
economic/energy preponderance or to enhance Washington’s global influence.  
 
 
 
DECLINE OF US EMPIRE AND ENERGY SECURITY: 
 
“During the past eight years, our energy policy has been directed by the two oil men 
in the White House [Bush and Cheney]. Their failed policy has increased our 
dependence on foreign oil, damaged our economy, and left consumers paying record 
prices at the pump.”  
Nancy Pelosi, August 2008.65 
 
 
 
“This might be the beginning of the end of the American empire.”  
 
Nouriel Roubini, economist, New York University, 
August 2008.66  
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 Beside the failure in Iraq, US power declined due to the recent global financial crisis as 
well. Like Paul Kennedy, Chalmers Johnson has forecasted that the “overstretched 
American empire” will probably first begin to unravel in the economic sphere.67 The 
2008 financial crisis proved them correct. The financial meltdown and the financial 
drain caused by the Iraq and Afghan wars have decreased the pre-eminence of US 
power, costing the US much of its unipolar advantage.68 John Gray wrote that the 
2008 global financial crisis was “more than a financial crisis”; it was a sign of 
“historic, geopolitical shift,” resulting from the financial strain of the Iraq war and an 
American ideology of financial deregulation.69 Like Paul Kennedy, Gray linked the 
fall of empires to a combination of wars and financial problems: 
The fate of empires is very often sealed by the 
interaction of war and debt. That was true of the British 
Empire, whose finances deteriorated from the First 
World War onwards, and of the Soviet Union. Defeat in 
Afghanistan and the economic burden of trying to 
respond to Reagan's technically flawed but politically 
extremely effective Star Wars programme were vital 
factors in triggering the Soviet collapse. Despite its 
insistent exceptionalism, America is no different. The 
Iraq War and the credit bubble have fatally undermined 
America's economic primacy. The US will continue to 
be the world's largest economy for a while longer, but it 
will be the new rising powers that, once the crisis is 
over, buy up what remains intact in the wreckage of 
America's financial system.70  
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Economists Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Blimes agreed that the Iraq war, despite not 
causing the Great Recession of 2008-2009, did contribute to the recession by 
exacerbating the US deficit and helping raise the global oil price. They argued that the 
Iraq war, which, according to their calculations, cost the US economy at least $3 
trillion dollars and helped erode the global leadership of the United States, was the 
most expensive war for the United States since World War II. Since the Iraq war was 
entirely financed by borrowing, mostly from abroad (mainly from China and the Gulf 
states), it helped raise the national deficit and the national debt, (both of which were 
further exacerbated by Bush’s tax cuts). Thus, the Iraq war strained the US economy, 
weakened the US dollar, and diverted money away from domestic projects which may 
have stimulated the US economy (refuting the argument that war is good for the 
economy). Pointing out that global oil prices rose from $25/barrel before the war to 
more than $100/barrel in early 2008, they “conservatively” assumed that the war has 
contributed to this rise in global oil prices by $5 or $10 dollars (although, they said, 
the actual figure may be closer to $35). This raised the cost of US oil imports, and 
helped divert money away from the US economy.71 Analyzing the role of rising oil 
prices in the Great Recession, Stiglitz wrote that:  
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 The burden on monetary policy was increased when oil 
prices started to soar after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
The United States spent hundreds of billions of dollars 
on importing oil – money otherwise would have gone to 
support the US economy. Oil price rose from $32 a 
barrel in March 2003 when the Iraq war began to $137 
per barrel in July 2008. This meant that Americans 
were spending $1.4 billion per day on imported oil (up 
from $292 million per day before the war started), 
instead of spending the money at home.72  
 
Similarly, financial expert Loretta Napoleoni agreed that the costs of the wars of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the fact that they were both funded by external debt 
(through the sale of US treasury bonds to China, Japan and the Gulf states), raised US 
debt and deficit, contributing to the credit crunch and the Great Recession. The fact 
that Greenspan’s Federal Reserve followed a policy of cutting interest rates, partially 
to make treasury bonds (necessary for war funding) more attractive to foreigners, 
encouraged the irresponsible wave of loans and mortgages. The rise in oil prices, too, 
played a role in the credit crunch, as a 1 rise in the price of fuel wipes $1 billion 
from the pockets of US consumers, depriving the nation of extra liquidity that could 
be spent on necessary investments.73 Economist James D. Hamilton focused on the 
effect of oil prices on the Great Recession. As oil prices doubled between June 2007 
and June 2008, he argued that “in addition to housing... oil prices were an important 
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10, 2010] http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/iraq-war-caused-slowdown-in-the-us/story-e6frg6tf-
1111115661208.  
72 Joseph Stiglitz, Freefall: Free markets and the sinking of the global economy. (London: Allen Lane, 
2010): 4. 
73 Loretta Napoleoni, Terrorism and the Economy: How the War on Terror is bankrupting the world. 
(New York: Seven Stories Press, 2010): passim. 
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factor in turning that slowdown into a recession.” In fact, “had there been no increase 
in oil prices between 2007:Q3 and 2008:Q2, the US economy would not have been in 
a recession over the period 2007:Q4 through 2008:Q3.” Due to “an interactive effect 
between the oil price shock and the problems in housing... oil prices indisputably 
made an important contribution to both the initial downturn and the magnitude of the 
problem.” Thus, “the economic downturn of 2007-08 should be added to the list of 
recessions to which oil prices appear to have made a material contribution.”74 
 
Due to the Great Recession, the United States lost its role as the sole engine of growth 
in the global economy, due to the rise of new growth engines, particularly in Asia.75 
Paul Kennedy agreed that “the real threat to US power in the future… is the steady 
rise of Asia and, in particular, China.”76 Economist Nouriel Roubini agreed that 
“recent economic, financial and geopolitical events suggest that the decline of the 
American Empire has started,” citing three factors which “suggest that the US has 
                                                 
74 James D. Hamilton, “Oil prices and the economic recession of 2007-08”, Vox, June 16, 2009 
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Jeffrey Garten of the Yale School of Management agrees that economic recovery in the US cannot be 
strong enough to be the locomotive for global recovery, and that if any country can accomplish that, it 
would have to be China where growth is more than 7% (Jefrey E. Garten, “America still rules: Why the 
United States will come out of the crisis on top”, Newsweek, August 3, 2009: 28.) This is especially 
true, as Asian economies are not as tied to US economic performance as they once were, as their 
economies are more driven by domestic factors such as manufacturing, and their global trade has 
declined.( “An astonishing rebound”, The Economist, August 15, 2009: 10, “On the rebound” , The 
Economist, August 15, 2009: 557 - 59). Indeed, Patrick Low, head of the Development and Economic 
Research Division of the WTO, forecasted that Asia would emerge stronger from the global economic 
crisis, and that the crisis has “changed the world.”( “The crisis plays in Asia’s favour”, Al Jazeera, 
August 10, 2009 [accessed August 10, 2009] http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/50D16133-CB60-
49C7-9CDF-B1E7C0864557.htm). Indeed, the crisis has reinforced the shift of economic power from 
east to west, as Asia’s emerging economies lead the global economic recovery since they grew at an 
average of 10% in 2009 while the US GDP fell by 1%.(“On the rebound”: 57, 59, and Jonathan Lynn 
and Kazunori Takada, “World trade to shrink 10 percent, Asia leads recovery: WTO”, Reuters, July 22, 
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squandered its unipolar moment”; excessive reliance on hard military power in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the rise of the BRIC countries, the EU, South Africa and Iran as 
economic rivals and/or regional powers, and most importantly, the fact that “the US 
squandered its economic and financial power by running reckless economic policies, 
especially in its twin fiscal and current account deficits.” This twin deficit, financed 
by strategic rivals like Russia and China, or “unstable petro-states” like Saudi Arabia 
and Gulf States,77 led to a “balance of financial terror,” since these creditors could 
“pull the plug” and sell US debts in mass, leading to the collapse of the US dollar. 
And even though it was unlikely that these creditors would “pull the plug” (since they 
themselves would suffer huge losses by such a move), it would still be risky for 
Washington to depend on them to finance its twin deficit.78  
 
George Soros agreed that the invasion of Iraq and Bush’s policies have decreased US 
global power and contributed to the rise in oil prices and the weakness of the US 
dollar in 2008-2009:   
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The United States during the Bush Administration 
failed to exercise proper political leadership. As a 
result the United States has suffered a precipitous 
decline in its power and influence in the world. The 
invasion of Iraq has much to do with the rise in the 
price of oil and the unwillingness of the rest of the 
world to hold dollars. A recession in the United States 
and the resilience of China, India and the oil-producing 
countries will reinforce the decline in the power and 
influence of the United States... The decline of the 
dollar as the generally accepted reserve currency will 
have far-reaching political consequences and raise the 
spectre of a breakdown in the prevailing world order.79  
 
On the global level, Paul Kennedy agreed that Krauthammer’s “unipolar moment” 
was over, as US power declined due to “inconsiderate and sometimes arrogant 
diplomacy, an obsession with the War on Terror, and reckless fiscal policies,” (This 
decline was evident in Washington’s passive reaction to the Russian offensive on 
Georgia in August 2008).80 Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign 
Relations, agreed that “what some dubbed the ‘unipolar moment’ is history.”81 
Therefore, argued Charles Kupchan, managing the competition with rising powers 
will be a greater challenge than terrorism,82 as Asia and the EU rise, challenging US 
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unilateralism and turning the world to multilateralism,83 (in addition to the emergence 
of the euro as a rival to the US dollar.)84   
 
“The US will remain the pre-eminent power, but… American dominance will be 
much diminished,” forecasted Thomas Fingar, the US intelligence community’s top 
analyst, in September 2008. America’s influence was diminishing as economic 
powerhouses such as China assert themselves on the global stage. Washington would 
no longer be in a position to dictate what the global structures would look like. Nor 
would any other country, but the world would shift to a less US-centric system.85 
According to Global Trends 2025, a report prepared by the National Intelligence 
Council (NIC) in November 2008, the US would suffer “relative” decline in economic 
and military power over the next period: 
 
The United States will have greater impact on how the 
international system evolves over the next 15-20 years 
than any other international actor, but it will have less 
power in a multipolar world than it has enjoyed for 
many decades. Owing to the relative decline of its 
economic, and to a lesser extent, military power, the US 
will no longer have the same flexibility in choosing 
among as many policy options. We believe that US 
interest and willingness to play a leadership role also 
may be constrained as the economic, military and 
opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are 
reassessed by American voters. Economic and 
opportunity costs in particular may cause the US public 
to favour new tradeoffs. 86 
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The Global Trends 2025 report paid special attention to energy supplies and other raw 
material, as it considered “energy scarcity as a driving factor in geopolitics,”87 since   
 “continued global growth – coupled with 1.2 billion more people by 2025 – will put 
pressure on energy, food and water resources”:88  
 
Resource issues will gain prominence on the 
international agenda. Unprecedented global 
economic growth — positive in so many other regards 
— will continue to put pressure on a number of 
highly strategic resources, including energy, food, 
and water, and demand is projected to outstrip easily 
available supplies over the next decade or so. For 
example, non-OPEC liquid hydrocarbon production 
—crude oil, natural gas liquids, and unconventionals 
such as tar sands — will not grow commensurate with 
demand.89   
 
Energy security would also become a major issue as India, China and other countries 
join the United States in seeking oil, gas and other energy sources. And since China 
and Europe receive a large portion of their energy supplies from Iran, US options on 
Iran would be limited. “So the turn-the-spigot-off kind of thing, even if we could do 
it, would be counter-productive,” said Fingar.90 Also, Russia would continue to use 
energy as a tool of coercion and influence, al Qaeda and other terrorist groups would 
continue to target Persian Gulf oil facilities, and ethnic conflict in oil producing 
regions would continue,91 especially that oil countries currently host about a third of 
the world’s civil wars, up from one fifth in 1992.92 Therefore, market forces would 
not be the only solution to the energy situation:  
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 Unlike earlier periods when resource scarcities loomed 
large, the significant growth in demand from emerging 
markets, combined with constraints on new production 
- such as the control exerted now by state-run 
companies in the global energy market – limits the 
likelihood that market forces alone will rectify the 
supply-and-demand imbalance.93  
 
On the other hand, the current talk about the replacement of US power by Asian 
power may be premature. Roubini acknowledged that the erosion of the US empire 
would not occur overnight, and that it would take “a couple of decades.”94 
Furthermore, despite its economic rise, Asia is not ready yet to assume economic 
leadership.95 Therefore, it would be too simplistic and premature to assume that the 
US will lose its power in the short-term, since, despite the signs that the “unipolar 
moment” is over, and signs that other powers will rise to challenge US power, the US 
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will remain the world’s most powerful nation for at least a few years to come, and the 
decline of the US empire will take a decade or two.  
 
It would also be premature to think that the Bush’s corporate globalization agenda 
will simply disappear because Bush left office, since this agenda actually predates 
him, being the work of a group of powerful politicians supported by the world’s most 
powerful corporations.96 Under the Obama Administration, the United States is still 
seeking to maintain and expand its military bases in the Middle East, Central Asia, the 
Far East, Africa and Latin America.97 In 2009, US Army Chief of Staff General 
George Casey said that plans were drawn up in case American fighting forces had to 
remain in Iraq for another decade, despite the written agreement with Baghdad to pull 
all troops out by the end of 2011.98 Richard Haass said that in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the US “is counting on Iraqis and Afghans to do more so that Americans can do less, 
but in neither country is it obvious, or even likely, that this will turn out to be the 
case,” making it likely that US troops would stay.99 Obama’s visit to Africa in July 
2009 and his support to the Africom force (at a time when US imports from Africa are 
increasing) marked the expansion of the “empire of bases” near Africa’s oil riches.100 
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His deal with Bogotá to use Colombia’s military bases, too, show the expansion of the 
empire of bases near Latin America’s oil riches.101  
Obama has repeatedly said that climate change and dependence on foreign oil were 
threats to America’s economic and national security, proposing alternative energy as a 
solution to these two threats. In a speech in August 2008, Obama pledged to decrease 
addiction to foreign oil, describing it as “one of the most dangerous and urgent threats 
this nation has ever faced” and pledging to eliminate the need for oil from the Middle 
East and Venezuela within 10 years by developing alternative sources of energy and 
encouraging conservation.102 During the 2008 presidential campaign, he initially 
opposed reversing a 27-year old ban on offshore drilling in the United States, (while 
President Bush and John McCain supported lifting the ban). But he later reversed his 
position saying that this shift in position was a necessary compromise with the 
Republicans to achieve his broader goals of energy independence and moderate 
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prices.103  Like Bush, he addressed the problem of energy during his first week in 
office, linking it to national security and the threat of terrorism. Furthermore, 
renewable energy/green technology (along with other similarly strategic industrial 
sectors like health care, broadband and infrastructure) are the main focus of Obama’s 
strategy in dealing with the recent economic crisis and the decline in America’s global 
standing; a strategy which Obama calls the “new energy economy.”104 He repeatedly 
vowed to spend $150 billion on green technology to stimulate jobs and conserve 
energy.105 On February 17, 2009, Obama signed into law the American Recovery and 
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Reinvestment Act, a $790-billion stimulus bill which included $60 billion to be spent 
on clean energy, scientific research, setting new fuel efficiency standards, address 
greenhouse gas emissions.106  In June 2009, under Obama’s support, the House of 
Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 to 
reduce gas emissions. Obama called it a “jobs bill” that would transform the US 
economy.107 However, critics argue that although the green technology sector does 
help create jobs, it would not be sufficient to create jobs and stimulate growth on the 
desired level.108 Furthermore, green technology is unlikely to significantly decrease 
dependence on oil, especially Middle East oil, any time soon. Therefore, Middle East 
oil will still remain America’s main source of energy for a long time.109  
*** 
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Bush brought oil to the fore along with other aspects of US foreign policy, and the 
failure to secure the oil resources of Iraq has led to unprecedented failure in Bush’s 
overall foreign policy. Before Bush came to office, energy has always been a vital 
part of the informal Open Door American empire, but Washington dealt with energy 
resources on an ad hoc basis. Bush elevated the level of energy in US foreign policy, 
as seen in the NEP of May 2001, and he tried to solve America’s energy problems, 
reshape the Middle East and establish a renewed American empire by invading Iraq. 
This was a part of the Open Door policy which Bush tried to implement. However, 
the application of the Open Door failed in Iraq, as Bush stuck to false claims over an 
Iraqi threat which did not exist, and to assumptions over an Iraq which would be 
intact after the invasion. He presented false claims over Saddam’s danger to the 
American public, and he rejected voices inside his own government which tried to 
warn him of his mistaken assumptions over the conduct of the invasion. When Bush 
failed to remake Iraq into a model for the Islamic world, his foreign policy vision 
collapsed as it was too dependent on Iraq. Also, the invasion (and the consequent 
violence and chaos in Iraq) led to the rise of more anti-Americanism, instead of 
turning the Middle East into a pro-American region, resulting in the rise of terrorism 
and militant assaults on American and Western interests in the region. The issue at 
stake was not just the security of oil resources, but also the stability of the US 
position in the Middle East, the Caspian, Latin America, Africa, and other regions in 
the world. Thus, the Bush Administration failed to advance its foreign policy agenda, 
failed to make the world a safer place for the United States, and failed to improve the 
energy security of the United States.  
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According to military historian Victor Davis Hanson, Bush had a “propensity to be 
idealistic and see that democracy is the innate right of mankind”, while Cheney, on 
the other hand, did not share this zeal for democratization, as his reasoning was more 
“Kissingerian”, weighing cost and benefit, balance of power, the marshalling of 
resources for national gain.110 McCrisken added that Bush suffered from solipsism; a 
belief that he was the world, or that nothing existed except the reality as he saw it. 
When combined with a high degree of self belief and moral superiority, this solipsism 
led to a degree of detachment from reality which prevented him from seeing things as 
they were.111 In the words of Jacob Weisberg, Bush suffered from a degree of “wilful 
self-delusion” which manifested itself when he insisted that his policy on Iraq was a 
success even as it was falling apart.112  
 
(Even after Bush left office, the US cannot walk away from the fact that it is less 
energy secure than it was when Bush took office, and Obama is not rejecting all of 
Bush’s policies, as he is still pursuing an empire of bases around energy-producing 
regions, although Obama is different in that he is paying more attention to green 
technology as an economic and security strategy). 
                                                 
110 Gellman, Angler: 239, 250-251. 
111 Trevor B. McCrisken, “George W. Bush, American exceptionalism and the Iraq war”, in David 
Ryan and Patrick Kiely (eds), America and Iraq: Policy-Making, Intervention and Regional Politics 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2009): 191. 
112 Weisberg, The Bush Tragedy: 240. 
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